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After the Mideast War

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JULY-AUGUST 95c.

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COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

Irving Howe and Stanley Plastrik

After the Mideast War

At one point, shortly before war broke out in the Mideast, it seemed that the very survival of Israel was at stake. To say this was not merely an emotional reaction, though emotion was certainly and legitimately involved. Nasser had blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba and grouped 100,000 soldiers in Sinai, as an announced preliminary to a holy war aimed at the extinction of Israel. The Syrians were steadily shelling border *kibbutzim*. The Russians were goading the Arabs toward a show of assault. The Western powers were preparing to agree upon a resolution defending maritime rights, the exact import of which in respect to Aqaba was not clear. And the UN, unable to be more than a resultant of the conflicts among the major powers, proved ineffectual.

To the Arab leaders it seemed that the time was at hand finally to destroy Israel. They were laden down with Russian arms; they had improved their armies; and they counted, perhaps rightly, upon the likelihood that the Western powers (especially in view of de Gaulle's newly-proclaimed neutrality) would not seriously impede their effort to put the squeeze on Israel.

In these circumstances, our first reaction was concern for the survival of Israel. We are not Zionists; or Jewish nationalists; or by any means uncritical of the state of Israel. But we believe that the destruction of Israel, coming after the holocaust of this century, would be intolerable. For it is a simple fact of geography that in a war an Israeli victory would not threaten the survival of Egypt or Syria while an Arab victory could easily signify the end of Israel. And that is why, at the moment of crisis in early June, we hoped that the United States would take a stand in behalf of Israeli sovereignty and her right to innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba (an issue important less in its own right than as a preparation for the show-down the Arab states were threatening). This did not mean U.S. military intervention in the Mideast, something that Israelis neither wanted nor asked for. And in fact there was no possibility whatever that the U.S. would act in behalf of Eshkol with the force it had employed in behalf of Ky. The only issue at that moment was whether the

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Western powers—no doubt to their moral dismay and eloquent regret—would accept a slow strangulation of Israel which could lead to its demise.

The Israelis decided to act alone. Such decision can never be accepted easily, if only because national survival is a slogan too often used to cover up national aggrandizement. Yet the frequency of past misuse is not, in any particular case, a sufficient argument against its relevance. Nor was Israel, with all its numerous faults, in our eyes merely another "small nation." For some of us, whom only an accident of geography kept from ending as bars of soap, the spectacle of Israel's development as a modern and democratic society, created in large part by survivors of the holocaust, was profoundly stirring. We were moved by the sight of an entire people, acting through the closest equivalent contemporary history offers of a citizens' army, rushing to defend their right to existence. Perhaps the experience of Israel may be of use to those who wonder why injections of "revolutionary" rhetoric—even the dispatch of John P. Roche to help write a constitution!—does not inspire the people of Vietnam to fight for Marshall Ky.

It would be foolhardy, in the middle of June, to pretend to a complete perspective on what has happened, but a few tentative conclusions may be ventured.

1) We support the survival of Israel as a people, but that in no way signifies acquiescence in the "tough" and chauvinist outcries that have emerged among certain Israeli political and military leaders. On the contrary: the Israelis urgently need to prepare—at the moment they cannot really effect—a rapprochement, or at least a truce, with the Arab nations. If a return to the old borders seems unrealistic insofar as it would leave Israel once again open to terrorist harassment, the Israelis would nevertheless do well to forgo the temptation of large-scale territorial conquest. A Versailles-like peace could only lead to future wars. If there is indeed a conflict within the Israeli government between Eshkol and Eban, who propose a generous policy toward the Arabs, and Dayan and the military, who seem to be flirting with the idea of "a greater Israel," then we stand with the civilians.

To be sure, a peace settlement does not depend on Israel alone. It is time for the Arabs to end the brutal pretext that they are in a permanent state of war with Israel, thereby justifying border raids and sea blockades; it is time for the Arabs to recognize (which does not mean approve) the existence of Israel. But in turn the Israelis should take a constructive and humane attitude toward the problem of the Arab refugees—who, even if exploited by the Arab governments, are suffering human beings and deserve more sympathy and active help than they have gotten from a nation itself comprised of refugees.

This is neither the moment, nor are we equipped, to spell out details of a policy that *might* lead to rapprochement. But it is very much our business to keep urging the appropriateness of such a policy.

2) Nasser's fiasco brings to a climax the whole wretched history of those "revolutionary-nationalist" dictators—Sukarno, Nkrumah, etc.—whose suppression of democratic rights has been

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justified as necessary for the development of the Third World. These dictators brought their countries to disaster by substituting for the hard task of social development a foreign policy of imperial braggadocio. Empty windbags, these "leftist" demagogues have proven capable neither of peace nor war, reform nor revolution. It is time that the myth created in their behalf by Western intellectuals nostalgic for revolution but indifferent to freedom should be put to an end.

3) Obviously the UN did not cover itself with glory yet we dislike the muscular *realpolitik* of those who dismiss it as a mere talk shop, for even if it is no more than a mere talk shop, that in itself proved useful insofar as it provided an agency through which the major powers could help to patch up a truce. One need only imagine what might have happened if there were no UN in order to be glad that, for all its grave failings, it was present.

4) The Mideast and Vietnam. Certain supporters of the Vietnam War have tried to make capital out of "inconsistencies" in the views of those who are hostile to U.S. policy in Vietnam yet wanted the U.S. to exert its influence in order to prevent the extinction of Israel. John P. Roche, the President's semi-attached intellectual, emerged from deep freeze to sneer at "doves for war." Such talk, in our view, is sheer nonsense, utter demagogy. Except for a small segment of the peace movement which has whipped itself into a position favoring a kind of unqualified isolationism, the opponents of the Vietnam War have based their opposition on specific criticism of the character, the purpose, the methods of U.S. intervention. (Even those who have advanced the not-very-useful slogan that "the U.S. should not be the policeman of the world" have not thereby committed themselves necessarily to a foreign policy of total abstention; they are presumably advocating grounds for a limitation or restraint upon the employment of U.S. power.)

Surely, a child can see the difference between Vietnam and the Mideast. Into Vietnam the U.S. thrust half a million soldiers; no serious opponent of the Vietnam War proposed that the U.S. intervene through unilateral military means in the Mideast. In Vietnam the U.S. intervened in behalf of Diem's dictatorship and the subsequent military puppets; at stake in the Mideast was a democratic nation, remarkable for its morale and composed in significant measure of the victims of genocide. In Vietnam the U.S. intervened in what is, to a considerable extent, a civil war—and a civil war in which a large portion of the Vietnamese people oppose the regime propped up by the U.S. No one has proposed that the U.S. intervene in the internal affairs of any nation in the Mideast.

The question of interventionism is, of course, difficult; but it cannot be discussed in the wise-guy style of Roche; and it cannot adequately be discussed in terms of absolutes, either positive or negative. Our general predisposition is to be very strongly inclined against U.S. military intervention—e.g., Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. But problems of foreign policy involving the application of pressure, the employment of economic aid, and the use of moral sanctions must be

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solved in terms of specific goals, specific situations. Judging the war in Vietnam to be reactionary, we oppose U.S. policy there. But that is surely no reason to claim that this binds us to a policy of inflexible abstentionism in other circumstances. Anyone who favors U.S. economic aid to, say, Yugoslavia, as we do; anyone who would like to see the U.S. apply limited nonmilitary sanctions against the racist government in Rhodesia favors "intervention" of a kind. It is all a matter of where, in what way, toward what end, and within what limits. Our hope therefore is that the Mideast crisis will in no way diminish opposition to the Vietnam War.

Bernard Rosenberg

The UAW: An Aura of Hope

Many young, middle-class radicals know little more about organized labor in the United States than that it is "stagnant," "sclerotic," and "inert." Such epithets would fit even better than they do if Walter Reuther had not recently applied all of them to other leaders of the AFL-CIO, the federation he helped to create 12 years ago. Observing Reuther preside over the Special United Automobile Workers Convention in Detroit late this April, one could hardly doubt that he is the living refutation of his own general indictment. I left the Convention, and the Reuther aura, convinced that trade unionism in America has a vital future.

A word about that aura. It is both palpable and mysterious. Any man should be laughable who publicly "recnizes" dangers and says that he is "gonna" overcome them by "tran-salating" principles into action—and who keeps on mouthing threadbare clichés and tired old jokes. That, after 31 years, these are not yet soporific is a tribute to the magical effect Walter Reuther can still produce. Something about him, possibly his basic incorruptibility, grips us and compels our respect. To be sure, the Boy Scout image has been tarnished, but by ever so little. Reuther's complicity (to the tune of $50,000) in a CIA effort to shore up democratic French and German trade unions is a matter of record. He deserves no praise for that piece of foolishness—but a good deal of praise for owning up to it. Can we say as much for George Meany or Jay Lovestone who, although much more deeply implicated, continue brazenly to deny everything? Surely, Victor Reuther had his brother's approval when he clamored for severance of the CIA tie more than a year ago, before newsmen had

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sensationalized the complex, scandalous, and ugly affair. The Reuthers must have known that full disclosure could only be an embarrassment to them. Yet, they pressed the issue which others sought to squelch.

II

Quite a long time has passed since an unknown sniper shot and injured Walter Reuther, shattering an arm few people thought would ever regain its old mobility. But it did, as Reuther proves with a flourish while he chops and cuts the air persuasively with both hands. That recovery appears to be a product of determination, grit, and patience. I take all this to be highly symbolic: we now have reason to hope that the left arm of labor, paralyzed for well over a decade, will once again be put into motion.

The widely publicized rift between Reuther and Meany may or may not eventuate in a break. Total separation would be costly to both sides, but costliest in dollars and cents to the Federation which would lose a cool million in annual UAW dues. If the break does not occur, labor-at-large may gain by responding to pressure from the Left for overall liberalization. Should there be a break, if nothing else, the UAW will have demonstrated (a possibly contagious) capacity for rejuvenation.

At the convention, Reuther decisively confounded his critics. They had predicted he would foster prolonged debate over whether to split or not to split, thereby deflecting worker unrest onto essentially extraneous matters. In fact, only a last half-day was devoted to the intramural dispute. Finally, just a few of the 3,000 delegates voted against a belated motion which most of them enthusiastically cheered. It gave the leadership a blank check on whether, when, and how to secede. For two solid days, delegates devoted themselves to a host of troublesome matters, unrelated or remotely related to the question of "going it alone." These matters formed the substance of their discussion, a lively affair that Reuther would not allow to be prematurely terminated. He solicited, and received, enough argumentation to reveal a dozen internal fissures, and as many fundamental grievances welling up from the ranks.

Women were heard, and that alone should be newsworthy. Furthermore, in speaking up vigorously they by no means limited themselves to the woman question. More significantly, Negroes constituted an articulate and sometimes vociferous presence. In the UAW, at least these two ordinarily voiceless minority groups have found their tongues and learned to swing their weight. They talk as uninhibitedly and unselfconsciously as the critical majority around them. The problems that interest them are common to industrial workers who divide here and coalesce there, but scarcely ever do so along sexual or racial lines.

Indeed, the subject of civil rights received attention mainly because Reuther chose to dwell upon it. In his keynote address, he excoriated hidebound AFL craft union officials for their flagrant and obnoxious racism. The UAW Negro knows that he belongs to a disadvantaged people most of whom continue to be mercilessly exploited. TULC, the Trade Union Leadership Council, which

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sparked A. Philip Randolph into a national effort directed at betterment of Negroes' working conditions, was first begun among UAW Negroes. They had to defy Reuther by opposing the incumbent Mayor Miriani of Detroit, and they probably tipped the balance for Cavanaugh, a man more responsive to their demands. They did much to elect a Negro councilman *and* a Negro member of the 21-men National Council of their union. They set up a useful and efficient school for Negro drop-outs, staffed it with teachers of business English and typing, enriched the curriculum by adding art and music, placed their graduates in white-collar jobs, and did much more on that community, grass-roots level which Sargent Shriver never seems able to reach.

The creators of TULC, men like Horace Sheffield, are actively engaged on every front. These people have plenty of political savvy. They come by it through a unique experience garnered over decades by long and hard participation in industrial unionism. About one third of the automobile workers at General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler are Negroes. When the topic at hand is workers' rights, they are still concerned about, but not obsessed with, civil rights. Nowhere else in America is there such a nucleus of Negroes, self-confident, with high morale, free of want, militant in deed as well as word. These men and women have been given an opportunity denied most of their black brothers. Change the *lumpenproletariat* into a working class, and you get human beings like these who need not be lectured about the dignity they have already come to possess. The UAW Negro does not suffer from fantasies of violence; neither is he cowed into silence and apathy. The Negro delegate to a UAW convention cries out just as manfully as the whites around him (for they are animated by the same militant tradition) for his "measure of justice." Whether he finds himself agreeing with union policy or strongly opposed to it is irrelevant. Either way, we have here a model for how to abolish that poverty of the human spirit which is our greatest affliction.

III

The UAW is a bread-and-butter, pragmatic trade union serving the special interests of relatively privileged factory workers. And it is an entity that to some extent embodies other more admirable qualities, without which one's references to "the human spirit" would be incongruous. Work standards rather than wages were the motif of this convention. Speaker after speaker rose to repeat a single slogan that reverberated through Detroit's Cobo Hall for three days. Banners and buttons and pamphlets re-echoed the same slogan: "Humanize Work."

On the first day, Reuther presented a list of priorities he proposed to lay on the bargaining table in July when negotiations begin for a new contract with management. On top of that list was a radical idea which, if implemented, would revolutionize the status of industrial operatives. The top command wanted above all to bargain for a new concept in labor relations, the guaranteed annual salary, designed to wipe out invidious distinctions between blue-collar and white-collar workers. Delegates did not warm

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to the idea. They liked better Reuther's admonition, "Let us never forget that this union was organized against the inhumanity of the speed-up, and not just to add nickels to payrolls," his allusion to "gold-plated sweatshops," and the need for applying as much ingenuity to human problems as to technical problems. A substantial increase in take-home pay will certainly be demanded, but many delegates regarded the substitution of "salaries" for "wages" as mere word magic. The switch did not excite them. More money, yes, the case for raises was compelling, but, they maintained, humanization and improved work standards should be the first order of business.

They carried the day. Reuther listened, joined the quarrel—and yielded to a clear preference other than his own. He downgraded the guaranteed annual salary and upgraded work standards. When you see such a reversal take place before your eyes, you can hardly accept the fashionable thesis that union democracy is wholly a dead-letter, a term to be used only ironically as a cover for bureaucratic control.

Now and then in these deliberations, humor emerged—laced with touches of bitterness—as delegate and chairman sparred with each other. Thus, a provocative remark from the floor causes Reuther to wag his finger:

"Brother, you're getting into deep water."

"Brother, being a production worker, I know how to swim."

Or, this from a representative of the much aggrieved Auto Parts Suppliers Council:

"Brother, may I read you a letter?"

"Yes, brother you may."

Here, however, the fraternal salutations end, and this letter begins, "Dear Daddy Walter: We know you need flexibility, but . . ." and there follow complaints about subcontracting, scab labor, preferential hiring, and arbitrary contract termination dates. It is signed, "Your stepsons and stepdaughters," with a postscript asking for full acceptance into the family.

Banter aside, a divisive and sufficiently serious situation is uncovered. Workers employed by small companies used to fare better than those in the Big Three. They had higher rates, the best representational pattern, and more benefits. After 1945, the big companies tightened up and squeezed the suppliers so hard that they were unable to maintain previous standards. Today, many of these workers, and there are approximately 300,000 of them, feel that they fall below a decent standard of living, receive unequal compensation for equal work, and scrape by from payday to payday. "Why," says another spokesman for this group, "A young fella working 40 hours a week can't educate his children. The loan companies are doing a land-office business in workers' homes. Most of us have forgotten what it's like to work a 40-hour week."

And the Canadians sound off for wage parity, currently unavailable to them. A Canadian delegate warns that parity is a must, and that Reuther had better remember it. General Motors keeps shipping work from U.S. to Canadian plants, which is good corporate economy and real labor oppression. So, "You've got the money now. *We* want it in '67." The Canadian

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government, with its advanced welfare state, does not yet permit conciliation and allegedly tarries over compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. Despite a common duty-free North American market, Canadian auto workers are paid less for the same output than workers just across the border. A Canadian exclaims, "We were a full-fledged colony of Great Britain. We are not going to be a full-fledged colony of General Motors or of International Harvester." And the UAW is pledged to rectify this inequity at the bargaining table. Will that give Canadian workers the right to strike, which is after all a domestic and governmental issue? "Not at all. But, we have a political party in Canada. Help us win." No answer.

The widely publicized rivalry between craft workers and production workers is papered over with affirmations of solidarity. Cracks show anyway. The earnestness with which each side backs the other sounds a trifle forced and artificial. Plainly, the union could be sundered by a division like this one. Or by workers (pipe-fitters, electricians, stamp operators), whose jobs are sometimes farmed out to "alley shops," as against workers fortunate enough to stay put. If militancy develops in a Dearborn plant, work may get switched to Chicago or to Cleveland; specific jobs may be surreptitiously "subcontracted out" so that cars are less and less frequently "100 per cent union-made." Men within the same factory feel unequally victimized. Some jobs get automated and go down the drain. This phenomenon has not proved to be a total calamity, but it creates more chasms. Young and old diverge; so do those in the shop and those in the office.

As a continuous influx of automated machinery takes place, should old workers be given the first opportunity to train for new jobs? A tool-and-dye man reports that in the cutting-grinding department, one new tool replaces 15 men. Who will be taught to use the new tool? Upwardly mobile people, including those past their youth, who see that technological innovation is irresistible, wish to be re-educated. In numerical control centers, salaried employees do the programming. Why not let qualified journeymen do the job when they are fully capable of mastering the necessary techniques? If this is logical, then, "Walter, send our people to school for six months. Some go on their own time. The International should do it for them."

How persistent the old dream of escaping from manual labor by acquiring a chicken farm or a small business still is, we do not know. Other delusions evidently hold sway over office workers, mostly "women who too often fool themselves that they aren't going to work long. They'll be in those offices until they retire." What follows? "Walter, go on out and organize those babes in the woods."

IV

The generational gap is underscored again and again: "Young skilled tradesmen work 12 hours a day. Older workers need money too. They're physically unable to put in a 70- or 80-hour week that some companies now force on them. Or, from an old-timer, "What's all this talk about whether we want $300 or $400 or $500 pensions? I'm from a small plant. Our pension is $60

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a month. What about us, Walter?" The point is made that when Studebaker moved out of South Bend, retirees lost their pensions, and that management outside the Big Three continually threatens to close down and move out or invoke some legal ruse to avoid payment of pensions.

These issues do not much concern the young. Perhaps they are more attentive to the words of a delegate dilating on executive salaries. That the president of General Motors took a voluntary salary cut from $825,000 to a measly $790,000 was page one news for Detroiters as the UAW convention began—Reuther noted that the new salary came to 96 times more than an average worker earns, and he added, "No human being is worth 96 times more than another human being." Besides, stock options made up for the reduced salary, with the president's total income amounting to over a $1,000,000. The delegate who came back to this matter did some calculating of his own:

> It would take an average worker at General Motors 120 years to make the president's reduced salary. But GM will talk at the table about having lost money. Actually, they make money on our sweat.

No doubt about it, the industry did suffer a decline this year (for which some jokesters suggest that Ralph Nader be rewarded with the GM presidency). But, optimism is justifiably high in every executive suite—from which the specter of an increase in production to 13,000,000 cars per annum, and conversion of America into an enormous parking lot, has lately emanated. Listen therefore to the arithmetically-minded delegate when he asks, "How about *our* kids, *our* health, *our* strength? Executives are not the only ones with these concerns." Do the young, not a few attending their first convention, prick up their ears at this? If not, then maybe they do when a representative of Local 600 claims, "Our 33 resolutions will prove to industry, and most important to the young people, that we are *never* satisfied with the status quo." Will it? Reuther, who needs all his genius as a labor prestidigitator just to keep the UAW from getting unstuck, is more realistic. He doubts that industry is ever persuaded by eloquence or by logic, and he asserts that it is impressed by only one thing: the power of a mobilized rank and file. Obviously skeptical about the efficacy of prayer, Reuther professes to pray for the day when the power of persuasion will triumph over the persuasion of power. That day is not yet.

Muscle will be applied. At this writing, a strike seems likely. Giant will be pitted against giant, each giving, both compromising, neither rocking the boat too much. Will the blame, as well as the credit, be ascribable to Walter Reuther? In some respects, he is goaded on to do things by a following that constantly grumbles about its dissatisfactions; in other respects, he is ahead of his members; and in yet other respects, external influence would be salutary. Reuther can be counted on to placate the dissatisfied by securing some of their objectives, and even to goad them when they do not goad him. Would any other labor leader taunt his people, as Reuther did at one point in the convention, by saying, "If I were in the shop, I

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would be raising hell with this union"?

On an issue like Vietnam, external influence by the liberal-left might be usefully brought to bear. Reuther referred to the war only obliquely, within a context of strike strategy. If it comes to that, the strike will be selective, hitting only one corporation and in such a way that "defense" production is unimpaired. Otherwise, the courts might impose a Taft-Hartley injunction, breaking the strike because of the "national emergency." A Florida delegate who endorsed the Reuther program as far as it went, and who parenthetically proclaimed that he got all his education in the UAW, felt nevertheless that something was missing. He wanted to know about the war economy: "Those who profit most from it want to stifle and choke us. Organized labor cannot get moving in this climate. We are already accused of disrupting the war effort. Management has the trump cards. The Dirksens and the Dixiecrats will play them, and we will act like empty shells, sitting on our status quo."

A more hostile delegate, spurning Reuther's plea for flexibility, argued in favor of "firing up the troops for war on General Motors" which "stopped workers from getting a 30-hour week on account of the Korean War. And now it's the lousy Vietnam War." These isolated outbursts were disregarded by Reuther. Not a word from him about his private misgivings on foreign policy, nor any acknowledgment of the 1965 UAW resolution according to which further escalation in Vietnam should be opposed. In 1965 there were only 100,000 Americans in Vietnam; by April, 1967 there were over 400,000. Failure to take a stand, either by repudiating the old resolution or by condemning the enormous escalation on which Lyndon Johnson did embark, cannot be lightly dismissed. But Reuther has tried to live as a principled man, and his friends do him no kindness if they let him forget it. In this area, moral discomfort, and the heat that it generates, will not come from within his own organization, but only from outside, from the unaffiliated ranks of those who dissent.

V

What about the disagreeable conditions of work? A special feature of UAW contracts is that they allow workers to strike over work standards, and the men around Reuther boast that their International Executive Board has never refused to authorize such a strike. Let standards be given primacy, they say, admitting that failure to establish proper standards not only deprives workingmen of the respect they crave, but results in the production of unsafe automobiles which, in turn, causes death to stalk the highways of America. A union that encompasses the aerospace industry could not convene this spring without mourning the death of four Apollo astronauts who might still be alive but for the poor workmanship that went into their spacecraft. A Congressional exposé of this situation might make Teapot Dome look harmless.

All in all, the case for high work standards is unanswerable. The sticking point is how to contractualize those standards. American-style collec-

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tive bargaining has conditioned management to make economic concessions —when necessary and under heavy pressure. But big business would ferociously defend its so far unchallenged prerogative to control production. The Reutherites believe they know their men: a short strike, a holiday, a fishing trip, temporary suspension of the customary drudgery would greatly please them. It always does. But to ask for joint decision-making, which by another name is co-determination, or, by two others, workers' democracy and socialism? They see much more readiness for the fulfillment of this historical aspiration among the leaders then among the men who remain unprepared for the sustained struggle, the class war that would be required.

Limited struggle, gradually expanded, is Reuther's essential message. While "not looking for a fight," he has prepared his cadres to "struggle as free workers," reminding them that "In totalitarian society, you get industrial peace because bayonets are behind every worker." He promises to strive for the best possible settlement with corporations grown fat on increasing productivity and expanded profitability, and thereafter, no matter what happens to his feud with George Meany, energetically to organize the unorganized masses. Whatever the failings of Reuther and his colleagues, it is good that they are a force in American life.

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What Can We Do?

". . . the new level of escalation marked by our bombing of the North Vietnamese airfields has brought us one step closer to World War III . . . I do not intend to remain silent in the face of what I regard as a policy of madness . . ."

—Senator McGovern

The President's decision to escalate the Vietnam War destroys whatever small chance there was for negotiations in the near future and plunges the United States into a major crisis. Among the growing number of Americans who see this war as unjust, inhumane, and reactionary, it provokes feelings of outrage and desperation.

What shall we, what can we do?

Perhaps there is no strategy that can now stop the country from sinking deeper into its shameful course. But we must try. We offer below a perspective, not because we have any sure-fire or magical answers, but because this seems to us a *possible* way of affecting American decision in the coming year.

We respect the integrity of the young people who have decided that, as an act of witness and conscience, they cannot fight in this war. We know they are not cowards; some of them put their lives on the line in fighting for Negro rights in Mississippi and elsewhere. We are ready to aid them against prosecution and/or persecution. We believe that where serious moral objection is held against a particular war, the procedures now governing conscientious objection on religious grounds should also apply.

But while respecting their moral stand, we do not believe the kind of action they are considering is likely, in the coming months, to lead to that large-scale outpouring of sentiment and action which can alone bring about a reversal of the President's course. And we cannot ignore the danger that a protest of desperation, morally valid though it would be, might leave the bulk of our citizens indifferent or even hostile, thereby giving both the Administration and various local forces of reaction a new pretext or opportunity to unleash repressive acts.

Individual protests must be honored and protected. Demonstrations are essential—they have helped stir people into action. Dramatic gestures

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can be useful. But the main job, we think, is to mobilize a large segment of the American people—those who stand politically at center or a bit left of center, those who have not yet joined in protests.

There is a humane and democratic tradition in this country which can be appealed to. Millions of ordinary Americans are disturbed. We reject the notion that they are all TV-duped and brainwashed "mass men" inaccessible to the claim of reason or morality.

Many will respond to what is the essential demand of the moment: Cease the bombing of North Vietnam as a prelude to a full-scale cease-fire and negotiations!

This seems to us the key: can there be mobilized a sufficient number of nonpolitical people to shake the country into conscience? These are people who might not respond to traditional devices of protest; but they could act through other and equally—perhaps more—effective ways.

They can organize groups within the political parties against the war. They can rouse the churches. They can stir their trade unions. They can show the Administration that its disastrous course leads to a steady erosion of popular support.

If, indeed, it will be possible to move a significant portion of the electorate, roughly the liberal-center segment, to speak out against the war, then we may be able to reverse Johnson's disastrous course.

This means that new actions are required, by those who sign this statement and those who read it. We must move beyond our accustomed circles and try to reach new communities of protest. Let us speak to trade unionists and see if we can persuade them to throw their weight behind peace. Let us try to involve more community and church organizations. Let us approach the small band of senators that has begun to speak out more forcefully against the war and persuade them that it is their duty to move out of Washington, into the countryside, to barnstorm and rally support.

If this war lasts much longer, horror will be piled on horror and injustice upon injustice. The whole political and social life of the country will be poisoned. Only a wave of popular sentiment, coming from the mainstream of American life, can prevent it.

Lewis Coser
Michael Harrington
Richard Hofstadter
Irving Howe
Arnold Kaufman
Jeremy Larner
Allard Lowenstein
Lenore Marshall
Seymour Melman
Stanley Plastrik
Bernard Rosenberg
Meyer Schapiro
Norman Thomas

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Daniel M. Friedenberg

THE U.S. IN LATIN AMERICA

A Reckoning of Shame*

Most Americans react indignantly when the U.S. is accused of following a path of world conquest. Comparisons with Hitler, with Stalin, and with the imperial machinery of England and France in the nineteenth century are met by shocked outrage. Educated persons may concede that there are some valid surface parallels but then insist that U.S. expansion, and the role of world policeman which America has reluctantly assumed, cannot be put in the same class with traditional imperialist aims.

A brief review of American expansion in the Western Hemisphere from the point of view of a Latin American may bring light to this question. It is obvious, of course, that such an interpretation of U.S. history would reflect another kind of bias—for the Latin American, like his Yankee counterpart, would be influenced by his own culture and tensions. Nevertheless, the following summary probably gives a fair picture of the feelings of many intelligent Latin Americans about Anglo-Saxon history in the Americas.

The original English interest was very minor on the American mainland, the initial focus being on the sugar-rich islands of the Caribbean. In South America the expeditions of Sir Walter Raleigh into what is now the Orinoco River basin of Venezuela were soon abandoned. In North America two areas were occupied, Massachusetts and Virginia. From these, the settlers spread west to the Appalachian mountains. To the south, they moved into South Carolina and Georgia, but then came up against the powerful Spanish interest in Florida. The Dutch in New York and Swedes in Delaware were weaker, and the areas were seized by force, uniting the Eastern Seaboard.

Historians of the American Revolution agree that the Royal Order of 1763, by which England sealed off the western lands and left them to the Indians, was a major factor in the resultant revolution. The land

* This essay is part of a series that examines critically, from a variety of political outlooks, American foreign policy. It will be part of a book the editors of DISSENT are preparing on the general theme of foreign affairs and foreign policy.

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speculation companies, controlled by men such as George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, were paralyzed just when the tobacco planters of the South were up to their necks in debt to English merchants and the Northern shipowners had been frozen out from the slave and rum trade of the Caribbean. Putting aside the exact ratio of patriotism to economic self-interest involved, it is a fact that expansion increased as soon as the colonists became Americans. The land west of the Appalachians was immediately overrun. Napoleon, who feared English conquest from Canada, in 1803 sold the vast land tier from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains. In 1812, the War Hawks again pushed America into war with England in their unsuccessful campaign to conquer Canada. (The French Canadians abstained, fearing New England Puritan bigotry far more than Post-Reformation English religious intolerance.) Andrew Jackson illegally seized Florida in 1818. From 1832 to 1836 American settlers broke off Texas from Mexico. Americans did the same in California in 1846. Not satisfied with such glut, (with Lincoln almost the sole public dissenter) the United States struck at Mexico in 1847 and took as war booty all the territory north of the Rio Grande as well as New Mexico and the remainder of California. In 1853 America broke off a final piece of Mexico, the so-called Gadsden Purchase. During the 1850's American-backed expeditions were launched against Cuba, Lower (Baja) California, and Nicaragua—and pressures were exerted against the Panama Zone and the northern provinces remaining to Mexico. These expeditions and pressures failed only because the South and North were so split on the slavery question, and expansion into more slaveholding areas was politically sabotaged.

The impulse to expansion was temporarily suspended by the Civil War and the resultant shift from an agricultural to a commercial America. By the 1890's it grew strong again. In the Spanish-American War the U.S. took Puerto Rico, the few remaining Spanish West Indies, and assumed tutelage over Cuba. In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt stole Panama. President Wilson was even more aggressive. He intervened in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, creating financial protectorates. He occupied parts of Mexico and only withdrew as he started to inveigle the United States into war with Germany, fearing hostile action on the exposed southern border. President Coolidge in 1924 occupied the Honduras and in 1926 Nicaragua. To complete the picture in our time, President Eisenhower in 1954 set up his own puppet in Guatemala by means of mercenary troops, President Kennedy sought to repeat the Guatemala story in 1961 in Cuba (for once without success, since the opponent was as ruthless as the Americans), and President Johnson in 1965

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overthrew a liberal revolution by direct intervention in the Dominican Republic.

This is history as an educated Latin American would see it. In terms of normal standards of peacetime amity, Andrew Jackson in Florida, Fremont in California, and Teddy Roosevelt in Panama were pirates no different than Drake and Hawkins when sacking the Spanish Main. In our own time, if it was wrong for Russia and China to invade Hungary and Tibet, it was certainly equally wrong for the U.S. to invade the Dominican Republic, to send quisling troops into Guatemala, or even —against all accepted modes of international law in peacetime—to stop ships of other nations from entering Cuban waters during the missile crisis. Put at its simplest, there was one rule for the United States and another for the rest of the world. Preaching democracy and liberty, the Americans had seized half of Mexico, all the remaining Spanish territories, broken off Panama from Colombia, and created an economic protectorate over Central America, the major islands of the Caribbean, and Venezuela on the South-American mainland. Where conquest was necessary, it was done. Where political subversion was required, it occurred. Where economic domination was denied, the Marines or mercenary troops were dispatched. And the ideology was ready at hand: for the Monroe Doctrine clearly meant that U.S. force (like U.S. missiles) was "good," while that of anybody else was "bad."

From an objective view, a certain pattern may be seen underlying these events. A schema would look somewhat as follows:

PERIOD	AIM	METHOD	RATIONALIZATION
1818–1903	More Territory	Direct Aggression	Manifest Destiny
1904–1926	Financial Control	Temporary Direct Aggression	The American Century
1927–1965	Investment Protection	Control of Local Military and Civilian Elite	Good-Neighbor Policy
1966–	National Security	Aggression through Control of Latin-American Dictatorships	Inter-American Peace Force

It is obvious that U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has gone through several phases, and though the above schema cannot be rigidly applied in each and every case, it summarizes the general movement.

II

The earliest stage, that of territorial enlargement, may be best summed up with a remark made by President McKinley during the

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Spanish-American War: "While we are conducting the war and until its conclusion, we must keep all we get; when the war is over, we must keep what we want." This was an era devoid of hypocrisy. The Anglo-Saxon settlers believed themselves to be superior to the Indians they exterminated, to the black men they enslaved, and to the Popish Latins. Theirs was a true religion, a superior racial stock, and a higher culture. History was on their side, as was indeed obvious from the course of events. Perhaps the best example was Andrew Jackson, who was an odd combination of much of the best and worst in American character. There was no nonsense about "Old Hickory"; he knew what he wanted and he went for it. In 1818 Jackson, bent on subduing the Seminole Indians, pursued them into Florida, territory of another country at peace with the United States. Before he was through, Jackson conquered the Spanish province except for the city of St. Augustine. Pro-Jackson sentiment was so strong, Spain was forced to cede Florida, in turn receiving a pledge whereby the United States renounced all claims to Texas—a pledge, incidentally, broken within the generation. By such methods the country expanded following its Manifest Destiny, until the broad swath of the North American continent formed one national territory.

The cynicism which motivated many U.S. leaders in the Spanish-American War, as can be seen in the above-quoted remark by McKinley, led to a change in spirit. The impulse toward domination, allied with the desire to control a growing market for sugar, bananas, metallic ores, and oil, clashed with a moral repugnance to old-fashioned aggrandizement. This critical attitude grew after World War I, when the fruits of Wilson's Crusade for Democracy became more obvious. The mood of the country was against territorial expansion, and far more suspicious of the motives behind patriotic rhetoric.

U.S. Latin-American policy was influenced by this change. It reshaped itself in the two decades between Woodrow Wilson and President Hoover, slowly creating new goals by trial and error. Direct intervention was more reluctantly applied with each successive Administration, until it faded out with the advent of Franklin Roosevelt. The policy during these years had two aims: primarily, support of expanding American investment and protection of those American citizens going about this business; secondarily, protection of the local oligarchs who were the American allies. In practice, of course, this meant maintaining the *status quo*. The rationale of this policy was that the U.S. had created the best system of government in the world and that by the extension of the American Century into other lands, like benefits would attend.

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Since Latins were obviously lazy, as well as corrupt and revolutionary, the best method of attaining such a laudable goal would be to control these areas financially.

An excellent example of this phase in Latin-American relations is the case of Nicaragua, precisely because it was so successful. We still have the "Somoza dynasty" that was created and the third successive Somoza, a West Pointer, was just "elected" this year under the aegis of the American eagle.

U.S. intervention occurred in 1926 when President Coolidge landed the Marines to put down discontent "encouraged by Communist influence from Mexico." Henry L. Stimson, the special representative sent by Coolidge, indicated that a native constabulary must be established which would "eventually greatly reduce the number of Marines necessary to guarantee stability." Stimson also felt that a two-party system should be encouraged. A constitutional democracy with two responsible parties was then set up on paper; to maintain this system a special training school for a national guard was established. General Anastasio Somoza became head of these guards trained by the Marines.

The job was indeed done well. The Marines are no longer necessary. The National Guard, under three different Somozas, still runs the country. Let it be stated in all fairness that the American investors did not press their advantage to the utmost. The present Somoza is president of a shipping company, an airline, and a textile company, as well as head of the family plantations. (No one ever accused Andy Jackson of splitting with the Indians.)

Ironically, the success of Coolidge in Nicaragua ushered in the third stage of U.S. relations with Latin America. What happened was so obvious that there was discontent at home. Stimson also came to the conclusion that Marine intervention had led to even greater turmoil. It was preferable to intervene without direct aggression. Controlling the local military establishment or civilian government could be just as effective, and far more discreet. We could be good neighbors, a Good Neighbor, without intervention, through a variety of devices.

In his initial approach to the creation of the good-neighbor policy, Henry L. Stimson was thoroughly sincere. He tied in the creation of a local constabulary with a two-party democracy. An honest conservative, he thought that creation of military stability would lead to more democracy (or at least his conception of democracy). It never seemed to occur to Stimson, as it obviously was beyond the range of John Bartlow Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Santo Domingo more recently, that free elections were a mockery without the existence of a middle class and a standard

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of living at that irreducible minimum where people would rather live in peace than die in revolt. The Stimson technique—as in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Honduras, where the same thing was done with minor variations—simply set up a caricature of democracy dominated by ruthless oligarchs. Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Batista in Cuba were the result. This process bottled up social reform to the point where moderate change may no longer be possible, as Cuba has shown. It also, and perhaps just as important for the success of revolutions, gave the extreme radical element a clear and present enemy to fight against: Uncle Sam.

III

The best example of the good-neighbor policy, as it developed, is Cuba, where the situation erupted at the end of the Hoover Presidency. A more detailed study is necessary, for the seeds of Fidel Castro were sown in 1933 and not 1957.

Henry L. Stimson, now Secretary of State under Hoover, had learned from Nicaragua. He opposed intervention in Cuba despite the increasing brutality of Gerardo Machado after 1930. Despotic Latin-American leaders were hardly a novelty and Machado had of course scrupulously respected the safety of American investment: at that time it already amounted to over a billion dollars.

In 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt had been in office only four months, Cuba exploded in violence. Roosevelt almost immediately replaced Ambassador Harry F. Guggenheim with Sumner Welles. Absorbed in the New Deal's domestic program, the President gave Welles a free hand in Havana. In short time Welles decided that Machado had to go or there would be a violent revolution. Roosevelt piously told the American people that it "would be obvious interference with the internal affairs of another nation" to insist on deposing Machado, but privately he backed Welles.* On August 10, 1933, Welles had a talk with General Alberto Herrera, chief of staff of the Cuban Army, and suggested that Machado take a leave of absence. On August 11, Machado accepted, as Welles reported: "due to the fact that all of the ranking officers of the Army throughout the Republic had notified him that the Cuban Army would not support him further." On August 12, Machado, with nearly all the leading members of the government, fled Cuba. U.S. influence was so enormous, intervention was not necessary to bring down the government.

* Under the Platt Amendment, passed after the Spanish-American War, the United States had the right to intervene when it desired in Cuban affairs.

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An interim government in Cuba was deposed after only one month by a mutiny in the Army. The leader of the soldiers was Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, backed by a radical junta of civilians. Ambassador Welles was shocked to his roots—he wanted to get rid of Machado in order to return to a stable conservative regime, not to invite social revolutoin. On three occasions he requested U.S. troops, the first time the very night of the Batista mutiny; Roosevelt rejected all three requests. Then Welles refused to recognize the government, and here he was backed by Washington. Finally, he organized an opposition and induced Cuban groups to revolt. The process took several months and the details are revealing.

The military rebels under Batista named as provisional President of Cuba a professor of biology, Ramon Grau San Martín. Welles defined this government immediately as "an undisciplined group of individuals of divergent tendencies representing the most irresponsible elements in the city of Havana . . ." He knew well that his refusal to recognize the Cuban administration made success impossible for Grau, that no Cuban government could stand up without U.S. recognition.

Grau somehow survived for a short period. In early October, the officers of the army attempted a counter-coup against Batista. This failed. Now Welles knew who was truly the master of Cuba.

Two days after the failure of this counter-coup, Ambassador Welles called for a talk with Sergeant Fulgencio Batista. Fortunately, a detailed report was sent to Washington. Welles told Batista that he was "the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority." His troops had likewise taken effective action against Communists, which had "rallied" the support of business interests. But, said Welles, the Grau regime "did not fill any of the conditions which the United States government had announced as making possible recognition [for it lacked] support of the commercial and financial interests in Cuba."

Welles then urged Batista "through the force of authority which he represented in his person [to seek a solution to the problem which] would make it possible for confidence in government to be restored in the Republic."

Though Cuba was now relatively peaceful, Welles categorized it in his dispatches to Washington as the "quiet of panic"; his staff member Adolf A. Berle, Jr., preferred the description "passive anarchy." Roosevelt was inclined to recognize Grau but, given such information, deferred. In early November, Roosevelt again considered recognition, and Welles nervously requested permission to return to the Capital in order to make a personal report.

Welles talked with Roosevelt and must have been most persuasive.

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The President issued a statement on November 24, which in effect destroyed Grau. For he not only refused recognition but slyly offered a bribe if the Cubans would revolt—a revision upward of the sugar quota and revocation of the Platt Amendment:

> We have wished to commence negotiations for a revision of the commercial convention between the two countries and for a modification of the permanent treaty between the United States and Cuba. . . . No progress along these lines can be made until there exists in Cuba a provisional government which through the popular support which it obtains and which through the general cooperation which it enjoys shows evidence of genuine stability.

It must be remembered that this was the depth of the Depression and an offer to push up the sugar quota at such a time was the difference between starvation and subsistence for many Cubans.

At the same time Roosevelt, feeling Welles was too personally involved, replaced him as Ambassador with Jefferson Caffery. Change in face was not a change in policy. Ambassador Caffery wholeheartedly agreed with Welles. His dispatches repeatedly stated that Grau was only supported by the army and the "ignorant masses." Three days after his arrival, Caffery had assured the Cubans their government would not be recognized; he attacked decrees for reflecting "seemingly Communistic tendencies in the present regime," and blocked the British Minister in Havana from recognizing Grau.

Now Batista realized he must move. From August through December he could never be sure whether Washington or the personal animosity of Welles created U.S. policy; but when the new Ambassador followed precisely the same line, he knew. In early January Batista bluntly asked Caffery what the U.S. "wanted done for recognition." Caffery referred to "our reiterated declarations as to our position on recognition." Within the week Batista came to terms with Carlos Mendieta, the kind of Cuban the Americans liked, and Grau was forced to resign. In a matter of days Roosevelt recognized the new regime, though he had refused such recognition to Grau over four months.

In this case Washington was right. Within the year Mendieta suspended the writ of *habeas corpus* and all constitutional guarantees, and he declared the sentence of death or life imprisonment for acts of violence—"stability" again descended on Cuba. In that same year, the Platt Amendment was abrogated and a new preferential trade agreement was signed for Cuban sugar.

Looking backward, two things are clear. The first is that Welles and Caffery had succeeded in maintaining the pre-1930 social and economic

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class structure in Cuba, including, of course, the dominance of U.S.-held enterprises. The second was that Batista, who ruled the army, had become the most powerful man in the land by deliberate American policy. From 1933 on political activity by the army, which had been nearly unknown in earlier days, was the major factor in Cuban government. Batista made and unmade Cuban Presidents at will. This culminated in his first successful campaign for the Presidency in 1940, followed by his dictatorship. The rest we all know.

The Cuban case is most instructive. The State Department, distinguishing between direct conquest and real control, concerned itself solely with the protection of American investment. The most effective way to do this was by dominating the elements that held power in the society. The oligarchic elite, of course, shared the same aims as U.S. investors. Political figures could be reached by other means. (CIA subversion came later.) The military was susceptible to the grant of arms, training programs, foreign consular posts, and decorations.

Unlike the earlier stages, direct aggression was ruled out, or would be used only under the most aggravated conditions. It was cheaper, and affronted public opinion less, to influence the elite than to dispatch the Marines. "Buying" or "bribing" are vulgar words to describe this process; making a key figure manager of an American branch bank or local representative of an American corporation should never be described in such ugly terms—nor the action of an American President in dangling a higher sugar quota in front of a country if there would be a revolt. But the essential consideration of the good-neighbor policy was not who ruled or how, democrat or tyrant, legally elected or not. What counted was whether the ruler could maintain the *status quo*—or as a last resort in the rare cases where a revolutionary party got control (as in Mexico under Cárdenas, or in Bolivia), whether proper indemnification could be secured for nationalist confiscation.

What led to the collapse of this policy was Cuba under Fidel Castro. An ocean of books has been written on the question whether the present Cuban dictator was originally a Communist or whether the United States made him one. This is surface analysis. The significant point is that the world had changed by the mid-twentieth century, but the tactics of the State Department had not reflected this change. Russia was now a world power with forces not too inferior to those of the U.S., and for the first time alternatives were available to Latin-American revolutionaries.

Earl E. T. Smith was Eisenhower's Ambassador to Cuba from 1957 to 1959. To justify his failure, Smith wrote a book, *The Fourth Floor,* in which he claims the State Department was full of Castroites who sabo-

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taged his policy: this is the measure of the man. Smith was a product of the American ambassadorial system, where if you give a large enough sum to the winning candidate you can choose your post. He was a Wall Street financier who knew nothing of the language, culture, or traditions of Cuba. Like Welles and Caffery in the earlier period, Smith considered himself a Proconsul over a conquered people and acted accordingly.

But the Cuba of 1958 was not the Cuba of 1933, and Castro was not Grau. If one would search for analogies, the most likely comparison would be Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas in 1938. Cárdenas did not hesitate to appeal to Nazi Germany when the American cartels blocked his oil sales and repurchase of drilling equipment. In the same way Castro turned to Russia, which gave him also the advantage of a home-trained administrative corps, the native Communists. And the United States, fearing war with Russia, did not land the Marines. Instead, it armed and launched a mercenary force of Cuban refugees, whose defeat sent Castro all the way into passionate avowal of Marxism-Leninism.

Fidel Castro marked the end of an epoch. It was obvious that virulent nationalism had at last caught up with the Latin-American countries. It was equally obvious that their leaders could now appeal to another power, namely Russia, to play off against U.S. might. *Mare Nostrum,* the Caribbean as an American Sea, was seriously threatened. This should have been apparent to U.S. leaders in 1954 at the time of the crisis in Guatemala. But the success of President Eisenhower in crushing Arbenz with a small mercenary army had lulled the State Department into false security.

IV

The next serious crisis arose in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The resultant U.S. intervention, and the ingenious creation of a new device to hold all Western Hemisphere states under American hegemony requires close analysis. Though considered the work of President Johnson, the policy was in fact born under President Kennedy in a defiant and chauvinistic speech following the defeat of his Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961. But the events that led to the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic must be set against 50 years of American manipulation of that state.

The leaders in the Dominican Republic refused to pay certain debts in 1914, and President Wilson occupied the country. Wilson set up a financial protectorate. As usual, a native constabulary was organized under the Marines to assure "stability." Before withdrawing, the Marines found a young man of firm opinions by the name of Rafael Trujillo

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Molina and pushed him to the top. Armed with this credential, the Generalissimo took over the government. Trujillo made an honest division of his country: the Americans could own all the sugar plantations and mills they wanted; and he would own everything else. Trujillo stayed in power under this amiable arrangement for over 30 years—a longer reign than that of Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin. A condottiere loose in the wrong century, Trujillo was indifferent to the old deal, the New Deal, or any other deal as long as the cards were dealt for him; he was a good friend of Franklin Roosevelt and of Dwight Eisenhower with equal aplomb, and if Mao Tse-tung had suddenly appeared, he would have made a similar accommodation.

By 1960 time was running out. No matter how many U.S. senators and congressmen he might have on his payroll, despite the best lobbying activities of Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. (who received $60,000 a year for his efforts and was then appointed Undersecretary of Commerce by Kennedy in 1963), even overlooking his killers who operated with impunity in the United States, Trujillo was getting into very serious trouble. "Keep the Faith, Baby" Adam Clayton Powell is the best example of Trujillo's problem. It was not that Powell operated differently from his peers in the flourishing trade of congressman, but rather that he was so obviously indifferent to the usual hypocrisies. Likewise, Trujillo violated all the rules of what is called civilized conduct.

Just who engineered the assassination of Trujillo in early 1961 we will probably never know. It was certainly not done by radicals. The instruments were members of his own entourage. In any case, his death plunged the Dominican Republic into chaos. The entire elite of the country, part of the Trujillo panoply, was discredited. All political organs of legitimacy had been wiped out many years before.

Into this breach stepped Juan Bosch, returning in October, 1961, after 24 years in exile. Bosch organized a liberal party, and in December, 1962, was elected President by over 60 per cent of the total vote. (President Kennedy, incidentally, supported the anti-Bosch side.) The Communists despised him and the best expression of their view may be seen from the statement of *Verde Olivo*, the official organ of the Cuban Armed Forces: "Juan Bosch is the candidate chosen by Yankee imperialism to check the growing liberation movement of the Dominican people which surged forward after the assassination of the dictator Trujillo."

Bosch lasted barely more than six months in office before he was overthrown by a military coup. Inheriting the old Trujillo armed forces, he was a prisoner from the beginning. If he had attempted a military purge, he would have been thrown out much earlier and would have

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triggered a civil war. As it was, such men could not be assuaged under any circumstances: the reason given for the revolt was that the President was soft on Communists and refused to "crack their heads."

The United States, as far as we know, did not motivate this coup. Bosch's anti-Communist position was well known. American investment had not been threatened. Kennedy's position might be described as two-faced. He publicly supported Bosch after his election but continued to subsidize the old military leaders. And no pressure was put on the ringleaders of the coup, all protégés of the Pentagon, to stop their action.* Yet President Kennedy deplored the overthrow, broke off diplomatic relations, and halted aid. Then Kennedy was assassinated (the Latins are usually more civilized in this matter, merely shipping off their presidents into exile), and President Johnson took over. In less than one month he reestablished diplomatic relations and resumed military aid.

For almost two years the Dominican Republic seesawed back and forth in a potpourri of generals. Conditions got steadily worse. In April, 1965, a counterrevolt broke out. This time it assumed the form of a mass insurrection, including many elements of the military establishment. A chronological description, including the reaction of the United States, makes quite clear what occurred.

> *April 24 and 25, 1965*: Pro-Bosch forces came close to winning a victory against the military junta. A large part of the military, including most of the junior officers, had defected.
>
> *April 25*: At 4:30 P.M. Air Force planes of General de los Santos Cespedes attacked the capital in cooperation with tanks sent by General Wessin y Wessin, former commander of the tank corps for Trujillo, graduate of the U. S. Army School in Panama and strong man of the 1963 anti-Bosch coup.
>
> *Note*: It was later published, without official contradiction, that a cable had been sent out from the U. S. Embassy at Santo Domingo earlier that day: "I have reluctantly agreed to the de los Santos-Wessin plan even though it could mean more bloodshed."
>
> *April 28*: By late afternoon it seemed that the attacking military junta was beaten. Ambassador Bennett cabled President Johnson of the situation. By evening American Marines landed and patrolled the streets of Santo Domingo in company with Wessin y Wessin's men. U. S. forces cut the Bosch zone into two parts and (later) permitted the regrouped junta to wipe out the northern sector.
>
> Undersecretary of State Thomas Mann publicly attributed the

* According to Sam Halper, former head of *Time* magazine's Caribbean Bureau, the Dominican generals decided to dump Bosch "as soon as they got a wink from the U. S. Pentagon." Halper feels the State Department and War Department were working at cross purposes. (*The New Leader*, May 10, 1965.)

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necessity for landing the Marines to the "virtual collapse" of the "regular forces." President Johnson claimed the Marines were disembarked solely to protect American lives.

Note: The Fulbright investigation later revealed that the military junta had requested American troops because of what they called danger of a Communist take-over. Ambassador Bennett, however, suggested the request be changed to ask for American intervention in order to protect the lives of U. S. citizens. The change was duly made; the troops were then duly sent from the ships waiting off the coast.

April 29: U. S. correspondents aboard a ship stationed off Santo Domingo accidentally tuned in a transistor radio on shortwave communications and overheard talks between Ambassador Bennett and military junta leaders. The American Ambassador was discussing delivery of U. S. equipment and food to the generals and giving words of encouragement.

Note: At the same time Washington insisted U. S. policy did not support any single group in the Dominican Republic.

May 2: President Johnson now charged that the Bosch group had been taken over by "a band of Communist conspirators." A series of atrocity stories were handed out for publication, all of them later proved false or totally unsubstantiated.

May 5: Washington released a list of 54 "Communist and Castroist" names, the men who were behind Bosch. The names faded away on close analysis to only two persons of minor authority in the entire Bosch movement.

Note: Later studies conclusively proved that the list of names had been presented to President Johnson several days after ordering the invasion; that is to say, the list was put together to justify an act already committed.

May 19: U. S. soldiers shot to death Colonel Rafael Fernandez Dominguez, the original military organizer of the revolt of April 24.

By late May plans were afoot as to how to follow up the U.S. victory. The State Department vacillated, while paying the salaries of the junta soldiers, as to the choice of its next creature in Santo Domingo. The final decision was for Dr. Joaquin Balaguer.

The choice of Balaguer is a measure of the panic in the Johnson Administration; for this was—admitting the limits of all historical analogy—much like picking Rudolf Hess, Hitler's old crony, to become Prime Minister of Germany after the Nazi defeat. Balaguer served Trujillo 30 years in every position of importance. He became Vice-President to the dictator in 1957 and was chosen as figurehead President by Trujillo in his last year when the public storm had begun to spill over. And Balaguer was the main speaker at Trujillo's funeral on June 2, 1961, and

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eulogized him: "Dear Chief: Adieu! We your spiritual children, veterans of the campaigns you fought during more than 30 years to make great and to stabilize the Fatherland, will look forward toward your sepulcher as toward a towering symbol. We shall in no way allow men to extinguish the flame you lighted on the altars of the Republic and in the souls of all Dominicans."

This was Washington's final choice. Now the entire political and financial weight of the United States was geared to action and backed, of course, by the military junta. Balaguer was elected President of the Dominican Republic. From April, 1965, to November, 1966, the American taxpayers poured $138 million into Balaguer's sty to keep him afloat. Just to be certain, the military purge continued. In December, 1965, Colonel Juan María Lora Fernandez, former Chief of Staff of the rebels, was killed by tank fire inside a hotel. In January, 1966, Leon Bosch, son of the former President, was shot in Santo Domingo. In August, 1966, Ramon Mejias Castillo, an important Bosch political leader, was assassinated three blocks from his house. The smaller fry were knocked off (without publicity in the United States). And a 3,400-man elite Dominican brigade, under American advisers, has been organized. "Stability" has again returned to Santo Domingo, as it returned to Havana when the U.S. engineered the exile of Grau San Martín in 1934. The only question is who shall be the next Trujillo.

V

At first glance, it would seem obvious that U.S. policy had reverted to an earlier period. But this is a surface impression. There are two schools among critics of American foreign policy. The optimists say U.S. policy-makers are idiots. The pessimists say they are malignant. Among such optimists is Theodore Draper, whose articles on the recent Dominican Republic crisis are most penetrating. After discussing Washington's choice of Balaguer, Draper then notes that the Provisional President chosen in the interim period before the election was Hector Garcia Godoy, "no puppet and no reactionary." Commenting on this divergence, Draper states the case of the optimists:

> After all this, after the support of Wessin, the instigation of Benoit, the backing of Imbert, the doublecross of Guzman, and the promotion of Balaguer, it should have been easy to predict whom the United States would in the end settle for—a reactionary puppet of a reactionary power, of course.
>
> Ah, but those who think that U. S. policy is as easy as all that do not know their United States. Lyndon Johnson may not be able to admit

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a mistake but it is not impossible that he is quite capable of correcting one. ("The Dominican Crisis," *Commentary,* December, 1965.)

What Theodore Draper took for indecision was not a sudden impulse toward sweetness and light, but rather an interval while U. S. policy-makers were casting about for the best method of achieving their objectives. The American invasion was so obviously similar to the Russian invasion of Hungary 10 years before, it could not be left on that unsubtle a level. And many Latin-American nations were in a frenzy of rage at the unilateral action. A device had to be worked out to smother the invasion in a rhetoric of Peace and Pan-Americanism.

The solution to this problem introduced a new stage of relations between the United States and the Latin-American countries, and one that may be with us for many years. It consisted of fabricating an "Inter-American Peace Force," formed with token troops from the Latin-American dictatorships which, combined with massive U. S. forces, would operate under a Latin-American general taking orders from Washington.

The Organization of American States was the perfect instrument. The O.A.S. is an American-dominated group whose aims originally were to sponsor better relations among the nations of the Americas, but which soon degenerated into an apologist body for U. S. policy. Canada had always refused to be a member. When Cuba went Communist under Castro, the country was expelled for being undemocratic: the necessary votes being supplied by such democratic nations as the Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Paraguay. An Inter-American Peace Force under the O.A.S. would be ideal camouflage to consolidate the Dominican operation—and any similar invasions required.

This was the latest evolution of American policy. Guatemala was the last of the pure banana aggressions. Though investment protection was still an important objective (the tension with Castro started because of his nationalist aims, not Communism), the Cuban fiasco and the missile crisis made national security an overriding obsession. Suddenly, the scales were turned. Instead of having Russia ringed by atomic missiles (defense of the U. S.), the War Department saw with horror Latin-American countries doing the same thing (offense against the U.S.). But taking this logic one step further, if a Communist country like Cuba could contemplate such a measure, it followed that a non-Communist leader like Juan Bosch, if not under the direct thumb of the Pentagon, was a mortal danger to U. S. security. It then was an equally logical conclusion that any country in Latin America (and especially in the Caribbean) not wholly subservient to the Pentagon was a hostile government. This argument was stated most clearly in

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Latin-American Mission by deLesseps S. Morrison, U. S. Ambassador to the O.A.S. from 1961 to 1964. Mr. Morrison wrote that Juan Bosch, former Costa Rican President José Figueres, former Puerto Rican Governor Luis Muñoz, and former Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt (all anti-Communists) "open the door" to Communists because they are of the "democratic Left."

The shift in American policy was engineered by summoning the O.A.S. to meet on the question of the Dominican Republic. Not why the American troops were there, but how they could be called Inter-American was the agenda. A Peace Force was then proposed, under which U. S. troops would operate.

The more democratic governments of Latin America, such as Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, protested and would have nothing to do with this comic-opera repertoire. But the dictators, who form the majority, gave their affirmative vote. And the O.A.S. then created the Inter-American Peace Force.

The results were predictable. The Commander of this force was from Brazil (where a military coup had taken over the government a short time before) and in total sympathy with the Dominican junta. Beside Brazilians, the other significant body of Latin-American troops came from Paraguay, where dictator Stroessner is a Teutonic version of Trujillo. Behind them stood the American Marines and paratroopers.

The concept of such an Inter-American Force had its virgin launching in the Dominican Republic. But what was good for the Dominicans can be equally good for all temporarily aberrant Good Neighbors. In May, 1965, Averell Harriman was sent to Latin America to explain U.S. Dominican policy. He told an audience in Montevideo that the principle of nonintervention was becoming "obsolete," a remark which President Johnson repeated shortly thereafter. In August, 1966, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey declared that "the U. S. and each Latin-American country are authorized to use armed force, individually or collectively, in confronting Communist threats." And New York's Senator Jacob Javits, when visiting Chile last year, told reporters that "either an Inter-American military force would have to be established to combat Communism or there would be future unilateral actions such as occurred in the Dominican Republic."

The message is clear. The Latin-American countries have been told by the most distinguished political figures in the U. S. to choose an Inter-American Force or the Marines.

The thread that binds the different stages of U. S. relations to Latin America is the relation of master to servant. In 1895, Cleveland's

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Secretary of State Olney stated the matter bluntly. Referring to the Monroe Doctrine, he said: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Whether creating a colonial empire, protecting investments, or out of fear of Communism, the American nation assumes the Western Hemisphere is its personal preserve in which there can be no poaching.

In this matter, of course, the United States is no different from any other great nation. In Shakespeare's *Pericles* a young fisherman asked how the fish live in the sea. "Why, as men do a-land; the great ones eat up the little ones," is the answer. America expanded where it could in the nineteenth century until it became, with Russia and China, one of the three most important land powers in the world. Russian expansion south and east during the past century is very similar to that of the United States; her recent conduct in Eastern Europe bears the same trademark as American policy in the Caribbean. China absorbed border peoples over many hundreds of years, and a strong government has renewed the habit in the last decade.

The major difference is that America pretends not to do what she does, concealing imperialism in a rhetoric of lofty aims. Stalin's Russia set up puppet Communist regimes in Eastern Europe that patently represented a small minority of the people. Mao's China simply took Tibet and the mountainous areas of eastern India by martial occupation. The United States talks of free elections, a good-neighbor policy and Pan-Americanism, while smashing the attempts of Latin-American nations to create governments that might disagree with Washington.

It may seem harsh to state that the United States actively promotes military dictatorships. But America fears independent leaders, nationalists who put their own interests over those of Pax Americana. In practice, therefore, the U. S. supports those elements which lead to rightist dictators. The clearest example is the Dominican situation. President Kennedy was adored by most liberals. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., another liberal, quoted with approval Kennedy's "realistic" view of the situation resulting from Trujillo's assassination: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third." (*A Thousand Days*, p. 769.)

Following this logic, President Kennedy opposed the election of Juan Bosch in 1962. President Johnson preferred not to take chances

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and brought the matter to its ultimate conclusion by conquering the country.

VI

The goal of U. S. policy, thus, is that pantomime governments share our aims and prejudices. This is the heart of the problem. America is ruled by an elite with a frozen interpretation of democracy, party structure, and stability. The government apparatus and communications media enforce and reinforce this mythology: the enormous expense of running for public office; the control of elections through the primary system; the channeling of public opinion by means of advertising pressures on magazines, newspapers, radio, and television; the domestic brainwashing that brands new political and social views disloyal. Any foreign figure or party which veers from our preconceived image is viewed with great distrust. This is the true meaning, to quote again from deLesseps S. Morrison, our former Ambassador to the O.A.S., of the statement that the "democratic Left" will "open the door" to Communists. Furthermore, most of the men who guide policy in Latin America not only emotionally distrust any social agitation based on the aspirations of the poor, but also have important personal financial interests at stake. And here may be the most vicious aspect of U.S.-Latin-American relations.

The Dominican Republic is a classic example of these forces at work. Joseph Farland, former Ambassador to Santo Domingo, was a board member of the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company, which owns 300,000 acres of land in that country and is considered the largest employer on the island. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., who vigorously defended the Dominican aggression, was chairman of the board of the Sucrest Company, large importers of molasses from the Dominican Republic. Ellsworth Bunker, Jr., U. S. Ambassador to the O.A.S., deeply involved in the Dominican negotiations, was a board member and stock owner of the National Sugar Refining Company, a firm with important Dominican sugar interests.

This web of self-interest is not unique to the Dominican scene. The Bradens and Guggenheims, with enormous copper interests in Chile and Peru, always seem to end up as ambassadors to Latin America. The Rockefellers own a large part of Venezuelan oil and Nelson Rockefeller was Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs from 1940 to 1944. General Walter Bedell Smith, director of the CIA when the coup against President Arbenz of Guatemala was planned, joined the board of the United Fruit Company the next year.

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Within the U. S., officials may only take office if they strip themselves of any investment which could lead to a conflict of interest. The reverse is true in the foreign service. It may not be too farfetched to hazard a guess that certain ambassadors and other high officeholders have deliberately chosen Latin-American posts under the spoils system in order to protect or advance their personal fortunes. The famous words of Marine General Smedly Butler (*Common Sense,* November 1935) still bear repeating: "I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank to collect revenue in. . . . I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests. . . ." And more recently, General David M. Shoup, retired Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, put it just as bluntly: "I believe that if we had and would keep our dirty, bloody dollar-crooked fingers out of the business of these nations so full of depressed, exploited people, they will arrive at a solution of their own."

Like the men who gravitate to the State Department, the Pentagon is also dominated by cadres who share both an emotional distrust of other systems and an automatic respect for conservative leadership dominated by moneyed interests. The Pentagon defines Communists within this frame of reference. Juan José Arevalo claimed in his famous anti-American diatribe, *The Shark and the Sardines,* that the State Department, the Pentagon, and Wall Street were three faces of the same repressive force and—putting aside certain exaggerations in style—there is much truth to the assertion. The Pentagon has been so shocked by Fidel Castro, that anyone not totally subservient to Washington now seems like an enemy fledgling who must be destroyed in the nest.

Such a foreign policy is dominated by negative thinking. It is based on the false assumption that "stability" through repression means progress and that the friendship of quislings or dictators is equivalent to Pan-American accord. U. S. policy leaders refuse to recognize that it is impossible to manufacture an American-type middle class out of a vacuum: what is worse, at the same time while they are pumping for an economic Common Market among the Latin-American nations, they resist all efforts to lower the high-tariff wall by which the raw materials and agricultural products from these nations are kept from being sold in the U. S. The same senators who whoop for invasion also represent domestic fruit growers, cattle herders, and sugar-beet planters. Our ideological desire to create a stable middle class is riven by contradictions from head to toe.

These contradictions also pervade the Alliance for Progress. The *Alianza* orginally was created by President Kennedy to counter the

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Castro heresy. But any goal is only as weak or strong as its presuppositions, and the Alliance is hamstrung by conceiving the ideal society only as an extension of the American system.

Mark Twain, in a light mood, once defined Americanization by the following story. A woman left dough to bake overnight in an oven. During the night a cat crawled into the oven and gave birth to kittens. The next morning, the woman took out the kittens and called them biscuits. The process might work in America, with all its attendant difficulties. But it cannot work in Latin America, for the weight of a different culture, a different history, a different language, a different racial composition, a different majority religion, and a different economic structure is too great for any Alliance for Progress to present kittens as biscuits.

Aids to industry become additional largesse for the present vested interests. Subsidies to support existent governments become instruments for enlarged state oppression. Homes for the poor end up as special housing for the lackeys of the *status quo*. Support of free currency exchange means greater uncontrolled foreign investment. Even the best aspects of disinterested philanthropy can be bad if not accompanied by other important reforms. Freeing water from bacterial infection, saving mothers from death in childbirth, inoculating children, enlarging educational opportunities in a static society only multiply the number of the hungry and discontented. To increase the population and to stimulate education in a petrified caste system merely enlarges misery. Ironically, such a program is also the best way to create Communists.

The future of Latin America lies in its own sense of history and not another sense of history, its own psychology and not another psychology, its own people and not another people. And the chances are that this process will collide with Yankee interest. It is illogical to expect the U. S. voluntarily to give up power. The State Department will still be under pressure from businessmen fearful of confiscation and desirous of profits. The Pentagon will still be obsessed with threats to U. S. hegemony. The American people will still feel only vague sympathy with nations of such vastly different backgrounds.

But the future of Latin America is also a special case of the U. S. future. Latin-Americans will take many years to reshape their destiny. It may take longer for Americans, freed of inflated rhetoric and official lies, to understand that every nation has a right to seek its own destiny in accordance with its own set of values. And it may take even longer for the more important truth to sink in that often what is called

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foreign policy is nothing more at bottom than the massive use of U. S. power to enrich a small group of well-placed businessmen.

Because these Americans—and not least in Congress—insist on identifying patriotism with their own pocketbooks, we are involved in continual conflict with the countries south of the Rio Grande. But since our foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy and the wishes of those who control it, the ultimate answer lies here at home. When those forces are curbed within the United States that fatten themselves on social inequality everywhere, then there will be little problem in adjusting to Latin-American ferment.

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Michael Walzer

THE CONDITION OF GREECE

Twenty Years after the Truman Doctrine

It is hard to talk about American intervention these days without talking about Vietnam. Yet Vietnam is not a typical case, in part because the Communists were and are so much stronger there than in any other country where Americans have been active during the past 20 years, in part because our response to Communism in Vietnam has been so radically unlimited. Perhaps this kind of response has been a possibility latent in every American intervention; perhaps we have been so successful precisely because we have always been willing to be so reckless. But our past interventions have been limited in character, even sophisticated, and it is worth exploring their consequences, if only to conclude that what is wrong with American policy in Vietnam is not merely its madness.

Just 20 years after President Truman initiated the policy of cold-war intervention, Greece has arrived at what many people regard as its culminating point: a right-wing military dictatorship. Not that this was Truman's goal; he certainly intended to bring Greece "the benefits of democracy," though it may be doubted that that was his only or even his primary intention. Nor is the regime of the colonels in any sense the direct result of the policy of Truman and his successors. It is the result of Greek politics, the outcome of local conflicts and contradictions not novel or unfamiliar to any student of Greek history. The Greeks have proven themselves capable of producing repressive rightist regimes in the past without American assistance. I want to argue, however, that the effect of American intervention has been to reinforce a system which periodically produces such regimes and to oppose all tendencies toward the radicalization of Greek society. And I want to argue, further, that this is, not the inevitable, but the probable effect of American intervention in general, given the ideologies that determine its course.

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I

I will consider American intervention in Greece under three headings: military, economic, and political. These headings are conventional and convenient, but it should be remembered that they can be misleading. Economic decisions are often made for political reasons, and political decisions for military reasons.

The U.S. provided approximately 3.5 billion dollars in assistance to Greece from 1947 to 1962, when the aid program was formally terminated. That is more money, relative to population, than we have provided for any other country, with the exception of Vietnam. About 40 per cent of the money was spent for military purposes, and annual grants for those purposes were continued after 1962 in undiminished amounts. Immediately after the recent military coup, *Le Monde* asserted that the Greek army was "wholly dependent" on American money, but that has not been true for many years. At the present time, we apparently pay (precise figures are not easy to come by) about one third of the Greek defense budget, most of this being spent in the U.S. for military equipment. I think it can be said that American assistance has not led to the creation of a permanent army larger, or much larger, than Greece can afford—though the army is considerably better equipped than Greece can afford and, in any case, it is afforded at the expense of social construction. But the size of the present army is not all that much bigger than was the size of the same army in the late 1930's, when the Greeks were paying for it entirely by themselves. It would be difficult, then, to make the conventional liberal argument against military assistance: that it produces an outsized and overbearing military machine threatening democratic institutions. American officials in Greece, in collaboration with rightst politicians and generals, have for some time resisted Center-Left demands for reductions in the defense budget. But rightist politicians and generals have their own reasons for joining this resistance, and it is probably true that Greek governments since 1947 have had the kind of army they required and probably would have had it whether we paid for it or not.

The crucial issue is the political character of the army and not its size. In 1947 we inherited from the British a Greek army thoroughly purged not only of all leftists, but also of all republicans (Greek republicans were generally "left" only in the most formal sense) and from which large numbers of young men were excluded because of their participation in ELAS, the wartime resistance movement. We also inherited an army responsible only to the king, pledged directly to him in an almost feudal fashion, and effectively removed from

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parliamentary control. That independence did not seem to matter much so long as the Right was in firm control of parliament. But it was designed to perpetuate that control, or rather, to deprive parliament permanently of the power to carry through reforms disliked by the officers, and so it posed a deadly danger to any possible Center-Left majority that intended actually to govern.

The effect of American policy has been to preserve this double inheritance. We have acted—for example, by our selection of officers to study in the U.S.—so as to preserve the rightist character of the officers' corps. We have watched benevolently while the army became the home of all sorts of anti-modernist ideologies—and became also a political force far more reactionary (in part because it was less corrupt) than the reactionary governments it sustained. The army was a political force precisely because of its "nonpolitical" independence, and this too has been enhanced by American intervention. The effective control over military policy that we established during the civil war, the participation of U.S. officers in Greek strategic planning, and finally the subordination of the Greek army to NATO's Mediterranean command —all these served to cut the army loose from effective domestic control and to place it into the hands of our own officers and of those Greeks they most trusted (one of whom, of course, was the king).

Thus the rightist character of the Greek army and its relative freedom from the Greek parliament both need to be explained at least in part by the strategic and ideological compulsions of American policy. The strategic compulsion was to create quickly a modern army capable first of fighting the guerrillas and then of playing its assigned NATO role. It is a little hard to imagine at this late date just what that role was. One must, however, make an effort to remember, and a recent book on Greece's participation in NATO is helpful: "[Greece and Turkey] formed the southeastern flank of the NATO alliance," the author writes, "and contributed significantly to the strength of the conventional armies of NATO, which were quite inadequate in comparison with their Soviet counterparts. In 1952, Greece had ten combat-ready divisions . . . the Greek army was the only European army which had successfully fought a full-scale war against the Communists." (Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, 1966.) This was obviously an army worth defending against the very real possibility (in 1956, for example, and again in the mid-sixties) of a Center-Left or even a popular front majority in parliament. And it was for this reason that anti-parliamentary politics were encouraged in the Greek army and various plans for military take-over were actually

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developed at NATO headquarters and as a part of NATO strategy—though the Greek participants in such planning undoubtedly had Greek purposes in mind as well.

The ideological compulsion of American policy was to create a strongly and permanently anti-Communist army in a country where a very large percentage of the people could plausibly be said to have collaborated with the Communists or to have supported them in the very recent past. Nothing less than militant anti-Communism was acceptable in an army which had just fought and might again have to fight considerable numbers of its own people and whose conscripts needed to be watched and purged. Given this perceived need—and few Americans in Greece had any other perceptions—it would have made no sense at all not to work with the existing officers' corps, ready as it was to begin immediately the creation of an effective anti-Communist army. Nor would it have made any sense to question the officers' independence: they were clearly more trustworthy than the Greek people.

A remarkable ideological coziness grew up between reactionary Greek officers and their American counterparts, many of whom would probably have been liberal enough under other circumstances. This was symbolized best in that famous egg-breaking ceremony of last April, the formal reconciliation of the king and the colonels. An American military attaché was prominent among the officers at the ceremony, and when asked why he was there—no other attaché was present—he replied that the presence of an American was "traditional" at such affairs. This is a "tradition" we must take into account in explaining those other traditions that the colonels are defending.

II

The U.S. has spent close to two billion dollars on the Greek economy, about a quarter of it on relief shipments, largely of foodstuffs, the rest in monetary grants. By and large, this money seems to have been spent sensibly and with good will: to restore agriculture after the destruction of the German occupation and the two civil wars; to rebuild and enlarge the economy's infrastructure, especially the transportation and energy systems (the U.S. financed the construction of a national electric transmission line and also helped build the wonderful road that sweeps northward to the Yugoslav frontier); finally, to meet the foreign exchange requirements of reconstruction and to stabilize the drachma. Given this assistance and within the frame it helped create, Greece has had a remarkable period of economic growth. From 1951 to 1961, the average annual rate of growth was 6 per cent (it has

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reached 8 per cent more recently)—a rate similar to Italy's and not so far from Germany's average for the 1950's of 7.5 per cent, though of course Greece started from a much lower base. But there are a number of important qualifications to be made of the bright picture these statistics suggest. Enthusiastic announcements about economic growth should always be taken as an invitation to ask questions: growth of what sort? for whose benefit? at whose expense?

1. The growth of manufacturing has been slow. The percentage of the total labor force involved in industry has not grown at all: it was 13.2 per cent in 1928, 13.4 per cent in 1951, 13.1 per cent in 1961. (Ellis, *Industrial Capital in Greek Development*, 1964.) The absolute numbers have grown, but only in a minor way, for population has remained fairly stable as a result of very high rates of emigration. About 100,000 Greeks have been leaving their homeland every year for the past decade, most of them young men. In a total population of 8 million that is an extraordinary drain of talent and energy, and one which many Greeks bitterly resent. It is, of course, to everyone's material advantage that so many leave: the emigrants earn more money abroad than they possibly could in Greece; their remittances have become a major source of national income; emigration reduces unemployment and raises wages at home. But these very facts constitute a major indictment of the Greek economy.

Higher investment in manufacturing would have meant slower growth during the past 15 years, but it might at least have begun the creation of an economic system capable of holding its young men. The American aid program was partly responsible for establishing opposite priorities, pushing rapid growth in fields like tourism at the expense of industry. This was due to a genuine pessimism among many American economists as to the possibility of industrializing Greece, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to a willingness to tolerate or encourage development in those fields that an entrepreneur would freely choose: that is, where profits promised to be high, and finally to a reluctance to allow the kinds of tariff protection that would have been necessary to sustain new industry. Now Greece's affiliation with the Common Market, strongly pushed by the U.S., virtually precludes such protection and stands as an effective bar to industrial growth.

2. Greek economic growth has been accompanied by sharply rising inequalities. The government issues no statistics on income distribution (few governments do), but profits have been high since 1951, while wages have lagged behind, rising at a rate only slightly above that of the cost of living, and farm income (the income of most Greeks) has

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lagged considerably further behind. Unemployment has been high, despite emigration: Greece has had its reserve army. Growing inequality is a usual feature at least of the early stages of development in a capitalist economy, but in Greece this feature has been exaggerated by the simultaneous slowness of growth in industry.

3. The area of most rapid growth has been housing construction, which in various years during the 1950's and early 1960's accounted for two-fifths of gross capital formation—a building boom of huge proportions. Yet the number of slum dwellings has not significantly declined since 1947 and may even have increased. Housing has been provided for those who can pay for it, and above all luxury housing for those who can pay for that; but at the same time, "Athens has come to be nearly encircled by a zone of shabby, one-room shacks" (Ellis). In explaining this familiar paradox, it is important to note that only 9 per cent of investment in housing has been public (this contrasts with 69 per cent in Holland, 56 per cent in Britain, 27 per cent in Germany), and this means that there has been no serious planning, little public housing, no "new cities," etc.

4. Greece has been flooded with American consumer goods—because of "buy American" policies, because of the uncontrolled demand of local elites and the absence of local competition, perhaps also because of discriminatory tariffs. The result has been to increase dramatically the visibility of economic inequality and to create an atmosphere of super-heated affluence in the chief cities, especially in Athens. This is one of the factors distorting the regional balance of Greek development, drawing large numbers of people into the cities where they can neither find useful work nor share in the material splendor.

5. Both Greek economic development and American investment have had the effect of increasing the country's dependence on foreigners and foreign economies. This takes different forms for different social classes. Thus, the enormous expansion of tourism means more and more men at work in one or another of the servile trades: waiters, guides, bellhops, etc. Domestic unemployment, low wages, and the consequent emigration means that Greek workers are immediately dependent on economic growth elsewhere: a West German slump would be a disaster both for those that have left and for those at home. And the wealthy are dependent too: the greater inequalities become, and the more visible, the more they come to rely on the American presence to guarantee their position.

6. Finally, economic growth in Greece has vastly improved investment and profit opportunities for relatively small numbers of people

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without transforming the petty bourgeois, familial character of most Greek enterprise, without significantly enlarging the scope of middle-level entrepreneurial activity, without generating larger firms (or, in the countryside, larger farms), and without producing a modern working class. In other words, it has not established a truly modern capitalism (on the model, say, of Western Europe), but rather that special capitalism which grows up in the midst of backwardness without transforming it, characterized by uneven development and radical inequality.

Once again I should say: these are not the direct results of American assistance. Nevertheless, the general scope and character of American assistance has contributed significantly to these results. So has American economic ideology, quickly adopted in its most backward forms by Greek businessmen and politicians and generally reinforced by American businessmen and diplomats.

III

American intervention in Greek politics has sometimes been extraordinarily blatant (as in the days of the Cowboy Ambassador Peurifoy) and sometimes almost discreet. Sometimes our intentions with regard to Greek domestic affairs have been easy to decipher: thus in 1952 Peurifoy wanted, and got, a strong rightist government under General Papagos. But in the preceding years we had supported a variety of centrist politicians, and it is probably true that American officials would have preferred governments of the Center-Left, had the Center-Left shown any capacity to govern. This is one of the more important lessons to be learned from the Greek experience: that it is naive to expect a regime seriously committed to social reform to emerge out of a successful struggle against Communist insurgency, or against leftist rebels of any sort—a lesson confirmed by recent events in the Dominican Republic. Not that the Center disappeared from Greek life in the years of the civil war and after. It showed, indeed, a remarkable capacity for survival. The more energetic advocates of reform, however, were compromised by their real or alleged associations with the Communists, and the rest developed a non-ideological politics of personality and office, incredibly divisive, opportunistic, and empty. They adapted, that is, to the American presence and to the general atmosphere of militant anti-Communism that made any assault upon privilege and inequity in Greek life impossible (even though many Americans privately favored such an assault). They cut themselves off from any organized popular base and turned parliamentarism, for a time, into a facade behind which old and new oligarchs operated freely. Though the Greek Right,

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after 1946, never won a majority of the popular vote, the centrist politicians were so hopelessly divided, the power of their various "personality parties" fluctuated so wildly from election to election and from one parliamentary maneuver to the next, that it was inconceivable that any of them could govern the country. It was a direct result of the successfully fought civil war that a strong lead could come only from the Right. And this lead took the usual form: political terrorism against former guerrillas and guerrilla sympathizers, uncontrolled economic growth, close military cooperation with the U.S.

As a result of all this, Center-Left politicians were occasionally tempted to experiment, however nervously, with a neutralist and popular front politics. They advocated reductions in military expenditure and so questioned the immediacy of the Russian threat; they expressed cautious concern about American interference in local politics, and uneasiness with the NATO alliance. This sort of thing fitted well with the demagogic nationalism on the Cyprus question that later became their stock-in-trade and served to conceal the near-identity of their domestic programs with those of the government. In 1956 there even appeared, briefly, a kind of popular front—an electoral coalition of the old republican parties with the Communist-dominated EDA. But this looks in retrospect less like a serious social movement than a desperate scramble for office. Still, when a decisive challenge to rightist power actually emerged in the early 1960's, in the form of a unified Center-Left led by Papandreou, American officials could hardly help but view it as a threat. It was indeed a threat to the whole pattern of priorities and alliances that they had worked out during the 10 years since Papagos came to power. Similarly, the new Center-Left, representing many different forces in Greek life, could hardly help but represent also a nascent anti-Americanism, a repudiation of those same 10 years.

So the Center-Left, when it finally reappeared years after a successful counter-insurgency, was still not the anti-Communist Left of the American liberal dream. In fact, its very reappearance seemed to depend upon the end of cold-war politics. Certainly, the young Papandreou represents a new radicalism in Greek life, seriously committed to social change, non-Communist but not militantly anti-Communist, and so at war with the built-in assumptions of the whole American mission.

IV

In an important sense, I think, the Greek coup supports the thesis of Barrington Moore's recent book *Social Origins of Democracy and*

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Dictatorship: that economic growth in the absence of radical social change culminates in rightist repression. One may hope for further "culminations," of course, but for the moment that seems a plausible conclusion. The kinds of assistance that America at its best provides encourage growth without encouraging structural transformation. And so they simultaneously reinforce oligarchic rule and threaten it—threaten the oligarchs because of the enhanced resentments and capacities of the population at large (two consequences of uneven development) and at the same time provide them with the material force to meet the threat.

It would be enormously useful to attempt a careful comparison along these lines of recent Greek and Yugoslav history. For the success of Communist insurgency in Yugoslavia was simultaneous with the success of British and then American intervention in Greece. A genuinely indigenous insurrection and a relatively sophisticated intervention: which has produced the better society? What price has Yugoslavia paid for destroying *and Greece for failing to destroy* the social and institutional basis of old authoritarianism and traditionalist mythology? This is not an easy question to answer, for there is no agreed-upon procedure for measuring the factors involved: political terrorism, intellectual freedom, economic inequality, etc. Still, it could be argued with considerable success that Yugoslavia is today the better society, or at least, the one for which we can entertain higher hopes. Perhaps the Yugoslavs will one day have to endure the rule of some leftist version of the Greek colonels. But the obstacles to such domination seem to grow greater every year—while in Greece the colonels' rule is, for the moment at least, unchallenged.

V

Even though the recent coup was probably carried out without American help or prior approval (various rumors about CIA involvement can neither be discounted nor believed), it is not unfair to suggest that rightist repression is in America's interest in Greece today. I mean interest in the narrow and specific sense: not your interest or mine, not the interest of the U.S. as a democratic society, or even as a world power, but rather the interest of the U.S. as defined by its present and past elites and embodied in their policies in countries like Greece since the late 1940's. This is not the place to attempt any careful analysis of these definitions and policies, but I do want to suggest three sources of both, sources directly relevant in explaining

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the pattern of military, economic, and political intervention that I have just outlined.

First of all, the character of American strategic thought, the interlocking system of commitments that have followed from it, and the institutional arrangements that follow from the commitments: all these together generate interests which are not illusory even if they sometimes seem fantastic. The fact that these interests endure long after even the most fervent military ideologist might well have forgotten them has something to do with their institutionalization; it is partly a consequence of bureaucratic immobility. For there is no better bureaucracy than that which soldiers create and very few, surely, within which patterns of thought so quickly become habitual. Today the Greek army stands guard against a Russian thrust southward; it is appropriately equipped and indoctrinated; all things being equal, it will stand guard forever. It is tightly locked into the NATO alliance, and if one of NATO's reasons for being is the defense of Greece, the defenders of Greece in turn gird themselves for the sake of NATO. It might even be said that Greece today is in the grip of its army because, free of that grip, it might have begun to free itself also of the NATO commitment.

Second, the anti-Communist ideology of American society in general and so of the American mission in Greece. This too gives rise to a system of commitments and alliances and—in the usual absence of effective anti-Communist reformers—ties the U.S. to the political Right, producing an extreme distrust of populist leaders, radical programs, and any kind of left-looking policies. Having come to Greece to oppose a Communist insurrection, we have stayed to oppose any rebuilding of the Left that might conceivably admit the Communists or their sympathizers to the centers of power. But that means to oppose the rebuilding of the Left, for the Communists retain the allegiance of from 10 to 20 per cent of the electorate, and any leftist leader seriously committed to social change is going to have to rely on their support at critical moments and to pay a price for it. There are some prices worth paying, surely, but the pervasive anti-Communist ideology makes it impossible for an American official to calculate these, or, if he makes the calculations, to defend them before his superiors.

Third, the ideology of free enterprise and the economic interests that develop around it. It would be ridiculous to claim that the American economy requires the exploitation of the Greek market, or, if it did, that it would require the kind of market generated by uneven development, upper-class affluence, extensive speculation, etc. It is al-

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most certainly true that a wider market and a more equalitarian society would be in the greater interest of the greater number of American entrepreneurs. Still, it would also be wrong to pretend that American businessmen-on-the-spot do not have an interest in Greece as-it-is. An expansive economy, like the American, is always represented abroad by particular people, never in its entirety, and these particular people and their self-defense and aggrandizement play an important part in determining policy. Today, many American businessmen abroad are involved in catering to local upper classes and a kind of mutual identification tends to grow up that expresses itself both socially and ideologically, affecting the whole tenor of the American presence and reinforcing its rightward bent.

These, I believe, are the sources of American policies in Greece. Any effort to change these policies must strike at the sources, and begin to cut them off. Democracy will one day return to Greece, as a result of Greek efforts and struggles. But the precondition of that achievement may well be an American attack on the American mission: a critique of NATO, of official anti-Communism, and of the capitalist character of foreign aid. That is the immediate work of the American Left.

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Arnold S. Kaufman

RADICALISM AND CONVENTIONAL POLITICS

The following article was presented as a discussion paper at an informal Conference for the Democratic Left held in New York City this past May. In future issues we will publish other papers.—EDITORS

For any rational man seriously committed to the values of an authentic liberalism or liberal socialism, the present mood must be one of despair, and even agony. For the processes of American democracy have proved inadequate to the task of restraining our government from embarking on a course in Vietnam that is as barbaric as it is pointless. One might even claim that there has never been an occasion in American history when belief in the total corruption of American society, lack of faith in the promise of the American constitutional order, is more justified by events. And yet, there are deeply ironical aspects to the present crisis, analysis of which reveals paradox and some basis for optimism.

I point the irony by way of a text:

> The two-party system which has become an object of veneration to numerous ex-radicals and liberals, continues to prevent any clear articulation of basic political choices. The more the intellectuals declare its virtues to be flexible, the more, in practice, does it make for an increasing homogeneity and conformism in American political life.

The author of this passage then goes on to inveigh against the idea that McCarthyism is dead—attributing the absurd belief to "the classical mistake of the liberal mind: the mistake of assuming that the essence of politics consists of parliamentary maneuvers, votes and resolutions." The writer is not a member of today's estranged Left. He is Irving Howe, writing in DISSENT in the winter of 1955.

I cite the passage, not for the purpose of picking a fight with Howe, whose recent writings do, I believe, exhibit discriminating intelligence, remarkable in these times of contaminating stress. I cite it rather in order to highlight the irony that concerns me here. A little over a decade ago Howe spoke for a group which was so inflexibly despairing of American society that they chose to take their stand outside the conventional political system —adopting the stance of maverick dissenters. The irony consists in the fact that he, and many who shared his views in 1955, are today among the most eloquent and persuasive advocates of the importance of working within existing political structures so as to shape and reshape them. They advocate a politics of coalition. They stress the possibilities that inhere within our conventional political system.

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They do not gloss over what is deranged and corrupt, but they refuse to participate in the fashion of a total repudiation of the American system. They stress opportunities as well as harsh realities. They emphasize the promise as well as the sickness of American liberalism. And in all of this I believe they are right.

The paradox consists in the fact that these radicals have moved to their present position during the very period in recent history in which has occurred the most dramatic evidence for their earlier mood of skepticism and rejection. At the very moment in history when, on any surface analysis, they should have moved even more firmly to a posture of dissent *outside* the conventional political system, they have done just the reverse. And on their left, expressing precisely the mood of total disengagement that they articulated in the mid-fifties, they find thousands who were well to their right during that period—those who form the largest element in the loose assortment of individuals that has come to be known as the New Politics. I think we can learn much by analyzing how this paradoxical situation has come about, and what it signifies.

Perhaps the most unwelcome gesture of all in the present situation is to express even a feeble note of optimism. Many protect their despair most vigorously. And yet it is as important to face the fact that the future is not all black as it is to accept the present bleakness.

II

The phenomenon I'm interested in is the process by which large numbers of people are radicalized on the Left in a way that results in their adopting a posture outside the political system, and are subsequently absorbed as militants into that system. This is not the only way in which people are radicalized, but it is the pattern that is particularly relevant to this discussion.

First a word or two about the idea of radicalization. Two different things are involved. All radicals have in common the belief that their society is so grossly defective that nothing less than fundamental reconstruction of basic institutions will provide an adequate remedy. But it is also often thought that to be radical one must be ready to engage in forms of political activity that are unorthodox and disreputable by conventional standards. These activities may be as mild as picketing or as severe as full-scale organized revolt. In our society the appropriate tactics seem to range over various forms of legal disturbance and civil disobedience. But I think these two ideas—radical reconstruction of institutions and unorthodox tactics and strategies—must be kept distinct. For my purposes a left-wing radical is one who seriously and persistently aims at fundamental reconstruction of basic institutions whether he deems it desirable to work within or outside of the conventional political process. For there is no *a priori* reasoning by which one mode of action as against another can be presumed to be most effective in relation to radical ends. But one qualification is required. If, on many occasions, there is good reason to think that an unorthodox course of action is likely to be more effective than available alternatives in realizing radical goals in which someone professes belief, then, if he always finds some

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reason or other to avoid such actions, we may fairly doubt that he is genuinely radical.

Three factors will normally be present when individuals become convinced that it is right and necessary for them to work outside the established political structures in order to achieve radical goals.

i. A situation exists, usually but not necessarily some datable event, which is viewed as catastrophically evil. The situation may be a depression, war, or tyrannical crusade, or it may be a system of slavery or systematic exploitation of some other sort. The important thing is not whether the situation is evil, but whether it is regarded as evil. In either case the belief that catastrophic evil is occurring normally results from the fact that those who so view matters have beliefs and expectations that are violently at odds with their view of existing reality. That is, there is an enormous gap between the ideals they profess and the facts as they view them. Among the situations that have produced radicalizing tendencies in American history are constriction of credit, slavery, sweated labor, the Great Depression, McCarthyism, and Vietnam.

ii. But these tendencies will not result in significant political action of any sort, estranged or conventional, unless there is a widespread belief that the catastrophic conditions are remediable. In the absence of such a belief, individuals angered and frustrated by events are more likely to engage in orgies or crime than in sit-ins or precinct politics. The idea that politics is the art of the possible may be the wardheeler's fallacy, but it is not an art that flourishes unless certain outcomes are believed possible.

iii. Neither of the first two factors will result in people taking the view that they must abandon conventional politics unless they also come to believe that the catastrophic evil is cause or symptom of social derangements so pervasive and deep that it is impossible to get any leverage by working for change in generally accepted ways. The normal processes of American democracy come to be regarded as so defective that reliance on them is futile. In these circumstances those who have been radicalized may demonstrate, sit-in, teach-in, riot, rebel, form third parties, burn flags, picket, deliberately disobey laws of one sort or another, sponsor a happening, and so on.

III

Americans are generally very reluctant to abandon the more respectable ways of pursuing their ends. And they will not do so unless they come to lose all confidence in the will or capacity for action of the leaders of the more "liberal" or "progressive" forces. On the other hand, these leaders will normally be able to make a convincing case why they should not be outspoken or publicly active in opposing the catastrophic evil. They will assure their followers *in private* that they are doing everything *in private* to remedy the catastrophic situation. They will point out that they have official positions that impose multiple obligations—and that to be publicly identified with the cause that generates major concern would be to forefeit all ability to work for beneficial outcomes in other respects. ("I must not openly

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oppose the war because to do so would impair my ability to function effectively in my capacity as trade union leader, civil rights leader, judge, teacher, administrator, legislator, publisher, etc.") From the point of view of those who see the evil as catastrophic this kind of reasoning is likely to be interpreted as self-serving; a way of avoiding anything that threatens one's career. (The very civil rights leaders who use this mode of reasoning to explain silence in relation to the war were once as vehement as their present critics in attacking trade union leaders, local politicians, Southern intellectuals, and the like for failing to stand up for racial justice—though the latter used exactly the same sorts of arguments in replying to the urgings of the civil rights leaders.) Some are more charitable. They fully sympathize with the bind the leader finds himself in. But they nevertheless lose confidence because though each particular act of non-commitment seems defensible, the cumulative impact of *all* these omissions is massive failure to operate the conventional agencies of political power so as to effect desired change. Each individual saves his *political substance,* the cumulative effect being to squander political opportunities.

Despair and disillusionment then reach such proportions that masses of people lose all confidence in the resilience and integrity of conventional political processes. In their frustration and anger they are as likely as not to turn more vehemently against those who continue to try to work within these established structures than against their common adversaries. (In my own town, Ann Arbor, many would rather beat the other faction, also opposed to the war, than elect a dove from the other camp.) Opposition to the catastrophic evil is thus fragmented, becomes even less effective than before, and intensifies the radicalizing processes. Those newly estranged from conventional politics in turn comfort themselves with the thought that they are the only men of true conscience in the country. They alone act in a morally authentic way. This makes tolerable the painful fact that they have abandoned any effort to gain control of existing levers of political power, and that they often undermine the work of organizations that could be effective in more conventional ways.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress the value as well as the defects of those who tend to abandon conventional politics. In my essay "Where Shall Liberals Go?"* I tried to characterize the three distinctive political styles—the politics of pseudo-realism, the politics of self-indulgence, and the politics of radical pressure—that one finds on the American Left. My own preference is for the latter. But, as I there argue, those who practice the politics of self-indulgence are more capable than most people of sustained, serious effort despite absence of conventional political rewards, and are often initiators of new and immensely significant departures from the normal processes; and they can provide an invaluable conscience for a movement whose members, in the attempt to be successful, are not always as careful as they might be to remain faithful to principle and basic aims. To cut oneself off from these sources of energy and inspiration can be disastrous.

* DISSENT, September–October 1966.

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IV

I have tried to describe the abstract pattern by which men are radicalized. The pattern can be applied, with little modification, to reactions to McCarthyism, the civil rights struggle, and now Vietnam.

Now suppose the catastrophic evil abates or is eliminated. McCarthy is crushed; significant civil rights progress is made. Suppose this reversal is brought about in part by a more effective functioning of conventional political processes. It may be that this happens as a result of the outside pressure. Alternatively, the catastrophic evil may reach so deeply into the society, affect so many, that it becomes politically advantageous to resist — as the military did during the McCarthy era. Leaders stop saving their substance and start grasping opportunities. Masses of men *within* the conventional system begin to unfreeze and to act. Those who have been radicalized and have opted out begin to be reabsorbed by the normal political structures. If the radicalization process has not affected them too deeply, they become the new militants—usually with the Democratic party.

If, on the other hand, the impact of the radicalization has been "traumatic"—if an individual has reacted too strongly against the system—then one of two things is likely to happen. He may become a politically marginal man, existing powerlessly on the fringe of the re-emerging coalitions, waiting like a rebellious Micawber, for some "revolutionary" opportunity to turn up. Alternatively, he may come to feel that he was gulled into overreacting; that he was duped by sinister forces. He may come to believe that a man as remarkably wise and virtuous as himself could not conceivably have been so wrong without having been victimized by satanic forces. He may then become a celebrant of the American system and a relentless persecutor of those by whom he thinks he was duped. He moves from excessively estranged radicalism to indefatigable defense of the American Way of Life. Or he may simply end up on Madison Avenue.

Of course, the destiny of a new militant is not necessarily one unsullied by vice. Indeed, he may become increasingly conservative as more and more of his original program is realized. He and his allies, having fought the good fight, and having much to show for their efforts, cease, out of tiredness or complacency, to function as militants. It is not that they abandon the old rhetoric. But the rhetoric becomes a mere, often self-deceptive cover for participation in that institutional indifference which, besides being the source of much comfort, is the ultimate disorder in American society. Of course the fact that they retain the old rhetoric keeps alive the possibility that they will recapture the old spark —but it is an increasingly remote possibility. Nevertheless another catastrophic evil may come along, and may fan the radical embers for a while. Nor is recovery of the old fire unimportant. For under appropriate circumstances fired-up warhorses can coalesce with others to produce a new and effective militancy. Such in fact seems to me to be happening in relation to our most recent catastrophic evil—the Vietnam War; a fact to which I'll return.

The preceding analysis has, as many

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of you have no doubt noted, omitted any reference to ideological considerations—to political theory, political philosophy, political reflection. But my reason is simple. Ideology and reflection figure in the pattern of analysis in two ways. A person's commitments, often reflectively achieved, are a very important consideration in determining who is and who is not radicalized by catastrophic evil. It is not surprising that academic intellectuals and college students are among those most radicalized by the Vietnam situation. For in matters of foreign policy almost the only ones who are radicalized are those who have commitments that withstand the pressures of the patriotic pitch. Secondly, under the impact of the radicalizing experience, one is often impelled to think more deeply about political matters than previously. It is not, then, that I think ideology and reflection unimportant; but rather that I have chosen to focus on other aspects of the pattern more germane to my present interest.

Let me now apply the analysis to the paradox I posed at the outset—the fact that many who were "outside" men in the mid-fifties (and, presumably before) have become "inside" men today. Given their shared commitment to democratic socialism, they were predisposed to be skeptical about the possibility of moving toward radical goals even before the catastrophic evil of McCarthyism. And in this their experience does not quite fit the pattern. Nevertheless, McCarthy must have intensified their skepticism. And America's inability or unwillingness to destroy the historic disabilities of black men confirmed them in the conviction that fundamental reconstitution of the processes of American democracy was required.

But deep commitment to democracy and to other liberal values forestalled extreme disenchantment with the conventional processes. McCarthy's decline and fall, mitigation at least of the most visible and worst manifestations of McCarthyism, and significant initial progress in the struggle for civil rights led to a revised estimate both of the potentialities of American democracy and the moral seriousness of at least a segment of those who call themselves liberals. The revised judgment, though severely shaken, has so far withstood the pressures generated by the Vietnam outrage.

V

The history of the labor movement provides another illustration of the dynamic I have described. Confronted by an implacably hostile corporate elite that seemed to be in firm control of the major agencies of political and industrial change, the labor movement resorted to every kind of "kooky" action, picketing, massive demonstrations, sit-ins, riots, wanton destruction, maybe even flag burnings, and other forms of civil disobedience that were the moral equivalents of draft-card burnings. The CIO fought the more complacent segments of the trade union movement. Partly in response to these extreme actions, partly because the evil that provoked the outbursts was one which more "respectable" and "moderate" people could no longer ignore, political programs were forced through in more conventional ways. Eventually, the demands that had stirred men to action at the outset were sufficiently satisfied, so that increasing

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numbers of militant trade unionists began to play less inflammatory roles within existing political agencies. They moved into the Democratic party and began to throw their weight around there. Every now and again, as with Reuther before the '48 elections, they toyed with the idea of a third force—a farmer-labor party that would supplant the Democratic party in the way that Britain's Labor party eventually replaced the Liberal party. But these initiatives turned out to be the last writhings of a social force increasingly committed to working within the two-party system. For better or worse, the trade union movement began to function as a force primarily dedicated to serving the interests of active members and to completing the welfare state, and is today only marginally committed to the full range of basic social programs that its original militancy might have led one to expect. And so in little more than a generation the trade union movement moved from a position outside conventional party politics to a position in which it became one of the great stabilizing forces within the society and the political system.

VI

Today we have a new catastrophic evil, a new process of radicalization occurring. Once again, as throughout American history, there are those who exhibit a positively indecent tendency to exaggerate the virtues of the American system, the American political order. And, as if determined not to be outdone, there are those who exaggerate its defects, underestimate its capacity for permitting and even supporting required change.

The Vietnam War is a particularly obscene, cruel and dangerous misuse of vast power. Since the week after the initial escalation, most of my political activity has been directed to ending that conflict. I say this so that I will not be misunderstood in what I say next.

It is not at all clear to me that it is a catastrophic evil worse than the Great Depression or destruction of lives and aspirations in America's ghettoes. It does not seem to me so deeply rooted in the American system as these other catastrophic evils were and are. It is not worse than a number of other obscenities that have occurred in the history of this nation—the Mexican War was a much more direct and brutal use of American power. That war seems less obnoxious only because the United States had less power at its disposal.

Nor are those who "accidentally" kill civilians in their bombing runs less callous or culpable than the millions of privately virtuous citizens who every day omit actions that could humanize the conditions of the ghettoes. Some of our best friends are the privately virtuous men who *encourage public vice knowing what they do.*

It is a mystery to me why literally thousands who did not lose faith in the American system while it perpetrated great iniquities on fellow Americans should at this moment begin to talk about a "fascist takeover" of the United States. That threat is less imminent than it was during the McCarthy era. Say what you will, during a major shooting war that has now lasted 2½ years, the institutions that protect the rights of protest and petition, the rights of dissent and due pro-

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cess, have held reasonably firm. The Congressional dissent has enlarged as the war has enlarged. The size and intensity of the demonstrations have grown.

The great tragedy is that it may be too late. The Administration seems determined to press this war until it forces the North to abandon the rebel forces in the South. If we fail to thwart that ambition, if more tragically we fail to avert a larger conflict, then those who failed to grasp the normal levers of political power in an effort to end the war will bear a heavy share of the fault.

But if we somehow survive this war, then there is reason for a modest political optimism. For those who have been radicalized will, in overwhelming numbers, move back into the conventional structures of political activity with predictable rapidity. Moreover, they will insist on basic revision of America's cold war policies and of the anti-Communist posture of yesterday's liberalism—both welcome developments. They will, together with those of us waiting to receive them, form cadres of militants. It is important to anticipate and encourage that development—something that can be done in three ways: (i) Let us prevent internal squabbles from becoming rancorous. Let us refrain from acting out our frustration and anger at administration policy within the ranks of those opposed to the war. (ii) Let us, when possible, coordinate our activities. There is an enormous amount to be done, and it is foolish to suppose that any particular strategic perspective charts the one true way. iii) Those of us who continue to hold different strategic concepts must articulate those differences firmly, responsibly, but without an overload of contempt and disdain. If we are right in our basic calculations others will hopefully discover that we are and will become our future allies—always provided we all survive. In any event, exaggerated polemics are not likely to produce concessions.

We may also take heart from the past that the war has sparked a chain reaction within the ranks of the "establishment" liberals. The growing division within the labor movement, within ADA, within the Democratic party, within religious groups, and, in a way, within the civil rights movement are symptoms of this development. The deepening split will not be easily healed when and if the war ends. In any event there is much we can do to prevent its being quickly patched over. For what is at issue is no mere policy of international extent and significance; what is at issue is the very integrity of the liberal ideal that has guided the more progressive factions within American political life since the inception of the American experiment. We are, hopefully, living through an episode in the development of a decent society; and it does little good to view the interlude in apocalyptic terms.

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William M. McCord

ARMIES AND POLITICS

A Problem in the Third World

"Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power": so observed the great Islamic philosopher, al-Ghazali, when describing Moslem nations in 1100. His aphorism applies only too well in many of the developing countries of our time. *Plus ça change, moins ça change.*

Third-World armies today serve almost every conceivable function except that of fighting. In Ethiopia army officers compose the nation's most popular jazz ballads, while the police force is building the country's first symphony orchestra. In Egypt military men run everything from textile factories to insurance companies. In Iran much of the army spends its time guarding vehicles which have broken down on the road (sometimes military units will remain encamped besides a car for as long as three months). And in Nigeria the 7500-men army tries its hand at the immensely difficult task of holding together some 55 million people in a tenuous federation.

I do not wish to imply that military rule is the wave of the future, for an equally important but often overlooked trend is toward the overthrow of military dictators by democratic elements (as recently in Columbia, Venezuela, and the Sudan). Nonetheless, the incursion of praetorian guards into political, economic, and social affairs strikes some observers as one of a very few gloomy alternatives open to developing nations. "The choice [for Africa] has not been between one-party and multi-party states," says sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein; "it has been between one-party states and either anarchy or military regimes or various combinations of the two." Wallerstein himself prefers one-party regimes since, he claims, they are the most "democratic" of the possibilities. But naive historical determinism hardly does justice to the people of Africa. While a multi-party system in Nigeria has, at least temporarily, been replaced by military rule, semi-democratic governments survive in such unexpected places as Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya. And, as in the Sudan, military regimes have been toppled by

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civilian forces seeking a measure of democracy. In Ghana the military's dethronement of Nkrumah has encouraged the re-emergence of democratic institutions. Generalizations of the Wallerstein stripe do little to illuminate the actual choices open to the people of developing countries.

While not an inevitable stage in world history, the military assumption of power does seem to occur frequently in the emerging nations at this particular moment. The recent *coups d'état* in Indonesia, Nigeria, and Ghana appear to confirm Morris Janowitz's view that "the chance of [the army's] political involvement increases year by year after independence, while the contraction of the military's political role remains a highly problematic issue."

Americans view the dominance of armies in the developing areas with a high degree of ambivalence. Official American policy condemns intervention by the military. Yet our government leaders have, in fact, indiscriminately handed out military toys, money, and medals to those generals in developing areas who have piously taken a pro-Western posture. American foreign-policy makers have assumed that such men as Jimenez, Trujillo, and Chiang Kai-shek can form a barrier against international Communism as well as an assurance of domestic "stability."

On the other hand, American dissenters—from the "New Left" to middle-aged liberals to old radicals—have usually regarded the military ruler in emerging nations with unrelenting hostility. The dissenters have considered the role of people like Nasser as, at best, a necessary, albeit distasteful transition to some form of democracy. At worst, the dominance of a General Stroessner in Paraguay has been considered the most reactionary blockade to social reform.

Both the official and the dissenting American opinions about the military in developing nations have often been myopic, for both sides have implicitly assumed that military men are always cut from the same mold. In fact, the social origins, training, organization, history, and orientation of military corps differ from country to country. To fashion a rational American foreign policy, we must, of course, recognize these differences and understand, for example, that Nigerian officers who truly wish to play an apolitical role differ dramatically from Brazilian admirals who believe they stand above the nation as "guardians of the constitution." Beyond this acknowledgement of diversity, we must also respond to two fundamental issues:

First, under what conditions, if any, does army rule in developing nations foster the growth of a liberal or social democracy? Many scholars have contended that the military can act as a neutral umpire between divisive forces, as a stabilizing force during periods of anarchy,

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and as a training school in which to forge a sense of national identity. From this standpoint, the temporary ascendance of military men could be a useful starting point in creating the "preconditions" for democracy.

Second, when, if ever, can a military regime quicken the pace of economic development and social reform? Is it possible, as several observers have contended, that the army possesses a unique aptitude for providing modernizing skills and leadership, for serving as a powerful agent of social reform, and if necessary, for maintaining the discipline required when the people of the "Third World" experience the sacrifices involved in reaching the "take-off" point?

Does Army Rule Facilitate the Growth of Democracy?

Politically, armies in the developing world act in one of five ways:

1) in rather rare instances, they abstain totally from politics (India);
2) they can consciously instill a sense of nationhood in their recruits but remain neutral in other ways (Israel);
3) they can function as an instrument for regulating conflicting civilian elements (Turkey);
4) they can serve as a political "party" in their own right (Indonesia);
5) or, as in many countries today, they can seize complete political power (Egypt).

The military's adoption of the final alternative, absolute domination of the polity, seems governed by several factors:

First, the nation's traditional culture has direct relevance: the prevalence of military rule in contemporary Moslem countries, for example, is partially due to the fact that Islam has never made a distinction between military and civilian authority. "The common way for a leader in traditional Islam to form a state," Manfred Halpern has observed, "was to conquer." This tendency obviously continues today.

Second, the colonial background of a nation's army must also be taken into account. India's 500,000-men force has so far refrained from political intervention because, in part, the officer corps received superb British training aimed at creating a professionally oriented army. At the other extreme, Belgium left the Congo with a sad heritage of the "Force Publique," a bunch of hoodlums ready to do the bidding of anyone who offered sufficient loot. Even Latin America's long history of armed *coups d'état* can be partly attributed to the military traditions left behind by Spain.

Third, the social origins of a nation's officers sometimes plays a decisive role. In Egypt, for example, the decline of Farouk began in the thirties when, for the first time, the King allowed men of lower-middle-

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class backgrounds into the previously aristocratic military college. The "first class" of new officers which graduated from the academy had no stake in preserving the status quo. From their ranks most of the leaders of the Egyptian revolution emerged.

Finally, armies take power most easily when the mass of the population has lost faith in civilian authority *or* the civilian authority has faltered in its ability to manipulate the army. This is more than the banal observation that armies often step into politics when parliamentary regimes have made a shambles of government and brought the nation to the brink of anarchy. It is increasingly apparent that armies today will also dethrone authoritarian and supposedly charismatic leaders: e.g., the eclipse of Nkrumah and Sukarno. Even unpopular governments can retain their power if they are sufficiently clever at placating the army, juggling its officers, and creating countervailing forces. Some rulers, such as Haile Selassie, have proved themselves quite adept at manipulating their armies. Haile Selassie has distributed power in a way which balances the army, the police, and the Imperial Bodyguard against each other; he has seconded army leaders to civilian posts when their personal influence became dangerous; and, in 1960, he successfully used the army and the air force to crush an abortive rebellion raised by their comrades in the Bodyguard and the police. Nkrumah, too, tried his hand at the game by establishing the paramilitary Workers' Brigade as a force competing with the army—but his experiment failed.

If civilian authority collapses and an army takes command of politics, how well does it govern? Can it, for example, fulfill its announced aims of creating unity, instilling discipline, and ending corruption? History has yet to provide definitive evidence but, tentatively, it appears that the answer is: No. In Indonesia, military rule over many sectors of the economy has destroyed the nation's potential wealth. In Burma, as Lucian Pye has observed, "The Burmese army officer proved to be no superman for he was no more able than the Burmese politician to rise above his cultural and historical heritage." In Thailand, where the military directs everything from the production of leather products to canned goods, David Wilson has contended that the army's "administrative free-wheeling has a tendency to run away with itself."

Perhaps the major political issue which confronts army rulers—assuming the purest of motives on their part—is how to forge a national consensus behind their policies of modernization. In this task, they appear no better qualified than their civilian counterparts. Indeed, because of a military background which assumes instant obedience,

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officers may suffer great disadvantages in a political realm requiring compromise between diverse interests.

Egypt provides a classic example. While Nasser has successfully, even brilliantly maintained his dominion for some 14 years, he has publicly admitted his bafflement over the difficulties involved in securing unified public allegiance. At the beginning of the revolution, Nasser had assumed that all of Egypt would fall in behind the army vanguard "in serried ranks." "Crowds did eventually come, and they came in endless droves," he later recognized, "—but how different is the reality from the dream! The masses that came were disunited, divided groups of stragglers." In most developing nations, the same problem appears. The army can command obedience and it can force through reforms in certain restricted areas (such as instituting the very popular land reforms of Egypt); but it cannot magically create social unity out of "divided groups of stragglers."

Still, one may reasonably argue that army rule, while no more effective than civilian authority, may be inevitable in some cases and may provide a bridge toward democracy. As the historian John Johnson has well demonstrated in his studies of Latin America, an evolution in military regimes can occur. The form of Latin-American militarism has gradually changed from a type of *caudillismo* (where temporary warlords allied themselves with the feudal order) to a new style where military coalitions with the urban middle and working classes have become normal. Recent events in Latin America seem to have decreased the power of the military, as new countervailing forces in urban centers increase in importance. 50 years from now, historians may look back on Latin-American militarism as merely a stage in the development of representative institutions.

This possible evolution of Latin America should not, however, be considered as inevitable or as support for the view that the invisible hand of economic development always produces groups which will weaken the hold of militarists. After reviewing the history of new nations, excepting Latin America, Morris Janowitz found little correlation between economic development and a decline in military pre-eminence. On the contrary: "The basic conclusion is that, with higher economic levels, the outcome is as likely as not to be in the direction of a military oligarchy, and perhaps somewhat more likely."

We cannot, therefore, delude ourselves with the comforting theory that once an army establishes the "prerequisites" for democracy and economic development, it will fade away, yielding the reins of government to civilian elements. A more realistic approach is to examine the

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ways by which an army, once having controlled a nation, has actually been retired into a neutral role. Two nations—Mexico and Turkey—offer historical experiences which may be relevant to other emerging countries.

After centuries of colonial rule, internal warfare, and government by warlords, Mexico effectively rid herself of militarism in the twenties and thirties. Mexico's miracle can hardly be attributed to implacable historical forces; rather, the army's withdrawal from politics seems due to a complicated web of intrigue, woven by individuals of good will and foresight as well as ambition and a greed for power. Oddly enough, determined generals themselves brought about the transformation through, as Edwin Lieuwen has put it, "a liberal use of Machiavellian techniques."

Prior to 1920, Mexico had been the most militarist of Latin-American nations. A thousand armed uprisings had scarred the first 100 years of her independent history. In any two years out of three during this period, the army's revenue exceeded the entire government budget. By 1938, however, the actions of four generals (Obregón, Calles, Amaro, and Cárdenas) had finally curbed the army's domination of politics.

In the early twenties President Obregón incorporated various splinter armies into the federal force, putting them on a single payroll. His successor, Calles, and Calles' Secretary of War, Amaro, successfully fought to transform the federal army into a well-disciplined professional body. Rather than directly challenging other generals, they began at the bottom by modernizing the training and equipment of enlisted men and by gradually pruning out guerrilla-type elements. Calles and Amaro also guided their troops into constructive activities, such as road-building. Eventually, they felt strong enough to shift the regional generals' commands, thus undermining local bases of personal power.

President Cárdenas, in the thirties, added the final touch by creating labor and agrarian organizations as a counterbalance to military influence. While some old generals protested Cárdenas's reforms, they could no longer muster independent forces to carry out threats of revolt.

For anyone concerned with the gradual evolution from military rule into democracy, Turkey represents another classic, if currently discouraging, case history. Like Mexico, Turkey is one of the very few nations which began her modern history under the aegis of a military regime that sincerely desired both to modernize and democratize a feudal social order. By 1950, when free elections were held and a multi-party system functioned, the tutelary military rulers voluntarily resigned their power. It seemed, for a decade, that a political miracle like Mexico's had occurred: a military elite had established a democracy.

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Then, in 1960, the military once again seized control, and Turkey's experiment with democracy encountered a tragic impasse.

Turkey's original military elite, led by Ataturk, initiated a variety of social reforms. The military also tried to incorporate civilian elements in its ranks but, unlike Mexico, it did so too little and too late. Prior to the establishment of a consensus concerning the goals of modernization, certain civilian segments of the community were allowed some political influence. Yet, too often, these new members of the elite were oriented to a traditional, feudal approach rather than to a modern democratic system. And certain social groups, stirred by the "revolution in expectations," were totally denied political expression prior to 1950. Neither peasants nor industrial workers could find a political outlet for their grievances. When a real party system began to function between 1950 and 1960, as Richard Frey has observed, the social groups which had previously been slighted used their newly achieved political power in a "vindictive or irresponsible fashion." The economy ground to a halt, "intra-elite" conflict paralyzed the newly appointed civilian rulers, and the military resumed control.

Turkey's failure—as well as Mexico's success—seems to hinge on one crucial variable: the willingness and ability of the military to bring about a "pluralistic" social order where various groups (particularly peasants and workers) can compete with the army. *Thus, if an army in an underdeveloped country will create or allow a "social revolution," it can serve as a facilitating instrument in the development of a democracy.*

There is, of course, one apparent difficulty in this position: army officers seldom carry out a social revolution. Indeed, most officers are psychologically unequipped for the task. As Eduardo Santos has written, military values and training are inherently antithetical to a democratic ethic:

> The military profession is poor schooling for learning the difficult art of government, for to govern well means to interpret, to reconcile, to respect the rights of all, to give freedom of expression to every opinion, to abide by the laws and never subordinate them to personal caprice, to have the courage to rectify mistakes, to ask for and listen to advice, to have patience, to realize that one owes one's power to the will of the people ... All this is difficult for the military to understand and accept, accustomed as they are to the blind obedience of their inferiors, the dry voices of command, and the narrow horizon of their profession, which rarely encompasses the element of humanism.

One must conclude, then, that with the exception of Mexico—and

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perhaps, eventually, such nations as Turkey, Egypt, Ghana, and Nigeria —dominance by a military elite seldom facilitates the growth of democracy. Rather, it generally stunts the development of democratic institutions. For some observers, however, such considerations seem irrelevant in the battle to end world poverty; for them, the only issue is whether a military government can economically modernize a nation more effectively than other forms of rule. If one dismisses the democratic ideal as a goal for developing nations, can one still defend military rule as the best way to dredge stagnant economies from the mire of poverty?

Does Army Rule Facilitate Economic Development?

Various more or less legitimate claims have been advanced to defend the role of military elites in the process of economic development:

Clearly, armies can serve a useful function in equipping their recruits with the basic skills demanded in a modern economy. Army training can furnish a nation with cadres of literate men, educated in mechanical skills, imbued with a sense of discipline, and, at times, indoctrinated with a feeling of nationalism.

Managerial talents acquired by the officer corps can also, under some conditions, be applied in directing certain types of industry—particularly those "labor-intensive" enterprises which require the sweat of large masses of men, rather than the technical competence of their leaders.

Further, although they seldom exercise their power, armies are in a unique position to push forward economic reforms. Because of their command over the means of violence, armies can, if they wish, crush religious obscurantism, eliminate a feudal land-holding class, or expropriate wealthy classes who waste capital.

This rather meager list of the advantages of army rule exhausts the economic benefits which the military may confer upon their countries. Any reasonable economic balance sheet would, however, show that the disadvantages of military government far outweigh its possible advantages.

The sheer cost of maintaining a military establishment drains any economy of potentially productive resources and, to the degree that an army comes to dominate a government, the officers naturally tend to devote an increasing amount of the nation's wealth for their own enhancement. Consequently, military regimes such as those of Pakistan spend at least 50 per cent of their official national budgets for armed forces while, at the opposite extreme, civilian governments like that of Tanganyika (before federal union) spend as little as 3 per cent.

Beyond the direct costs, army rule can hobble a developing economy

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in various other crucial ways. The bureaucratic style of army life can compound the problems already created in most nations by an overblown, unproductive, and often corrupt civil bureaucracy. In addition, army leaders usually do not have the mentality to undertake large-scale economic planning. As many observers have demonstrated, army officers in the new countries have been trained as infantry commanders. They may fight well in tight tactical positions but they lack a strategic perspective—let alone the knowledge and specific talents—to run large-scale enterprises or to plan for sustained nation-wide economic growth.

Finally, it need hardly be said that the officer class, like any oligarchy, may develop a stake in the existing economy and refuse to initiate any fundamental reforms which threaten its position.

Because of these shackles, military regimes have generally produced a sorry record of economic growth. Military managers of plantations and mineral resources in Indonesia caused an actual retrogression of the economy. The military rulers of Burma, Thailand, and Pakistan have merely perpetuated economic incompetence and stagnation. South Korea and Formosa have grown economically but only because of their "special relationship" with the United States. Egypt may be considered an exception to the rule, for Nasser has managed to continue a modest rate of growth (albeit one bought at the cost of enormous foreign debts). At the worst, as in Peron's time, military regimes can demolish a prospering economy. At their best, as in Egypt, military rulers have sustained a moderate pace of development.

Clearly, the most striking economic advances have occurred in such diverse countries as China, Mexico, the Phillipines, and Malaya. Politically, these nations have little in common except for the central fact that none of them is characterized by total military rule. Whatever their worth in other respects, armies do not—and, perhaps, cannot—push their countries into that rarefied realm where the economy grows by more than 6 per cent a year.

The record shows, then, that military rule has more often than not resulted in economic paralysis. This demonstrated inability of armies (although relative) to stimulate economic change can be traced to a central dilemma faced by the officer corps, a quandary which Edward Shils has nicely summarized:

> They [the officers] are not businessmen, and they are not civil servants with an ideology of economic growth. If they encourage either or both, they weaken their own hold by encouraging independent centers of power and decision. If they do not encourage or tolerate independent activity, they will see the country standing still.

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Despite this economic incompetence of armies, the United States continues to support military regimes of various hues, contributing hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the goal of "military assistance." How wise is this charity?

American Military Assistance Policy

In a maze of conflicting justifications, one can disengage three—equally mistaken—master strategies which govern American military assistance in the Third World: Our government wishes to build military bastions against international Communism and, consequently, gives aid to the military dictators of South Vietnam, Formosa, South Korea, and Thailand. Our government wishes to reinforce the internal stability of presently "friendly" regimes and, thus, sends armaments to areas like South America. Our government wishes to sustain a balance of power in some regions and therefore has distributed tanks and jets with equal largesse to Israel and Jordan, Pakistan and India.

Each of these strategies—even when judged solely by the military or commercial interests of the United States—is open to serious question:

The Military Bastion Theory: The majority of our military assistance goes to nations like Formosa and South Korea which are regarded as essential outposts in the perimeter surrounding China. American generals presumably count on the troops of these regions as a decisive military force in times of crisis. Perhaps the professional judgment of American officers has value. Nonetheless, for a civilian outsider, these "bastions" hardly seem worth their immense cost.

Whatever one's opinion about the American presence in Vietnam, the military situation there clearly demonstrates the bankruptcy of the Southeast Asia bastion theory. For reasons which require no explanation, Formosa's aging legions are and will remain chained. South Korea has been able to make only token contributions to American forces in Vietnam. The South-Vietnamese army itself (in spite of decades of French and American "advice") has proven increasingly, and now totally, ineffective.

The lesson is clear. In moments of crisis only the massive intervention of American troops, planes, and ships has fulfilled Pentagon dreams. In the crucible of warfare, the armies of Southeast Asia have proven to be paper tigers.

The Internal Stability Theory: The American use of military despots to maintain domestic tranquility in the Third World is a quixotic attempt to alter the drift of global politics. Our support of military

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regimes in such nations as Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba not only flaunted American ideals of representative government but contributed nothing to the goal of political stability. Such policies gained for the United States only the hostility of those forces which sought the dethronement of military dictators.

It is also apparent that American military assistance can, in itself, contribute to revolutionary passions. The Brazilian purchase of an old aircraft carrier from the United States in 1956 serves as a case in point. A squabble about the use of the carrier ensued between the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force. The conflicting aspirations of these forces ended in shooting battles and undermined the regimes of four Brazilian presidents.

If by "stability" America really means democracy, then it is clear in Latin America and other areas, as Edwin Lieuwen has written, that ". . . insofar as the military aid programs have increased the political influence of the armed forces, the prospects for democracy have suffered." Temporary crises, as in the Congo, may arise where military assistance is demanded, but these situations can best be handled by United Nations forces. Long-term support of military regimes by the United States serves only to keep the lid on potentially revolutionary situations which are bound to explode in the end.

The Balance of Power Theory: America has played a dangerous game in Asia and the Middle East by arming competing nations. As always in human history, the temptation exists to use "defensive" weapons in launching a preventive war. The most recent explosions in the Middle East illustrate that point. The fact that both sides used Western arms underscores the ineffectiveness of our policy in this region.

The formation of a strongly armed, U.N.-staffed "cordon sanitaire" along the Arab-Israeli or Indian-Pakistani borders would be a far saner approach than the encouragement of regional arms races. Since neither Russia nor the West gain from "small" wars of this type, the great powers could realistically support such a U.N. policy.

All of these considerations point to a major reversal in American foreign policy, a transformation which ultimately would serve the interests of both the emerging nations and the United States. The ideal goal for American foreign policy should be the eventual disarmament and true neutralization of the Third World. In the immediate future, our government can use its weight—specifically, in bilateral military assistance pacts—to support tendencies toward democratization and social

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reforms. We may as well aim toward building a strong U.N. third force, made up of armies drawn from the new nations.

The logic favoring ultimate disarmament in developing countries seems irrefutable. An American policy which would encourage disarmament could reduce the economic burdens born by these nations, help to release those elements seeking liberalization and social reform, and relieve us of the onus of backing unpopular military oligarchies. Ironically, total disarmament in the Third World might involve an even greater American committment abroad, for the emerging nations would still require a shield against international aggression. Even today, realists in Latin America recognize the uselessness of their armies as a defense against foreign aggression. In the unlikely event of an international invasion of Latin America, United States forces are now and will continue to be the only genuine defense.

An immediate end to all military assistance programs is, however, hardly a realistic goal. We are bound by various treaties to the support of certain military programs. And even if we broke these agreements, an inescapable fact remains: almost all of the developing countries clamor for their own armies. Even if these military forces are mere symbols of independence—as with Togo's 200-men force—America can ill afford to ignore this revolution in military expectations. If the United States suddenly clamped down on armaments exports, many of the developing nations would simply take their requests to Western Europe, Russia, or China. As the President of Peru recently commented, "If the United States is not willing to sell us the planes we need, we will buy them from any other country willing to sell to us." A sudden, unilateral American de-escalation of military assistance would then do little to change the situation and might well increase the domestic military costs of new nations.

In the short run, therefore, American policy must be guided by more constrained aims. We should gradually reduce military assistance to the point regarded as absolutely minimal by Third-World leaders. We should utilize American military missions to train existing armies in techniques of aiding economic development, such as the construction of public utilities. We can, in addition, encourage the use of armies in emerging nations as units in a strengthened U.N. military force. The creation of a United Nations army is a desirable goal in itself and our current expenditures for separate armies in the Third World could more usefully be spent in developing a U.N. force. Moreover, public opinion in emerging nations would undoubtedly welcome the use of their armies as world guardians of peace.

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We should, openly or not, put strings on current military assistance: to the degree that the government in power encourages democratization and social reform, a modicum of military assistance can be justified. Short-term military aid to the Shah of Iran, for example, can be useful during the period when he carries out revolutionary land reforms against the opposition of his own aristocracy. Military aid to West-African nations can be defended as long as the military elites fulfill their promises of restoring civil liberties and parliamentary rule. In other words, if military rulers exhibit a genuine intent to "pluralize" their social orders, as Mexico's leaders did, assistance to them should be continued.

If, however, the government in power refuses to allow change—as in Batista's Cuba, Trujillo's Dominican Republic, or Duvalier's Haiti—American military aid should end abruptly. Neither the United States nor the emerging nations gain from unquestioning support of military dictators. Whether judged from the standpoint of American interests, the economic development of new nations, or the gradual democratization of the Third World, Demosthenes' dictum of 345 B.C. still holds true: "Close alliances with despots are never safe for free states."

BOOKS FROM THE LID

The Accidental Century, by Michael Harrington. Penguin. 1966. (list $1.25) 95¢

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Lawrence W. Hyman

LITERATURE AND POLITICAL ACTION

For the past twenty years or so, the study of literature has been dominated by formal analysis. We have been told to examine carefully the structure, imagery, and tone of a literary work, so that we can see the novel or the poem as an artifact which creates its own world and is only incidentally a reflection of the world of everyday experience. As a result, many people have felt that literature is becoming removed from the moral issues we face in everyday life. Contemporary criticism has been called a mere game for aesthetes, and from time to time prominent critics and novelists issue statements advocating that literature once again be related to our moral concerns.

A recent example of such an accusation occurs in a pamphlet of the Students For a Democratic Society. In seeking to vitalize American colleges, these students make obvious suggestions as to how the social sciences can be used to bring about a better society. When it comes to the arts, they are (as we would expect the current generation of students to be) more cautious and specifically "reject the idea that the obligation of a radical artist is to produce art which serves and glorifies the movement." They are also opposed to a "philistine preoccupation with the purely political." At the same time, in its criticism of the academic disciplines, the report maintains that "formalistic analysis saps man's creative products of their social meaning and thereby, often, of their spiritual impact." (*Radical Education Project*, May, 1966.)

Although my example is taken from a radical group, the argument is not confined to them, but would reflect, without any change, the objection to the current study of literature that is voiced by conservative and, particularly, by religious groups. When a young person wants to know what he must do to be saved, or what we must all do to save our society, he finds very few guidelines in his literary study. The challenge being taken up here is therefore not confined to radicals, but is one that can rightfully be made by anyone who wants the knowledge gained in the humanities to be directly related to his moral experience. If literature is to be studied as a self-contained work of art which does

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not teach us anything that is directly relevant to the world of action, can it still have any importance for our moral development?

Before offering my own answer, which is that literature does have such an impact despite its "amorality," I would like to refer very briefly to another kind of answer which will help clarify the issue. In discussing George Orwell's importance, Richard Rovere is forced to admit that Orwell is a minor novelist, definitely "of the second rank." Yet the critic argues that he gets "major satisfactions from certain minor novelists and minor satisfactions from certain major novelists. Stendhal, for example, means less to me than Butler, and Orwell more than Joyce." The context of the entire essay makes clear that Orwell "means more than Joyce" chiefly because Orwell could renew within us a feeling for the universally accessible virtues: "candor, courage, love, common sense, integrity, decency, charity."

The point of view expressed by Mr. Rovere, and shared by many intelligent readers, can be construed as one kind of answer to the charge that literary critics and teachers should bring literature closer to our moral concerns. Too sophisticated to ask that critics find moral direction in Stendhal and Joyce—instead of ambivalence and irony—critics like Mr. Rovere put these great writers into some kind of aesthetic limbo, where they can be praised without limit while at the same time "enjoyed" only for their "minor satisfactions." For their major satisfactions, these critics and readers turn to writers like Orwell in whose works courage, love, and decency are clearly distinguished from cowardice, hatred, and degeneracy.

There are, of course, many other ways of reconciling our natural impulse to find some relationship between literature and morality with the fact that critical analysis makes it increasingly difficult to find anything but ambivalence and irony in the best literature both of the past and the present. Nor is it our purpose here to prove that there is only one way to do so. But most critics who deal with the problem, even critics as diverse as F. R. Leavis, William Empson, Lionel Trilling, and Wayne Booth, assume that the moral concern to be found in literature is basically the same as the moral concern we have in ordinary experience. I want, however, to deny that assumption and to point out that the moral direction necessary in the world of action is not relevant to art. Second, and more important, I hope to show that the amorality or the "negative capability" (to use Keats's phrase) that is relevant to great literature has a "spiritual impact," but that this impact is dependent not on the answers the novel or poem may

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give to us but on its power to make us question the answers we already have. It is not a moral direction that we must look for in literature, but a disturbance. Yet it is a kind of disturbance, and this will be my final point, that the moralist, of all people, needs the most.

To help clarify the first point, let me refer to a poem by Robert Frost, "The Most of It." The poem deals, in a broad and obvious sense, with the question of man's relationship to the natural forces of the universe. In his discussion of the poem's answer to this question, Randell Jarrell concludes that Frost expresses the

> willingness to admit both the falseness in the cliché and the falseness in the contradiction of the chiché; if the universe never gives us a black or white answer, but only a black-and-white one that is somehow not an answer at all, still its inhuman "non-answer" exceeds any answer that we human beings would have thought of or wished for. (*Poetry and the Modern Age,* 1959, p. 50.)

For the common reader who wants the moral of the poem, who wants the critic to explain just what Frost thinks about man's kinship with the natural world, Jarrell's answer is not very helpful. Like so much of modern criticism, this interpretation doesn't help us to come to any particular conclusion but, rather, makes us aware of the impossibility of coming to any conclusion.

What is true of this short poem is true also of novels. When we get to the bottom of a contemporary interpretation of Raskolnikov or Billy Budd or Jay Gatsby, we get an answer to what the hero is really like not in terms of our own attitudes and concepts, but in terms of the particular situation depicted in the novel or the play.

It is for this reason that the critic pays so much attention to the particular images, rhythms, and tones of the work. It is not that the contextualist critic (as he is sometimes called) is indifferent to the moral issues faced by these characters, but that he wants to make sure that the issue is seen through that particular character, not in the general terms of philosophy or politics. Instead of bringing the moral significance out from the novel into our own familiar world, our familiar world is darkened and confused by being forced into the ambiguous complexity of the novel. It is not Raskolnikov who must fit into our concept of sin and repentance, or Billy Budd into the idea of injured innocence; on the contrary, it is our concepts and attitudes that must be modified, often quite drastically, to follow the unique experience presented by the novelist and poet.

As a result of such an emphasis, we are, it must be admitted, likely to receive not so much an answer as a "non-answer" to the moral ques-

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tions raised in the novels, poems, and plays. We are not told what can be done or even how, in conventional terms, we should feel toward the heroes and the villains presented to us. Even in such a work as *Billy Budd,* a highly moral work in which the deepest feelings against tyranny —on the part of Melville and those of his readers—are so strongly engaged, we are still trying to see what can be said for the tyrannical captain who murders an innocent man. Does all "justice" really involve the betrayal of our natural feelings as we witness in Captain Vere? Again, as in Frost, we see the artist replying with a "non-answer." As one critic has recently remarked, the story would be poor if it gave us a clear answer, if it allowed for

> gross indignation as the only response. Either the tale is dynamic, in which case Vere's position is one version of the truth, and the "rights of man" another; or the tale is static melodrama in which the villain wins the day through spurious rationalizations, and then Melville has written a tract against naval injustice. (Mark Spilka, *PAUNCH,* October 1966.)

We are not concerned here with a definitive interpretation of a story which has been read, and will continue to be read, in different ways. Nor do we maintain that in practice most readers lose their innate sympathy for the victim or their hatred for the executioner. But most critics would agree with Mr. Spilka that Melville's artistic power reaches its highest level to the extent that it makes us go beyond the sympathies (and antipathies) that we naturally enough bring to the novel from our everyday experience. And conversely, to the extent that it merely enforces our hatred of the tyranny represented by Captain Vere, Melville's story becomes "static melodrama" and a "tract." If the tale is "dynamic," as Mr. Spilka uses the term, then our feelings while reading the story are dynamic also.

If we were in the world of action, such an effect might be not only useless but immoral. The "non-answers" would, by immobilizing our sympathies, prevent us from supporting Billy Budd against Captain Vere, or even Desdemona against Iago. And for those readers who do not make a sharp distinction between art and life, such a situation is intolerable. If we are to accept the contemporary critics' denial of moral direction, what can we say about the moral impact of these novels and poems? Is there a value, a "spiritual impact" in the artist's telling us that there is no answer to basic questions of right and wrong, life and death? I believe that there is, and that to see it we must recognize that art separates us from the world of action.

For those to whom there is no real life outside of action, to a man who is a political animal only, this last statement is tantamount to say-

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ing that art has no value. But in actual fact there are very few people who are not aware, consciously or unconsciously, of a level of experience which goes below the surface of what they do and say. When we act or say something in everyday experience, we choose, out of many possibilities, one path, or attitude, or concept. We vote for a candidate or do not vote for him, we write down one conclusion or another, or we say that there is no answer. To act is to "actualize" only one of the many possibilities that lie within us. But such a choice does not exhaust these possibilities. The other possibilities are still present in our minds. And it is in literature above all that we become aware of these possibilities.

Suppose we were to see a group of white men with shotguns approaching a newly integrated school in a Southern town, and beginning to threaten Negro children. And suppose we were on the side of the children and completely opposed to the mob. In terms of action we would do whatever possible to disperse the mob. Our knowledge of American history, psychology and sociology would, it is true, help us to understand the actions even of those who were on the wrong side. But it is only the novelist who can bring us to a level of experience where we get inside the minds of the armed mob and see them as they see themselves. Or, to put it another way, the novelist, unlike the political scientist or the psychologist, tries to "understand" the situation not in order to act more intelligently, but to bring us to a level of experience in which all action is irrelevant.

It must be emphasized that this indifference to action does not come about because the novelist is emotionally removed from the tense scene, as some aestheticians maintain. Ortega y Gasset, for example, would argue that the artist is "completely unconcerned, does nothing but keep his eyes open ... The tragic inner meaning escapes his attention...." In contrast to such concepts of emotional or aesthetic distance, I believe that the artist would be more deeply involved, in this imaginary scene between the Negro students and the white mob, than a civil rights worker. But the novelist is involved in *every* aspect of the situation, and the "depth" of his involvement brings him to a level where action is irrelevant.

Unlike the civil rights worker who wants to "know" the situation in order to prevent the mob from attacking the children, the novelist, in his capacity as novelist, is not interested in having anything happen, for good or for bad. He and his readers are consequently free to experience the scene outside of the fixed categories of perception that we ordinarily bring to any experience. For these categories, which include

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ideas as to what is relevant and what is good, screen us from the immediacy, the living, ever-changing qualities of the scene. The civil rights worker, intent on driving off the white mob, is naturally enough blind to the pathos and courage that might be present in a member of that mob. And if he is to be effective, he is, or should be, oblivious to the divided feelings that may be present in his friends and even within himself. The man of action must concentrate on what is relevant for his purpose.

But such an attitude, necessary as it is for action, is disastrous in art. The artist too selects; no one, it must be granted, can see everything. But the artist who sees only what he needs to see for a political purpose, or to support a moral bias, is to that extent a poor or a lesser artist. An artist reaches his greatness not by subordinating his impressions to his moral or personal bias, but by getting out of himself. He tries to escape from his particular personality (to use T. S. Eliot's phrase), in order to give us the immediacy of the experience—the sensation that we are looking at the object or the experience for the first time.

The scene, even in a story by Kafka or Faulkner, is recognizable in terms of our everyday experience. And Wallace Stevens, who is both a poet and an aesthetician, has emphasized the continuity of art and reality. He asks the poet to give us

> A tune beyond us, yet ourselves,
> A tune upon the blue guitar
> Of things exactly as they are.

But the world is not presented to us as we would like it to be, or as we are accustomed to seeing it, or even as we need to see it in order to act effectively. The things should be "exactly as they are." It is their very being, not their practical uses, that the artist is trying to get. Whatever else it may be, the reality that an artist gives us is not the same as the reality that we abstract from the world around us for the purposes of doing something about it. A remark by William Faulkner will allow us to see another way in which the artist's purpose necessarily negates action: "My ambition is to put everything into one sentence—not only the present but the whole past on which it depends and which keeps overtaking the present, second by second." (*Faulkner-Cowley File*, New York, 1966.)

Such a purpose would be disastrous for a social scientist—and not only stylistically. For the social scientist and the historian learn about the past to use it. To return to our example of the integrated school,

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they might want to learn about the South in 1872 so as to prevent a defeat for the Negro revolution in 1972. In the world of action, because we are interested in the future, we do not want the past to overtake the present. The opposite is true in the world of fiction. There is no future after the novel or the play comes to an end. The only motion at the end of a work of art is cyclic: If the music moves us deeply we want to listen to it again, and the ideal action at the end of a novel is to return to the first page.

Taken as a guide to action in dealing with the Negro revolution in our time, even the best works of Faulkner are useless. His novels are in fact worse than useless, even harmful, if we accept his sense of inevitable doom, of irreconcilable conflicts within society and the individual, as a political program.

But novels are not taken as guides to action, even by the novelists themselves. The novelist is not just a novelist, anymore than the reader is just a reader. And the novelist and poet is often the most vigorous political activist because he realizes this sharp difference between art and everyday experience. But if we do not ask of our novels and poems and plays what they cannot give, we may find in them something that is of value to all people, but particularly to those of us whose lives are dominated by moral imperatives. We are now ready for the answer to our final question: Just what kind of spiritual impact can we expect from art if we cannot get any moral direction?

The work of art, particularly literature, deals directly with the essential danger of any system of morality. For any idea by its very nature is prone to cut us off from the immediate experience which first produced the idea. Our "idea" of a flower can prevent us from really "seeing" the flower; and for this reason we appreciate the painter or the poet who can make us "see" the flower as if for the first time. In a more important sense, our ideas of segregation or of civil rights, or of passive resistance can prevent us from really seeing what is happening in a particular situation. (I am not, of course, even suggesting that we can live without preconceived ideas, or that it would be valuable to enter any situation with a *tabula rasa*—even if it were possible.) But it is equally obvious that our sense of what is relevant or irrelevant, right or wrong, is only one aspect of the world that surrounds us.

To be fully human we must not only have a moral imperative but an ability to go outside of that imperative and see things simply as things—outside of our own categories of right and wrong. The dusty roads (in the mob scene), the burning sun, the terror, fear, and heroism

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of both friend and enemy, all have an existence aside from their role in the political struggle. And it is in art, particularly in literature, that we can become aware of this level of experience that goes beyond right and wrong. "Yet [as John Dewey has said] this indifference to praise and blame because of preoccupation with imaginative experience constitutes the heart of the moral potency of art. From it derives the liberating and uniting power of art." (*Art as Experience.*)

In the context of the argument presented here, the "liberating" power would refer to our freedom from the imperatives of our moral and political beliefs. And the "uniting power of art" would bring us (not of course in a political or social sense) as close to the man who is pointing his gun at us as it would to the innocent boy we are trying to protect. A good *reader,* as we have just seen, may be, imaginatively, as close to Captain Vere as he is to Billy Budd.

Such a description of art's relationship to morality should indicate not only its distinctive power, but also its limitations. It should be mentioned that Keats, who was perhaps the first to express the amorality of the artist in memorable form, also warned us that "poetry is not so fine a thing as philosophy—For the same reason as an eagle is not so fine a thing as truth." The spiritual impact described here may not be so fine—and is certainly not as necessary for our survival—as morality. We cannot live in a world dominated by art; or at least we cannot live and act at our best in such a world. But to live in a world without art, or in a world without the particular satisfactions offered to us by the great writers, would also be frightening—even if not as frightening as a world without morality.

It is important to vote the right way, march on the right side, and if one must use a gun, to point it in the right direction. But we are all aware of how narrow and superficial human beings can be even when their behavior is morally correct. And this narrowness and emptiness hurts society as well as themselves. For even a political victory cannot be complete if it results in men who are unable to be more than voters or marchers. And art is one of the ways in which all of us can be reminded of those levels of experience that go beyond our political and moral imperatives.

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NOTEBOOK

Irving Howe

The First Generation of SNCC

Right now John Lewis is a homeless man. Chairman of SNCC during its most active and heroic period, one of the first Freedom Riders, arrested innumerable times in the Deep South, and a vividly radical speaker at the 1963 March on Washington, Lewis now lives in New York City, privately employed and not prominently involved in any of the Negro organizations. Nor is he alone in this respect. Within the past two or three years there has appeared a generation of SNCC "graduates," young men and women once completely caught up in that organization but now either inactive or entirely out. They work for the poverty program, they go to school, or they simply drift. They retain a strong feeling for SNCC, which remains the center of their emotional life; but at least for them, the SNCC mystique has been broken and that painful process of self-questioning which seems to follow the crest of all political movements, has begun. Lewis himself grasps the fact that he is in a dilemma. He speaks without hesitation about "the first SNCC generation," now scattered in Northern exile, but he does hesitate to answer questions about his present opinions of SNCC. Perhaps he is not quite sure and perhaps he finds it painful to discuss.

In any case, what follows is a summary, mostly in my words, of a long conversation recently held with Lewis. It does not pretend to be a history of SNCC, or even a full account of the matters raised by Lewis; but it is, I think, faithful to the way Lewis now looks back upon his relationship to the movement. And I write here frankly as a recorder and sometimes a commentator, but with no pretense to "inside" knowledge.

During the academic year 1958–59 John Lewis, a student at the American Baptist Seminary in Nashville, Tennessee, was one of a group of fifteen or twenty young people, both black and white, who would go each Tuesday night to a discussion group led by James Lawson, a Negro divinity student at Vanderbilt who preached the philosophy of non-violence. Among those who used also to attend were Marion Barry and Diane Nash, both to become leading members of SNCC.

The ideas, or example, of Gandhi figured strongly in these discussions, and for Lewis, if not for others, Gandhi remains a moral hero. Lawson belonged to the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the role he played in directing the religious sentiments of Lewis and his friends toward moral and political protest indicates the importance of American pacifism in sparking the civil rights movement. It

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also suggests that, on occasion at least, ideas can suddenly set off significant political action: even the ideas of obscure and confined little groups.

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When Lewis now turns back in memory to the Nashville days, his voice becomes harsher than it usually is, so that one begins to understand how so gentle a young man could by all accounts have been an effective leader and speaker. For him, those were the days of purity: the first, sweet communion of coming together for action and risk. Two months before the famous sit-ins at Greensboro, North Carolina, the Nashville students had begun their test sit-ins at the downtown stores. They would demonstrate on "T-Days," Tuesdays and Thursdays, when classes were light. There was neither staff nor money, only a loose gathering of students, with most of them from the Negro middle class. (Obviously, this means something decidedly lower on the economic scale than the point occupied by the white middle class.)

Despite the fears of mothers and hesitations of fathers, the Nashville students were now able to use family cars; hemmed in by the barriers of segregation, they began to use them as a fleet for the burgeoning movement. Polite and well-dressed, the students would descend on the stores, to sit at lunch-counters, doing their homework and preserving strict decorum. They set themselves up as absolute instances of the American virtues, to the confusion and anger of the segregationists. It is this moment of fraternity which lives most strongly in Lewis's mind: the moment before the burden of national strategies, before the complications of politics, and as he remarks with particular stress, "before we got around to having leaders."

Since at this point there were occurring similar outbursts of protest on other Negro campuses, Ella Baker, a veteran of the movement then working for Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Council, proposed that a meeting be held to coordinate activity on the campus. In April, 1960 about 200 students came to Raleigh, North Carolina, and set up the group that would later be known as SNCC. Marion Barry was chosen temporary chairman and Jane Stembridge, a white girl with religious pacifist convictions, became secretary. James Lawson's opening speech expounded the ethic of non-violence, and the flavor of the whole occassion can be gotten from Jane Stembridge's recollection: "It was inspiring because it was the beginning and because, in a sense, it was the purest moment." The original flavor comes through with equal strength in the remarks of Marion Barry—they form a sharp contrast to later SNCC pronouncements—at the 1960 Democratic National Convention:

> To label our goals, methods and presuppositions "communistic" is to credit Communism with an attempt to remove tyranny . . . [But] Communism seeks power, ignores people, and thrives on social conflict. We seek a community in which man can realize the full meaning of the self which demands open relationships with others.

In these early years SNCC was almost entirely Southern in membership, about 60 per cent Negro and 40 per cent white. Many of its activists were sincerely devoted to the moral-religious norms of non-violence, and most were also extremely suspicious of both for-

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mal organization and centralized leadership. To these ideas and values Lewis remains faithful, and his recent estrangement from SNCC seems the result of the drift its present leadership has encouraged away from the original SNCC outlook. Yet Lewis has also come to see that, as SNCC grew in size and influence, it simply could not continue to function as a loving community of primitive Christians. The dilemmas of organization and power, which have tormented so many other people in the past, now torment Lewis as he tries to draw up for himself a balance sheet of his experience in SNCC.

When he turns to the years 1960–63, John Lewis speaks with confidence and thrust. During one of the Freedom Rides he was thrown into jail in Birmingham. He went on a hunger strike and then, with several friends, was taken to the Alabama-Tennessee line and dropped on the road. Hungry, tired, and bruised, the Riders sought help from some Negro families in a tiny village in Tennessee. Nothing that Lewis recalled in our conversations seemed to stir him as much as the way that handful of Negro families wanted both to help the Riders and avoid the retaliation of the local whites—so that they went from white store to white store buying food in small quantities at each place, in order not to rouse suspicion.

Even as Lewis defined SNCC as the Negro group most eager to break out of traditional patterns of compliance —and this clearly is one of its major accomplishments—so he also spoke with respect and compassion about the older generation of Negroes. That these people in that little town in Tennessee were excited by the Freedom Riders and fearful of what might happen after an open display of support for them, was something Lewis not merely understood but could accept emotionally. He had struggled as a boy with his own father, a farmer in Troy, Alabama, who disapproved of John's rebelliousness. His mother had tried to persuade him to drop out of the movement while he was a student in Nashville. Lewis understood why it was that Negro parents, proud to be able to send a son to college and hopeful he might rise above their own poverty, should have tried to dissuade him from activities which, in their innermost hearts, they admired. Lewis is quite free from that generation-baiting which, among certain young radicals, has replaced both political thought and human response.

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Lewis takes seriously the philosophy of non-violence, not merely as a tactic or device *vis à vis* the outer world, but as a genuine and fundamental value. He is skeptical about the tendency which has arisen in the Negro movement to indulge in apocalyptic fantasies: "the worse things get, the better for us." A sense of achievement, even of small victories registered, is needed to keep people from slipping into despair and frustration.

After the Freedom Rides, SNCC undertook a major turn. It decided to go to the people and root itself among them. It realized that a policy of dramatic raids followed by sudden withdrawals would bring large amounts of publicity but could also lead to severe damage in the local communities. Piling into a town in

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Alabama and Mississippi, starting a much-needed protest movement and then pulling out, might or might not help create a local and indigenous leadership. The danger in such a policy was always that the fabric of social life in the local Negro communities might be ripped apart while nothing better was offered or prepared to replace it. Field secretaries were now sent to work full-time in Negro communities, in order to train people for voting and to create a new combative and independent spirit in the Deep South.

It is here, one must tentatively conclude, that SNCC ran into its greatest problem. The idea of establishing grass-roots community movements was entirely sound; the perils of sudden dashes in and out of the most segregated places in the South were entirely obvious. But what the SNCC people could not quite appreciate were the problems this new strategy would bring both to themselves as young well-educated students and to the people in the communities they were now going to enter. For as soon as SNCC people began to settle, they were in effect beginning to do what they consciously wanted least to do: *they were beginning to set themselves up as a special group, a stratum of professional organizers, and thereby a potential elite.* Even as their loyalties would be given with the utmost generosity to the people among whom they were now working and living, they would sooner or later have to face the discrepancies between their own political and cultural styles and those of the people. And still more difficult, they would have to face the possibility of a clash in outlook or even interest between those with whom they worked day by day and the movement to which they were committed.

For as it became more and more a self-contained world, SNCC developed its own mores, its own language, its own style. In a particular town, the three or four SNCC workers would be working selflessly to gain particular objectives the local Negroes needed—improved street lights or better schools; but at the same time, within the SNCC world, they were beginning to develop the ideology that it was mistaken to want to integrate into a "sick society." They said, with the deepest sincerity, that they hoped to enable the Negro people to fight for what they, the people, wanted; but at the same time the SNCC organizers were more and more becoming part of an ideological elite which knew, or felt it knew, what the people *should* want. Their style of dress, their inner group language, their sexual habits, their attitudes toward work—all these were caught in a series of cross-pressures between the "inside" SNCC world and the "outside" world in which they were trying to root themselves. I do not say this as a criticism; it is a problem that has confronted all political movements deciding to "go to the people" from the distance of political ideology and/or intellectual life. All that one can ask is that the people caught in this problem be aware of it and not let themselves muck it up with populist rhetoric.

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Within the last two or so years, SNCC has undergone a further and,

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some may feel, an inevitable change. Any organization as committed as SNCC is to the imagery of a final confrontation, must expect a large turnover of participants, young people who burn themselves out in their intensity, or who become exhausted from frustration, loneliness, and violence, or who grow bewildered at the discrepancies between their experience and their vocabulary. Within SNCC the tendencies toward centralization grew stronger, and after a while Bob Moses, who represented those with a yearning for a style of strong and even anarchic individuality, went his own way. Where SNCC had been, during its most active period, a bi-racial organization, it has recently been strongly drawn to black nationalism.

And so there are now scattered through Northern cities these "graduates" of SNCC. They feel an intense affection for it, no matter how troubled they may be about its present course. They follow its affairs closely. They are in irregular communication with one another. Yet they feel, as Lewis sadly remarks, "nothing left to relate to."

What makes them relatively fortunate in their trouble is that at least in one respect they are much better off than radicals of a generation ago who also became "graduates" of movements: these ex- or semi-SNCC people look back with great pride upon their time in the movement and they still hope again to be active. Mostly, they are not embittered, and none of them feels he has sacrificed himself for a falsehood. Some even feel that it is *they* who still or best exemplify the original SNCC spirit. But realistically, one gathers, they cannot go back to SNCC, even if they were welcomed. They have passed beyond.

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What went wrong and did it have to go wrong? This was the last question I asked Lewis after we had been talking for several hours, and as I asked it there occurred perhaps the most vivid event of the evening. About an hour earlier Bayard Rustin had dropped in at the apartment where we were talking. Rustin sat quietly, not saying a word. But as I asked this final question and Lewis clearly indicated that this indeed was the key problem but one about which he could not yet speak with assurance, Rustin asked permission to break in. Lewis quickly, humorously agreed: "Sure, tell us." And what Rustin said, in rapid improvisation, might be summarized like this:

> First, SNCC was trapped in the difficulties all youth movements face when they have to go it alone, without an adult movement to learn from and fall back upon or graduate into—so that it was driven into accentuating differences of generation when it should have been struggling with problems of strategy. There was of course a lot of adult Negro activity in the South during the early sixties, but not really a stable and coherent organization to which SNCC could attach itself.
>
> SNCC therefore, and for other reasons too, tried to go it alone; perhaps *had* to go it alone. Most of the original SNCC leaders were the sons of the Southern Negro middle class. Their parents, settled into a way of life, couldn't move. The sons could. The more they learned, the more they felt themselves chocked-in by society. It was they, the younger ones, the students, who sparked the rebellion. But

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then, once they decided—and in principle they were right—to go into the communities, to go to the people, they got into trouble. There they were, these educated Negro boys and girls—which in that world meant they were like aristocrats!—trying to pass themselves off as peasants. They simply weren't willing to confront the responsibility and the torment of leadership. And by a paradox, just because they tried to hide from themselves the fact that they really were leaders, they began to act, maybe unconsciously, as an elitist group, further and further cutting themselves off from the masses of Negro people.

As Rustin talked, Lewis listened with complete absorption. Did he agree? Lewis smiled and said, "There's a lot to what the man says." More he would not say and more I saw no reason to ask.

•

What will happen to John Lewis and the others like him? It matters enormously. It matters whether they will find, sooner or later, a place in a renewed movement, one that is concerned both with the problems of the American Negroes and the problems of the country as a whole. Unless that happens, a large part of the sacrifice and energy of the last years will have been wasted. Without quite knowing how, I think that it will happen.

Raphael Rothstein

Rebellion in Portuguese Africa

Portugal, the poor cousin of the Western alliance, has over 120,000 troops fighting four wars against nationalist rebels in its African possessions—Angola, Mozambique, Cabinada, and Guinea—at an annual cost of over $132 million.

Nearly half the troops are in Mozambique which borders on Tanzania, Malawi, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The paucity of information concerning the struggle is the direct result of Portugal's policy of allowing few foreign journalists into the colony. Most reports of this "forgotten" war appearing in the American press originate in Lisbon and reflect the official Portuguese line.

The major rebel organization is FRELIMO—the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique—which is led by Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a handsome, 46-year-old former professor of cultural anthropology at Syracuse University.

Mondlane, who gave up his academic career in 1963 and returned to Africa where he set up FRELIMO headquarters in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, recently visited the United States to confer with officials of the private American foundations and humanitarian groups that support the

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Mozambique Institute in Dar Es Salaam, a secondary school for young refugees from the Portuguese territory.

In an interview granted during a brief stay in New York City, where he was making arrangements for the opening this spring of a FRELIMO office to represent the movement in North America, Mondlane explained that FRELIMO was at war only because attempts to have the future of Mozambique settled by discussions through the United Nations were rejected by the Portuguese. "We are fighting against a political system, not against the Portuguese," he said. "Our people have strict instructions not to harm people of any race unless they are soldiers or informers."

•

FRELIMO began its revolution in September, 1964, with 250 men organized into small guerrilla bands. Now the movement claims to have over 7,000 fighting men operating in the northern third of the country against an estimated 60,000 Portuguese troops. (Lisbon says that it has about 35,000 military personnel assigned to Mozambique.) In the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, according to Mondlane, FRELIMO has seriously disrupted the Portuguese administration and succeeded in establishing military bases, hospitals, and schools of its own. About 2,500,000 of Mozambique's estimated 7 million inhabitants —50,000 of them Portuguese—live in Cabo Delgado province.

FRELIMO's organization operates partly in Mozambique and partly in Tanzania. The army, larger than that of most African states, is mostly inside Mozambique where 80 per cent of the training takes place. Mondlane and a few other senior officials of FRELIMO's Central Committee are based in Dar Es Salaam where the Tanzanian government has granted the movement exile status in accordance with President Julius Nyerere's policy of supporting African nationalist struggles.

Among journalists Mondlane enjoys the reputation as one of Africa's most truthful, realistic leaders. Characteristically, his claims regarding the rebel operations inside Mozambique are modest.

The guerrillas rely on ambush tactics even though FRELIMO now feels itself strong enough to engage the enemy in company actions—committing between 65 to 100 men to an engagement. Mondlane says:

> We generally avoid large-scale combat, because we don't have the arms to match the Portuguese. We don't deceive ourselves, we haven't the power to wipe out the Portuguese but we are inflicting casualties and forcing Lisbon to expend vast amounts of money on this war. It is this continual financial drain, we believe, that will eventually force the Portuguese to negotiate independence with us.

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FRELIMO's forces have been educated in the art of guerrilla warfare by cadres trained in Algeria, Egypt, North Vietnam, and China. A nurses corps studied in Israel. The arms used by the rebel movement are supplied by the Organization for African Unity, the Soviet Union, China, and several other Communist countries.

A mention of the frequent allegations that FRELIMO is anti-Western because it depends so heavily on Communist help elicits a bitter reply from Mondlane: "What can we do if apart from the Africans, only the Communists will train and arm us? We are denied Western aid, can we be expected to do without Communist aid as well?" Mondlane pointed out that although the West provides no military aid to FRELIMO, several funds have been raised in the West by voluntary groups for movements like FRELIMO. Ironically, one of these groups, the African-American Institute, was recently named as a recipient of CIA funds and strongly attacked in the Portuguese press. Mondlane, however, accused the CIA of supplying the Portuguese with aircraft that bomb and strafe villages sympathetic to the rebels.

The FRELIMO leader is sharply critical of the United States which, he said, had "retreated" from its commitment to the principle of self-determination for Portugal's African possessions. Mondlane recalled that in 1961 the U.S. supported a U.N. Security Council resolution urging independence for areas under colonial rule but, the FRELIMO leader added, since then Washington has offered little encouragement to anti-Portuguese nationalist movements.

Mondlane says – and one suspects that this usually candid man is indulging in a bit of political guile by over-simplifying—that FRELIMO considers discussions of Communism and capitalism irrelevant. "Our movement is not based on ideology but rather on a struggle for freedom against colonialism."

The three-point FRELIMO program —ousting Portuguese power, building a new political order based on equitable land distribution and economic development, and developing cultural resources—is being gradually implemented in areas under FRELIMO control where agricultural cooperatives have been set up and political discussion groups formed.

The Portuguese claim that the rebellion is confined to the Makonde tribe, traditional enemies of several other Mozambique tribes. Mondlane seeks to refute what he called this "divide and rule" policy by pointing out that within the northern third of the country the majority of the population supports FRELIMO and that the fighting units are totally integrated, representing a tribal cross-section. He said an essential by-product of the military struggle is the growing unity of purpose among the Mozambicans themselves:

> The aim of our movement is not simply to wage a revolutionary struggle, but to convert FRELIMO into an institution which will progressively take over the government of the country as we liberate new parts. We are concerned with building up a unified political system as well as creating a fighting army. We are realistic enough to know that it may take a very long time before the Portuguese can be driven from Mozambique.

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MORE ON POVERTY

The following articles will extend the series of poverty reports which began last fall and continued with Vera Rony's article on Tennessee and Pat Watters' on Mississippi. Reports on various problems and areas of the Poverty Program will appear regularly in subsequent issues.—ED.

Frank Riessman

The Myth of Saul Alinsky

It is most fascinating that Saul Alinsky's approach to community organizing is commonly regarded as a radical one and that a number of people with progressive and radical leanings are so strongly attracted to it. However, the Alinsky model neither implies a radical view of society nor calls for radical social change. What, then, are its essential ingredients of social action?[1]

The major goal is to build a powerful neighborhood organization. This organization is to include all elements in the community—the people, the clergy, businessmen's groups, PTA's, service groups, block groups, the "poor."[2] Essentially, it is to be a local united front, an organization of organizations, and, like a labor union, it attempts to maintain its status as the sole bargaining agent in the area. The local organization involves at most 2 per cent of the people in the community; its purpose is to shift power to itself by taking it away from the existing local groups that are most vulnerable.[3]

Alinsky's model organization is built largely through stirring conflict, "rubbing raw the sores of discontent," attempting to disorganize whatever community organization exists.[4] A continuous state of militancy is emphasized, and demonstrations, pickets, boycotts, direct action, and publicity are stressed in order to involve people in building the organization.

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For example, in Alinsky's best-known group—The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago (TWO)—the aim was to expose and stop the exploitation of those neighborhood merchants who were overcharging. TWO got the cooperation of Woodlawn residents and community leaders and received a great deal of publicity. TWO also organized tenant groups trying to get slum landlords to repair building-code violations. If the landlords would not comply, TWO called rent strikes and picketed the homes of some landlords in white suburbs.

These are typical activities used all over the country by many different consumer, tenant, and civil rights groups to win specific gains. Alinsky attempts to use these tactics in order to develop local organization and power.

Sociotherapy for the Poor

Writers like Charles Silberman and Warren Haggstrom have added a sociotherapeutic dimension to the Alinsky model, arguing that militant social action presumably transforms apathetic, dependent, poor people into independent, dignified citizens.[5] Haggstrom believes that poor people need power, not money, and that this power will make them feel able and competent. In discussing the sociotherapeutic implications of the Alinsky model, Sherrard and Murray comment:

> It is assumed that aggression is a natural way for people who have been oppressed, mistreated, exploited or neglected to respond to those who have misused them, and that this [conflict] mode of organization will therefore overcome apathy and sustain participation among those who would not otherwise be willing to expend their energy on any social enterprise.
>
> It is perhaps assumed that this stance of righteous anger attracts and holds certain kinds of people who seem to require more compelling and intensive involvement than they get attending meetings and engaging in community problem solving. A militant stance of this sort may also encourage the timid who have legitimate complaints and have suffered and have been exploited to come forward and air their grievances. . . .
>
> This activity may indeed be therapeutic, if by acting out and giving vent to their hostilities these deprived individuals and groups attain subsequently a more stable and realistic relationship to their institutional environment. However, unless there is accompanying change in their environment, such activity may disrupt and further prevent the participants from making a new social adjustment. Any "therapy" must, above all, be realistic and honest at the same time that it raises aspiration and motivation—admittedly a difficult balance to achieve. It is yet to be proved that conflict organization is indeed therapeutic.[6]

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What Are The Local Results?

Apart from the fact that Alinsky offers no national program directed toward social change, what has he achieved locally through his model? He contends that his Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) has organized over 2 million people in 44 communities over the last 30 years. However, as Arthur Hillman comments, "Certainly if one out of every 100 people in the population are somehow enrolled or had recently been involved, the whole movement would have been much better known long before the recent publicity."[7] Alinsky offers no systematic evidence of any kind regarding the numbers of people he has organized. Moreover, it is very difficult even to locate the 44 communities now. A good many of them seem not to have survived for any period of time.

In the better known communities that Alinsky has organized (or stimulated)—Chelsea in New York City, The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago, FIGHT in Rochester, Back of the Yards in Chicago, the Syracuse Community Action Training Project—there is considerable question as to their effectiveness and achievements. The Chelsea project in New York, organized in the 1940's, which is rarely referred to anymore, was a complete fiasco.[8] It ended with great bitterness, no results, and disorganization. The Back of the Yards project in Chicago remains well-organized, but has ultimately become anti-Negro. Alinsky resigned from the Syracuse project not long after the going got rough, and the Office of Economic Opportunity (which had founded the organization) required that the project be placed under the umbrella of the city-wide antipoverty agency. Alinsky seemed completely unable to develop tactics to respond to this condition. Moreover, the achievements in the Syracuse project (such as organizing tenants in public housing projects) were probably not any more outstanding than those of the great variety of far less militant community action projects developed through antipoverty funding. For example, the Lincoln Hospital Neighborhood Service Center Program also organized tenants, participated in voter registration campaigns and the welfare rights movement with far less fanfare.[9]

In Rochester, the Alinsky-inspired agency called FIGHT has developed an almost completely segregated Negro organization. FIGHT is presently engaged in negotiating with Eastman-Kodak for job training for Negro youngsters in the area. Recently, perhaps as a result of much criticism regarding his localism, Alinsky has been suggesting that the Eastman-Kodak issue in Rochester may spread to become a national

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issue for every Negro ghetto in America and "revive the fading civil rights movement."[10]

There is no question that considerable press attention has been directed toward the Kodak issue: Stokely Carmichael has been introduced to Rochester; the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty has been investigating the issue; and the National Council of Churches has become involved. The question remains, however, whether it is more of a national newspaper issue than a movement. For example, "the national boycott of Kodak, which Carmichael promised to help organize, turned out to be a complete flop. Picketing scheduled in only nine cities actually occurred in four. At that only a few dozen showed up in New York, Detroit, Chicago and San Francisco and only five to seven in Atlanta."[11]

Perhaps even more relevant is the fact that locally in Rochester the "White Friends of FIGHT" have been losing their enthusiasm, and two of their presidents have resigned. Direct anti-Semitism expressed by Rev. Florence, the head of FIGHT, has antagonized many supporters. The church support in Rochester is rapidly dwindling and FIGHT's isolation from other civil rights organizations is increasing. Moreover, Kodak, Xerox, and many other firms throughout the nation, are involved in providing on-the-job training for "hard-core poor." The demand is not unique to FIGHT, and it is achieving results without the militant rhetoric that characterizes FIGHT. To pretend that there is deep establishment resistance to this program of on-the-job training and that only some militant organization can break this resistance is patently absurd. Reverend Leon Sullivan has developed similar, far more successful projects (Opportunity Industrialization Centers) in over 20 cities with much less revolutionary rhetoric. And in San Francisco the Mayor has been involved by the "New Careers Movement," which includes non-professionals and professionals, in developing a program for 3,000 New Careers jobs and careers for poor people, without any of the publicity attached to the Alinsky model. Not only are jobs to be produced, but training, upgrading, career lines, and modifications in Civil Service provisions as well; in other words, a series of potential institutional changes.

Alinsky's most publicized organization is The Woodlawn Organization, TWO, in Chicago. Countless newspaper and magazine writers have visited this project to bring back glowing reports about the development of dignity in the people of the area, victories over local shopkeepers and slumlords, exciting tactics (truth squads, death watches), and presumably the organization of previously apathetic, uninvolved, hard-core poor people.[12] Various Chicago-based social-scientist observers, however,

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present quite different reports. Sherrard and Murray, Arthur Hillman, and Philip Hauser all raise serious questions (see below) regarding the TWO project, and again it must be remarked that Alinsky has no systematic evidence whatsoever to back up the high-order publicity claims which have emerged.[13] Thus, Sherrard and Murray—who live, work, and conduct research in Chicago and along with Hillman have studied The Woodlawn Organization at close hand—seriously question the claim that TWO has reached the most deprived segment of the community. Hillman states: "Various kinds of evidence and the judgment of observers show that TWO's leaders and principal participants are middle class or upwardly mobile lower class persons. They are definitely not the most deprived or depressed."

Sherrard and Murray note in regard to the Chicago projects (and they are referring to all four of Alinsky's groups in Chicago), that "these church sponsored organizations have introduced a number of persons into political and city-wide prominence, but they have not become city-wide leaders. Organizational preoccupation with local self-interest and hostility toward citywide institutions severely limits their municipal leadership potential."

The question has also been raised as to whether pressure on offending merchants and slumlords forces changes that endure for any length of time. The recent supermarket boycott by women in various cities in the United States and Toronto probably stimulated the reduction of prices for a short time, but whether these prices will long remain at the new level is an open question. Tenant groups throughout the country, without the organization and funding of Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, have conducted rent strikes and have won gains with regard to housing repair, etc. There is no evidence in Alinsky's TWO or any of his other projects that their gains are greater than those of comparable communities in Chicago or other cities. Again, there is a lack of hard data.

The limitations of Alinsky's model in Chicago are particularly outstanding because he has organized four different groups in this city and yet appears to have had no significant influence on the Daley machine—an avowed enemy. Martin Luther King, through a few large demonstrations in Chicago last summer, was able to wrest concessions from Mayor Daley which Chicago's four church-sponsored Alinsky groups have never been able to win from the city.

When antipoverty organizations produce as little as Alinsky's groups, they receive no end of criticism. But the Alinsky facade continues to enchant the press and thereby the public.

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Alinsky constantly poses as anti-establishment, but the question is: which establishment is he opposed to? The organization of organizations that he produces in the local community often seems to become a new local establishment. He does not in any fundamental way challenge the city-wide or national establishments.

Perhaps more to the point, Alinsky's approach has not led to anything in the way of development, movement, national program, or national organization. It is possible to argue, of course, that some other group may come along and organize those people who have been aroused by Alinsky's organizers; but this does not seem to have occurred, an interesting fact in itself. Perhaps, the Alinsky model fundamentally diverts people from the idea of larger organization. In his opposition to large programs, broad goals and ideology, Alinsky diverts and confuses even the small masses that are included in his organization. This is most evident in the groups he has organized over the last 30 years; but even in TWO, his most positive example, there does not seem to be any significant movement toward a larger program. Recently, TWO has been moving toward job training and psychiatry for the poor, etc.—hardly programs of large social significance.

Alinsky's great concern that the people in the local neighborhood should develop their own goals by themselves leads further to the possibility of a localist agenda, because it is the organizer-strategist-intellectual who should provide the connections, the larger view that will lead to the development of a movement. This is not to suggest that the larger view should be imposed upon the local group; yet, it certainly should be developed, in part, by nationally-oriented leadership. It still can then be vetoed, amended, or accepted by the local population.

Many people who are not major supporters of Alinsky believe that he plays a valuable role in aiding less "radical" groups in the society to make more extreme demands. The argument goes: if a group makes powerful, extreme demands, the establishment is more likely to accede to the milder demands of liberals and other less militant forces. There is no question that sometimes this argument holds true, but it requires a careful analysis of the conditions under which it does and under which it does not. For example, it is fairly clear that the "Black Power" movement in the United States is not making the struggle of the other civil rights groups easier—to the contrary! Some years ago the militant posture and activity of Mobilization for Youth so highly sensitized the local governmental systems that any attempts by public-sponsored agencies to become involved in social action were thereafter looked at askance. Some people mistakenly believe that the violence and the riots

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in various ghetto areas has led to new programs related to these areas. But there is no evidence for this. What happens is that money will be spent for riot control and temporary programs to keep youngsters off the streets. Typically, the money is taken from one program and simply transferred to another. There is no evidence of any expanded programming in relation to riots that have occurred, other than perhaps permitting the turning-on of hydrants in hot weather.

It is not possible to offer here a full analysis of the conditions under which a more extreme movement makes it easier for a less extreme movement to achieve gains. Suffice to say, however, that the extreme movement should probably possess genuine power which is more than locally-based and should be able to have some relationship, short of complete disparagement, with the less militant groups. The civil rights movement in its earlier phase was illustrative. At that time, when the more militant groups such as CORE and SNCC were able to have an influence on the other civil rights groups and frequently coalesced with them, the movement had much greater influence as a whole.

The question has to be asked repeatedly, and not only as to whether an opposite effect occurs in response to an extreme demand, but also whether the goals would be achieved, independent of this type of demand. We must always ask, "What are the alternatives if the Alinsky position were not offered?" "How is Alinsky distracting and diverting from more significant programs of social change?" "Does he politicize the area, or does he simply direct people into a kind of dead-end local activism?"[14]

Radical Rhetoric vs. Radical Goals

In some cases, Alinsky probably does break a local stalemate and provides a door opener where nothing has been happening. The existing political power structure in Rochester, for example, responded to the coming of Alinsky by making counter-promises, etc. Frequently, however, as much energy is directed into exposing Alinsky, and little real change takes place. This, of course, is not a necessary condition, but it seems to happen frequently, probably largely because Alinsky is concerned with developing counter-organization rather than large-scale political change; his tactics, therefore, are in this direction and there is an under-emphasis on methods of influencing the local power groups that cannot be directly attributed to the power of the Alinsky organization.

It is difficult to understand why Alinsky should be accepted as a radical by people knowledgeable about radicalism, since he has no

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basic critical analysis of American society, no program for large-scale institutional changes, and no national program whatsoever.

(The titles of Alinsky's books are most revealing with regard to the man who calls himself a "professional radical." He published *Reveille for Radicals* in 1945, and for some time he has talked about a book to be published called *Rules for Revolution*.)

Alinsky has developed no organization outside of local areas, and he eschews ideology which he equates with dogma; he has no plan to assist the poor to become non-poor and to leave poverty. He has never developed any national coalition with other major forces. Groups he has organized sometimes actually develop reactionary orientations (for example, the anti-Negro orientation of the Back of the Yards group in Chicago). He provides no analysis of new developments taking place in the society that might have relevance for a long-range strategy.

> The Alinsky formula assumes some kind of bootstrap magic by which individual neighborhoods can solve their problems through an almost Mao-like belief in the magic or efficacy of unaided human will. It seems doubtful in the extreme whether local communities can make up for an inadequate national growth rate, and, in many if not most cases, the local economy is a reflection of factors beyond its individual control. The Alinsky model may thus lead to profound conservatism in practice in which radical slogans and rent strikes serve as a substitute for coordinated programmatic national action. Neighborhood organization without adequate theory may produce no more than piecemeal noble gestures.[15]

Essentially, then, it is clear that what is radical about Alinsky's approach is its rhetoric—its emphasis on militant posture, and its anti-establishment mystique. Why, then, does such an approach appeal to many American progressives and radicals?[16] There seem to be at least three reasons:

• 1) There is a powerful underdog, anti-establishment tradition in America which can easily be transformed into a mystique of the poor in which there is little careful understanding of what significant, progressive roles an underclass can play in a national movement, if united with other forces, such as intellectuals and strategists. European history is replete with leaders who knew how to unite intellectuals and the underclass. American intellectuals are not especially politically sophisticated. They have few ideological traditions and little experience with the development of national political movements. Strachey, Laski, Bernstein, Lenin, Marx, and countless others developed strategy, tactics, ideology, and program. But Alinsky has only glamorous tactics, and *ultimately tactics without strategy become bad tactics.*

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• 2) There is a bias in America for a kind of mindless, anarchic, pragmatic action, and a leader who ruthlessly calls for "getting things done," not talking a lot of bull, may have considerable appeal.

• 3) Finally, progressives and intellectuals in our society, nostalgic for the 30's, awakened by the civil rights movement of the 60's, and impressed by the activism of the young Left, have been searching for models to complete their early, unfulfilled radicalism.

To do this successfully, however, we will have to reappraise the potential trends and possibilities of the 60's. Through combining our goals with these trends, we will be able to shape new radical programs and strategies different from those of the 30's.

Frankly, we believe that many of the groups concerned with a radical program in America are caught up in stale images and biases. Thus, many radicals today one-sidedly emphasize conflict and demonstration tactics with little realization of the need to develop these into broader political tactics; they overlook the important cleavages within the establishment and the significance of many sub-establishments, possess a simplistic, finite view of power, and underestimate the significance of the expanding public sector of the economy. There is also a failure to grasp the dialectics of leadership, and hence too many radical-minded leaders in community action simply follow the new trends of the ghetto rather than provide the leadership that would come from large vision, national understanding, and theory.

The radicals of the 60's have little to learn from Alinsky because he is not concerned with goals and trends, nor with how to formulate new positions. Alinsky offers sociotherapy (action as therapy) without direction, but action which has no direction ultimately becomes non-therapeutic. In essence, Alinsky's approach represents tactics without strategy, protest without program. An anti-establishment activism is equated with radicalism; but they are by no means the same, and sometimes the activism can be harmful to the radicalism.

[1] See Saul D. Alinsky, *Reveille for Radicals*; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. Alinsky, "The Urban Immigrant," in T. T. McAvoy, ed., *Roman Catholicism and the American Way of Life*; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960. Alinsky, "Citizen Participation and Community Organization in Planning and Urban Renewal," address to National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, Chicago, January 1962.

[2] See Thomas D. Sherrard and Richard C. Murray, "The Church and Neighborhood Community Organization," *Social Work*, Vol. 10, No. 3, July 1965, pp. 3–14.

[3] Nicholas von Hoffman, the principal Alinsky organizer in Woodlawn wrote, "It is an organization of perhaps two per cent of the people. Those who talk about

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organizing 'all the people,' or 'the masses,' or 'the great majority of the people,' are talking unrealizable balderdash." "Finding and Making Leaders," Ann Arbor: Students for Democratic Society, 1964, p. 9.

4 See Saul Alinsky, "From Citizen Apathy to Participation." Paper presented at the Association of Community Councils of Chicago, October 1957, pp. 4 and 6.

5 Charles Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White*; New York: Random House, 1964, Chapter 10. (This is essentially the same as "Up from Apathy—The Woodlawn Experiment," *Commentary*, Vol. 37, No. 5, May 1964.) Warren C. Haggstrom, "The Power of the Poor," *Mental Health of the Poor*, edited by Riessman, Cohen, Pearl; New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 205–212.

6 Sherrard and Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

7 Personal communication from Arthur Hillman, Director of the National Friends Service Training Center, Chicago, Illinois.

8 E. C. Parker, "How Chelsea Was Torn Apart," *Christian Century*, February 3, 1960, p. 130.

9 See Emanuel Hallowitz and Frank Riessman, "The Role of the Indigenous Nonprofessional in a Community Mental Health Neighborhood Service Center Program," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 1967, in press.

10 See: Barbara Carter, "The Fight Against Kodak," *The Reporter*, pp. 28–31, April 27, 1967.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

12 Articles about Alinsky have appeared in *Harper's, Commentary, The Sunday Times Magazine, Reporter, Saturday Evening Post, Look, New Republic, Time* etc.

13 Op. Cit.; Philip Hauser, "Conflict vs. Consensus," *Chicago Sun-Times*, Dec. 13, 1964, Section II, pp. 1–3.

14 See Paul Feldman, "The Pathos of Black Power," DISSENT, January–February 1967, pp. 69–80.

15 From "Politics of Social Welfare," paper prepared for Columbia University Conference, November 1965.

16 This critique of American radicals who are influenced by Alinsky does not exclude myself. In an earlier article on Alinsky, though highly critical and never presuming him to be radical, I was to some extent taken in by magazine claims regarding his effectiveness. More recent events, further information, and analysis have led to the present position which sees him as highly ineffective and diversionary. See Frank Riessman, "Self-Help Among the Poor: New Styles of Social Action," *Transaction*, September–October 1965, Vol. 2, No. 6, p. 32. Also, "A Comparison of Two Social Action Approaches: Saul Alinsky and the New Student Left," by F. Riessman, in *New York State Psychologist*, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1966.

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Howard Thorkelson

Food Stamps & Hunger in America

There *is* hunger in the welfare state; everywhere standards are chronically inadequate. The most glaring inadequacy of the welfare system—the diet of the poor—has been patched over by supplementary programs: first surplus commodities, now food stamps, both administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

The administration and operation of these programs reveal a deep ambiguity in the government's commitment to assure an adequate diet to those in need. Recently in county after county in the South the distribution of free food has stopped with the adoption of the cash-based food stamp program. A main source of food has been cut off to thousands of people who have little or no cash. USDA has had to face charges, from poor people and senators, in public hearings, mass meetings and petitions, of its complicity in "forced starvation." It has met the charges with bureaucratic obduracy.

Direct distribution of federal surplus food began on a regular basis in 1933. Direct distribution was devised to avert mass starvation in the Depression while simultaneously disposing of the food stocks acquired by the government in the initial farm price support program. Responsibility for administration was confused, and shifted from the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Now the responsibility lies with the Consumer and Marketing Service of USDA. From the beginning, the federal agency has distributed food, not directly to needy persons, but to public welfare and private charitable agencies. Distribution began with three commodities made available by price-support purchases: pork, butter, and wheat. It later included fruit, vegetables, eggs, fish, and other products, but the presence of a surplus almost always determined the selection. When perishable foods in surplus were distributed locally, well-off people complained about pampering those on relief—which amounted usually to no more than a surfeit of grapefruit in school lunches. The success, either in relief or farm price support, of this early direct distribution is in doubt, because local welfare agencies would often cut cash relief payments by the amount taken to be the value of the food distributed; the family would therefore end up with even less money to buy food. However, as many as 13 million persons received food in 1939.

A 1935 Amendment to the first Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, which authorizes the distribution of food acquired for surplus-

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reduction,* has remained the principal basis of the direct distribution of food ever since. This provision prescribes no means of administration, but clearly authorizes complete federal operation. Nor does this provision prescribe any standards for determining who may receive food, or even any limitations on standards that could be used by the distributing agency. These decisions were left to the Secretary of Agriculture.

The decision was that the program should be operated locally, not by the federal government, but by the various state departments of public welfare which in turn used the office of their county branches.

For more than 30 years the issuance of canned meat, cheese, flour, beans, dry milk, and lard was part of the routine of survival for millions of persons. But in 1964 this routine was threatened by the enactment of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which was intended to phase out the surplus commodities program. This Act was based on the operation of pilot food stamp programs, which President Kennedy had initiated in 1961. In the pilot projects, as now, the participant, after showing that he didn't have too much property, would give the amount of his income and be told how much he would have to pay for the stamps. If he bought them he would receive "bonus" stamps in addition. But unlike now, if he had no income, as about 10 per cent of those participating didn't, he would be issued stamps free.

Throughout the South the families which could get surplus foods were the fortunate ones. Whether they could depended, and still depends, upon which county they lived in. In Georgia in 1967, 100 out of 159 counties had no food programs. In Alabama in 1966, 36 of the state's 67 counties had no food programs whatsoever. These 36 counties were mostly southern, that is the poorer counties where black people live in larger proportions. These are also the counties in which arbitrary personal and political standards are most likely to prevail in the administration of public assistance.

From 1933 to 1943, FERA and WPA provided operating funds which enabled states to conduct statewide distribution, as did Alabama, for example. Since the government now allows the states to make counties bear the cost of storing, transporting, and distributing the food† and does not require that the state *insure* the statewide operation of a program, the choice for the people of any county is made by the governing body of that county. Thus the general poverty of some counties encourages the white leadership to refuse the surplus food program.

Probably no county, however, has too small a tax base to pay the costs of distributing food. Yet many county officials in the South must believe that it's not worth it, since the labor of poor families is no longer necessary to agriculture and free food would only delay their departure for the North. In Hale County, Alabama, in 1966, about half the population of 19,000 would have been eligible for surplus foods. The probate judge told some

* § 32 Act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 744. Typically, the provision for low-income persons was an afterthought, not added until 1939. 53 Stat. 975.

† 6 CFR §503.6 (i).

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local people that if they were poor they should go to work or leave the county. This is the prerogative which the federal government has delegated to county leadership.

While the "need" standard might have been applied by a simple declaration, USDA requires the states to put people through the archaic ritual of the means test (unless they are already getting public assistance), showing that their income and property are within the limitations. The income limitations are rigid. In New York State a family of four with an income of $280 a month is eligible but a dollar more disqualifies them. "Hardship" provisions, optional with the states, often require a natural disaster, such as a flood or hurricane, rather than a family illness. Then the applicants must meet USDA's definition of a "household," which it applies in both the surplus commodities and food stamp programs. "Household" is defined as people living together in an economic unit, sharing the purchase and preparation of food. This rarefied concept serves to cover almost all families, but when a person lives alone and eats with a relative nearby or when two old people live in the same house but buy their food separately, they are denied food. In early 1967 people living in a Freedom Camp in the Mississippi Delta, having been evicted from their farms, were denied food on the ostensible grounds that none of them comprised a "household," because the families were cooking and eating in communal style.

For the rest, the states are free to impose their own limitations, within the tolerance of USDA. Thus in Arizona, for example, a man living alone cannot get his portion of boiled beef, rice, flour, etc. "unless it is established that he is unemployable. . . ." Arizona will not feed him even if he is working and his property and income are below the maximum standards. Nor can any farm-labor family get food if there are two or more able-bodied men over the age of 16 and the welfare department finds that work is available in Arizona, California, Utah, Nevada, or New Mexico.* In other states, including Mississippi, food is denied, during the crop season, to men, women, and children who might be able to work in the fields.

Once a family does qualify to receive food, it faces the problem of how to get it. In New York City it may go to one of a number of distribution depots, which are open on a staggered schedule. In Manhattan there are 11. But in the rural South getting the food often entails paying one's neighbor or boss man to drive him into the county seat on the one day a month when food is distributed. Someone may go *for* a family or a sick person, but this must be arranged in advance or authorized in writing. At the depot one joins the line and waits to be handed the bundle of food. In 1966 in Alabama the bundle was worth about $19, and in New York its composition and value were about the same.

With the gradual and increasing replacement of surplus food distribution by food stamps, certain well-advertised advantages are supposed to accrue: better food, such as fresh meat and

* Arizon Manual of Pub. Welf. Admin. §3-1002.(A) (1966).

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eggs; a wider selection of food; not a give-away but a supplementation of the family's food budget; and use of the existing channels of commerce. The poor consumer soon discovers, however, that merchants raise prices and put forth inferior foods. The selection does not include any food marked imported and so discriminates against Puerto Ricans or Italians who commit their food budgets to stamps. Families in large cities will have to go to supermarkets instead of small markets and *bodegas*, which are deterred from participating by inertia or bureaucratic obstructions. But since food stamps come only in two denominations (two dollars, or fifty cents) and merchants are not allowed to give change, they will cheat on the credit record; and they will tear off additional stamps.

In Louisiana civil rights workers found that food prices shot up with the adoption of the food stamp program. In rural counties some farmers, who had to borrow money to buy stamps during most of the year, made an arrangement with the grocer. He advanced the cash for the stamps, and they bought them and turned them over to him for credit. The grocer was then free to overcharge to the extent of the credit. Of course USDA regulations prohibit discriminatory price raises but provide no means for consumers to enforce the prohibition.

USDA spokesmen have told representatives of welfare groups that the purpose of the food stamp program is not to aid the poor but to maintain farmers' incomes. USDA has several means of using the program to maximize consumption. One is the regular-participation requirement, which punishes a family for failing to buy stamps for two, or perhaps three, months in succession. The family suffers exclusion from the program for a period and must reapply to participate again. Another means of maximizing consumption is the prescribed scale which determines how much a family must pay to buy stamps. The scale discriminates against the very poor in that it requires the commitment to food spending of a disproportionately high share of the income of a family which has *little or no* income. In Mississippi a family of four with monthly income between $0 and $29.99 must pay $8 (for $48 worth of stamps). In Illinois a family of four (not receiving public assistance) with monthly income between $0 and $69.99 must pay $28 (for $68 worth of stamps).

For any person who has received surplus foods the most important fact about food stamps is that they cost money. They cost an amount so much higher than what the family would otherwise spend for food as to make it difficult or impossible to participate in the program. Preliminary reports from USDA indicate that *the change from surplus food to stamps in the South causes a drop in participation of at least 40% and that in 1966 a source of food was cut off for at least 75,000.* As the change continues, these figures will probably climb much higher. In the affected areas of Georgia participation dropped about 75%, in Kentucky about 50%. The record of older programs shows a tendency for participation in the food stamp program to drop as it goes on. The program in Fayette County, Pennsylvania,

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started with 23,670 buying stamps in June, 1961 and had 13,843 people participating in June, 1966 (both months of national peak participation). USDA reports an over-50% drop for Detroit from 1962 to 1965.

How do poor people endure in states like Mississippi?

> MRS. W. . . . I live with my seven children. I haven't worked since three months ago before the baby was born. I don't get welfare. I do get $5 to $10 about once a month from the baby's father. Two of my children chopped a little cotton last year, two days a week for $2 to $3 a day. . . . Two of them are in school but don't have enough money to pay for their lunches. I used to get commodities until the program ended. . . . Now we're eating some leftover commodities. I don't know where I will get any money to buy food when we run out of commodities. . . . Some days I don't have anything to eat at all. I have used my last can of commodity meat.
>
> MRS. B. . . . I live with my five children. I haven't worked since January 21st, when I lost my Work Experience program job. . . . They haven't given me a job as they promised. . . . Since I lost the job I've been eating only what people give me plus some commodities which were left over when the program ended. . . . For breakfast we have dry rice and bread; I feed my children beans or bread for lunch, and don't eat myself. . . . For supper we eat whatever is left from lunch, if anything. I was asked for $12 to buy food stamps. I don't have $12. . . .

People in the rural South have a credit economy. If these farm families do not receive public assistance, they have cash income perhaps once or twice a year. Negro families borrow regularly from the plantation owner, the white family for whom the mother does domestic work, the grocer, the neighbors, the relatives. Some people —the aged and those who cannot work and have no resources—must get along without cash at all, living on garden vegetables, perhaps fresh eggs, and gifts. Yet USDA rules that those who ordinarily spend nothing for food pay cash for stamps.

USDA has imposed this cash requirement on the program apparently out of fanatical rejection of "something for nothing." According to one USDA official, "presumably, a couple of odd jobs could supply that minimum purchase requirement."* It is not a question of the cost of the program, since the government could issue at least the free bonus coupons to any family without income and disregard the rest of the allotment.

There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended that families without income receive their entire allotments without charge. The Food Stamp Act says simply that the family

POVERTY AND POLITICS

"We in America today are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land. . . .

"We have not yet reached the goal, but given a chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years, and we shall soon, with the help of God, be within sight of the day when poverty shall be banished from this nation."

The quotation is not, as you might suppose, from a speech of Lyndon Johnson heralding his war on poverty. It's from Herbert Hoover, speaking in another summer, when he accepted the nomination for President in 1928.

—*The Wall Street Journal*

* *Wall Street Journal*, April 29, 1967.

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should pay an amount "determined to be equivalent to their normal expenditures for food." Suppose the family has no "normal expenditures for food." In the Congressional debate Senator Humphrey answered:

> The price they pay is approximately what they would normally spend for food out of whatever income they have from whatever source. When the families have little or no income they make only token payments or receive their coupons free.*

The agriculture bureaucrats of the USDA have their own client groups: the representatives of the white South who dominate the agriculture committees in the House and Senate, and the powerful organizations of the prosperous commercial white farmers. The alliance of USDA and the white farmer has brought about the practical elimination of production surpluses. But farm prices have not been rising, and so the more the poor are forced to consume commercially sold food, the better for farmers.

The government's response to the Mississippi crisis was a demonstration of virtuosity. The Office of Economic Opportunity, called upon for help, recited USDA's interpretation of the Food Stamp Act but announced that it (OEO) would grant family loans to enable families to buy food stamps. The loans, ranging in amount from $2 to $12, at 2 per cent interest, were to begin in June and to be made available for four months in 20 Southern counties including four in Mississippi and one in Alabama.† Presumably many of the loans would never be repayed. It is ironic that OEO, an agency dedicated to specialized service programs, must pay the cost of USDA's intransigence.

A proposal by Congressman Poage of Texas would require the states to pay 20% of the cost of the bonus stamps, besides the present operating costs. That would effectively end food stamp programs in most of the South by causing states to withdraw their food stamp "plans" and leave those counties which have recently changed without any food program. The growing hunger might lead USDA to acknowledge and exercise its power to distribute food directly, itself, in any county which did not have food stamps. Until then, although USDA could impose any reasonable conditions upon any state's food stamp program, it is prohibited by a provision of the Act (which was supported by the Secretary of Agriculture) from distributing food in a county which has stamps unless the Secretary declares the existence of a "national or other disaster." The Secretary must know what he means by a "national disaster": apparently it is not mass hunger and slow starvation.

* 110 Cong. Rec. 15442 (1964). Statements to the same effect were made by the author of the legislation, 110 Cong. Rec. 7128 (1964), and other supporters, 110 Cong. Rec. 7150 (1964).

† The Southern Courier, May 13–14, 1967, p. 6 col. 1.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Henry Pachter

Troubles of a Jewish Conscience

June 12, 1967

I have talked to a number of citizens of Jewish descent —some of whom have relatives in Israel or have lived there—who, like me, have been troubled by the ruthless actions of the Tel Aviv government in the recent conflict. While we hold no brief for Arab provocations and fully understand Israel's right to self-defense, we are deeply disturbed by General Dayan's independence in the execution of his assignment. By proclaiming the Army's determination to keep the Old City of Jerusalem, he contradicted the words of his Foreign Minister who—almost at the same time—promised the United Nations Security Council that Israel would annex no territory. By pursuing the Egyptians until his troops had reached the Suez Canal, he defied the U.N. Security Council's cease-fire order; by continuing the war in Syria long after the deadline of the cease-fire had expired, he defied world opinion.

In addition, we note with regret a number of incidents which require a thorough investigation by impartial authorities:

The refusal, at the beginning of the crisis, to accept the UNEF on Israeli territory;

The repeated disregard of U.N. Security Council orders and the welshing and hemming on the given word of the Foreign Minister or his representative in the United Nations;

The killing of 11 UNEF members in the Gaza Strip;

The occupation of U.N. Truce Supervision Commission Headquarters in Jerusalem;

The brutal expulsion of Arab refugees from conquered territory west of the Jordan River.

The United States has been proud to support the only democratic government in the Near East. It would be sad if that government were to be replaced by a military dictatorship or if it were swayed by militaristic-chauvinistic passions which might prevent a just and fair peace. Generosity behooves the victor and we hope that Israel, while insisting on a peace which would give it as much security as can be expected within a rather imperfect system of states, will

moderate its demands in such a way as to avoid additional humiliations, which might only give the Arabs and their allies new cause for revenge;

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make constructive proposals for a fair solution of the refugee problem.

I am frankly dismayed by the inclusion in the cabinet of Menachem Begin, a terrorist, fascist, and expansionist.

We further note with regret the wave of mistaken chauvinism among American Jews and their friends. In a democracy we are taught to support our government not blindly but critically; this should also be the rule for the support of our friends. If they are wrong, we feel compelled to tell them so. We therefore had to take exception, regretfully but firmly, to a statement of blind support, published in *The New York Times* by a number of writers usually associated with the Left and presuming to speak in the name of "the intellectuals." It was particularly surprising to find among the signers some persons who previously had associated themselves with protests against the American conduct in the Vietnam War. Is it too much to ask for consistency? We certainly condemn the aggressive policies of the Arab dictators and of the Soviet government which abetted their provocations. But we continue to uphold the ideals of humanity and of obedience to international law against our own and any other government, and we hope that the peace will be fair to all. We further hope that the United Nations' authority will be restored in the area, especially that an independent peace guard will be constituted and that it will be given sovereignty in disputed strategic areas such as the Gaza Strip and the hills overlooking the Israeli-Syrian border, as well as the City of Jerusalem with the holy places of many nations.

Bob Simon

Questions on the Freedom Budget

The Freedom Budget is a coherent, pragmatic, democratic, non-apocalyptic program for political action. Unfortunately, the Vietnam War makes it far more utopian than anything proposed by Narodnicki students who allegedly don't understand politics.

This is not the fault of Bayard Rustin (who has been caricatured by Staughton Lynd as a "labor lieutenant of capitalism"). Rustin is committed to getting what people need to reconstruct their lives through tactically sound politics. Real options for action are being constricted by a deteriorating national situation rather than by leaders "selling out" the movement.

White middle-class America is moving to the Right—not toward garrison-state fascism, but toward an endorsement, no matter how apathetic, of an indefinite future of urban decay, repression of the ghettos, welfare doles,

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and donations of armed self-determination to Asian peoples.

Radical responses to this exhaustion of the progressive impulse are predictable. Some will resign because trends are inevitable, "nothing can be done." Some transcend limited options with unlimited ideological frenzy, "first the fascists, then us." Others will continue grass-roots projects with the poor under increasingly debilitating and isolating conditions.

Rustin and his colleagues want a national program for the broadest possible movement and they begin with sound assumptions. For every voter on our Left, there are a thousand on our Right. Politics based on strenuous, self-conscious purity are consumed in instant publicity—the first sign of early extinction.

These premises seem to require a "realistic" strategy. Influential liberals, including supporters of the war, join labor and civil rights spokesmen in signing the Freedom Budget. Leon Keyserling demonstrates how a "national growth dividend" can pay for Vietnam, the rebuilding of cities, and the eradication of poverty.

The Establishment is to be disarmed in advance. There are no sources of economic intelligence, known only to your President, that compel him, in all candor, to tell the people he can't spend the money and have his war too. The subliminal message goes to the Far Left: Vietnam is not the inevitable result of the System's holding on to markets while expending its surplus in imperialist war.

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The Budget will be an educational holding action, but its initial, partial implementation must await the coming end of the war.

Which war? Vietnam, the emerging struggle against aggression from the north in Thailand? Five years from now, will we be arguing about coalition strategy during the pacification of Nepal?

Concentration on Vietnam is said by coalitionists to be the kind of one-issue politics that insures that Negroes and white poor will bear the cost of the war.

Here, it is Rustin who is taking an ahistorical position. America is committed to welfare capitalism; the Welfare State is far more than a myth. But it is a timid variant compared to others in the West; generally, no more than an expensive mopping up of destructive, privately generated social costs.

Whether in any single election the majority of middle-class voters moves Left or Right, fundamental political obstacles are never really eliminated. Parochial conservatism, routine racism, liberal default, corporate influence, world "crisis," and war endlessly reduce practical expectations to uselessly low levels. Nothing more can be expected "now."

Of course, a war's effect on domestic progress is not the final criterion for its justification. This time, fortunately, radicals are not compelled to offer critical support in the struggle against the invisable Chinese hordes.

We know that most Americans, including Negroes, labor, and the poor, are only peripherally concerned with Vietnam. *But even if significant political action cannot be mobilized on this issue, there will be no serious advances toward economic democracy*

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until the problem of American interventionism is permanently solved.

The political uses of anti-Communism have created an automatic system of false choices and resolutions that are reproduced in every major domestic conflict. Attacks on the refusal to be anti-Communist in any situation are not relevant here. Socialists have for years been against totalitarianism, against American interventionism, and against political manipulation of democratic ideals. We did not create the subtle link between anti-Communism and anti-anti-poverty! Our opponents did.

By now these confusions are so much a part of our national thought that nothing will be clarified by radicals wearing one hat for the anti-war movement and another for poverty and civil rights. The Rustin-Keyserling strategy is a crippling refusal to confront this tenacious complex of ideology, ritualistic political responses, and economic interests.

Paradoxically, socialists define with scholastic precision who they will coalesce with and on what issues— it seems to matter. Yet they seem to think it is impractical to work at getting our society out of this false dilemma for good.

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About immediate questions, what to do this year, the strategists for the Freedom Budget ought to be able to tell us:

1) What can they expect from this Congress? The Administration and Congress agreed last session that excessive domestic spending and Asian land-wars lead to inflation. Will the Civil Rights Bill be renewed, crippling appropriation cuts for community action be restored, Harlem's democratic right to elect a bad congressman be reconfirmed, etc?

2) Why should radicals agree with the right-wing myth about the political power of labor on tap for liberal causes? In the last session most of the COPE-backed congressmen supported Johnson's request for a ceiling on domestic spending. In November, 49 of them lost their House seats. Republican voting among the rank and file was embarrassingly heavy. Congress has come to reject the repeal of 14-B with bored complacency.

3) What is to be the precise role of the civil rights movement? Rustin and Randolph are openly dubious about the wisdom of mass demonstrations as leverage in bargaining situations. They are not in a bargaining position now and it is incontestable that, in the immediate future, demonstrations won't put them into one.

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Perhaps it is expected that the sympathies of civil rights leaders, combined with fears of crime in the streets, will shame the already beleaguered liberals into doing their duty. This is far more mystical than conclusively proving whites can't understand nitty-gritty and hog jowls. Although SNCC has withdrawn as a cosponsor of the Budget, it could be of positive importance in orienting the movement toward a concrete social program for jobs, housing, schools, and income. But Rustin could also be on his way to a convincing demonstration of Carmichael's thesis that they won't give you what you need and have earned, not because they can't afford it, but because you're black.

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BOOKS

George Dennison

Isolation at the Heart of Busy Occasions

FIVE YEARS: Thoughts During a Useless Time, by Paul Goodman. Preface by Harold Rosenberg. New York: Brussel & Brussel. 257 pp. $5.

Paul Goodman now has 21 books in print and we can expect two more within the year. These 21 are variously short stories, dramas, poetry, literary and social criticism, works on psychotherapy, community planning, and education. *Five Years,* which is neither a diary nor a journal, but a collection of "thoughts," not only touches on all these interests but adds linguistic analysis, travels in Europe, and in a more personal vein problems of home and friends and of the streets of various cities, seen frequently under the difficult light of looking for love.

The book is remarkable for the quality and range of its thought, and for the life-experience it records. Its subtitle, *thoughts during a useless time,* refers to the years between 1955 and 1960. Both *Empire City* and *Growing Up Absurd* were published during these years, yet by and large the author experienced them as a kind of coda to a still longer period of isolation and neglect. He was 45 years old when he commenced the *thoughts.* He had written some 20 books and they had been largely ignored. He had lived for the most part in poverty. Yet if his privations and disappointments had been only of this kind, *Five Years* would not be the fascinating document that it is.

At the heart of the book we find a very personal malaise. It appears sometimes as the problem of not living in "a reasonable world," sometimes as an arrogance which alienates him from the lives of others, sometimes as a humility which sets him apart from the conceits of mass society's symbolic materialism, a humanity which ripens frequently into religious obedience; again, it appears as a sense of loss which makes him seem like a disembodied spirit trying to learn the laws of fleshly existence. Harold Rosenberg, in his preface, cites the dissatisfactions attendant upon these dilemmas as aspects of the author's "hunger." This is not an adequate analysis, yet some such idea is necessary to explain the fact that Goodman's sense of isolation is not cured by his own activity or by the presence of other persons, just as his sexual yearning is not stilled by bouts of sex (. . . when the bout is all over and gone, I lust"). For in general, as these notes make clear, the life that Goodman speaks of so bleakly was unusually active and filled with

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persons: family, friends, admirers, colleagues of several kinds, and patients in psychotherapy. His average day tended to have it in such quantities of encounters as would have surfeited or delighted another man.

> In the afternoon I was with the beautiful wild boy who plays by the river, sexy, amiable, and on the loose so that he will come to nothing. But I could happily spend all my days with him if I dared . . . in the evening I was in the great new aeroplane flying West, and I was abashed and made small by that machine, society with a big S . . . Finally, at night I was at the conference, leading a company of my peers who seemed to accord me attention and respect, and even (as it turned out) interesting sex. I spoke well, absorbed and spontaneous; a good deal panned out; I downed my misgivings and asked for what I wanted and somewhat got it. But that was yesterday: what is their reaction now that I am gone? I am again faced with an empty day, yet I have less impulse to throw myself into the wild and its fears.

"I am again faced with an empty day." There is something essential about Goodman in this remark, coming as it does after a description of rather interesting and rewarding events. It is as if he lived terribly close to the void, which rather than ignore he attempts to fill with real things. There are many entries of this kind, revealing the solitude at the heart of busy occasions. When the experience is of solitude itself, another aspect of the author's life comes to light.

> Giving up my planless and fruitless search for company, I go far off on the empty beach. And what if I were Robinson Crusoe? I would collect kinds of insects and shellfish, whatever has a will of its own. Everything—the waves, the sun—has a rudimentary will of its own. Soon the nature of things becomes a Thou for me. There is a return of the forgotten and the landscape is peopled with its gods. This company of the chosen solitude, or resigned solitude—it comes to the same thing—is what I really want, but I am so impatient.

On the same page:

> I go up to the lonely moor behind the dune, where no one ever goes but me, and no one can see me. By short stages of association—"moor" "lonely moor"—I think of the verses, "God be my help and stay secure, I'll think of the leech-gatherer!" I ask myself if I can resign from this Purgatory, and I at once think of Rabbi Tarfon's sentence, "It is not incumbent on you to finish, neither are you free to leave it off." All my deep advisers say the same thing, but I only shake my head, while the sobs rise in my breast.

This experience of isolation, the being "set apart"—which takes so many forms—runs like a substratum through these thoughts. We sense it even in the more formal entries, the philosophical, ethical, religious, esthetic, and psychological observations which make up the greater part of the book. The observations come through to us, as they do to the author, as kinds of imperatives. One might say that before the fact Goodman's thought is disinterested and yields speculations, but that after the fact it announces articles of engagement. The effect is of a philosophic mind in the service of yearning.

The experience of isolation appears too—and profoundly, I think—in those aspects of the book in which we see the shaping of a life (and even, to some extent, the shaping of a self). In these entries the author proposes tasks, duties, and loyalties to himself; he examines his behavior and wonders about alternatives. The significance of

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all this lies in the fact that he does not, and cannot, take for granted the ordinary bases of life, but examines everything, analyzing and reassembling according to the necessities he himself considers most profound. It is an extraordinary demonstration of the shaping *will.* The courage that sustains it can hardly be overpraised; which is not to say that there are no Quixotic moments. There are many. We find episodes where Goodman wants to be treated simultaneously as a patriarch and a little child, and others in which he reads the Riot Act of Natural Sex to persons quite capable of a good time if only he himself were not so busy spoiling things.

Taken as a whole, such episodes fill out a life spectrum of enormous range, one which proposes several mysteries, first among them the relation of Goodman's prodigious literary creativity to the character traits he describes. For there is much in the life that is not authentic. "I have gradually been refining from my behaviour," he writes, "the bluff, the false dignity, the evasive maneuvers, the actions performed to make good the bluff. But this is a dangerous course, for soon I come to see that the whole is false *en bloc,* it is 'not myself.' " Yet, no matter what happens, whether it is or is not "himself," he extracts from it, or builds upon it, various forms of art (such as the *thoughts* themselves), and these are always authentic, always ring true. One would not say *to* life, but true *as* life and therefore true as art, distinct from the "merely literary." I can think of no other journal or diary in which the existential necessities of a single life are so openly and deeply revealed. Baudelaire's *Intimate Journal* has much in it that is extreme, but his plight was desperate, he could not make good his resolves, and we see a tragic picture of fitful hopes and a crumbling life.

The dilemmas which are extreme in *Five Years* are answered by extraordinary powers, and the underlying process is a life-creating dialectic of need and response, disease and health, failure and success.

In view of the fascination and profundity of this, taken even as spectacle, Harold Rosenberg's interpretive preface is sadly misleading. He explains the book as if it were A Sample of Our Culture rather than the life of a man. "It is a memoir," he writes, "of a victim of ideology, of a man who wrecks his comfort and his sense of seemliness for the sake of an idea. With P.G., Eros turned into a vengeful Jehovah who condemned him to a *law* of hunger and flight." This is as much as to say that no real needs were operating, and that the failures of the life were merely those of ideational errors. One wonders, too, if our deeper needs are much met by comfort. Rosenberg's interpretation denies the very aspects of the book that are most interesting and most deserving of praise, those I have referred to as dialectical, in which we see intellect, will, courage, and religious obedience fashioning a life in dialogue with many ills, some of which are the author's own and others the well-known maladies of the modern world.

If such things as I have just described are the heart of the book, and perhaps, too, its veins and arteries, they are not its body. One's first impression is of an intimate conversation

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ranging over a great many subjects and events. Goodman writes with impressive learning, but in such a way that the necessarily artificial boundaries observed by specialists – the boundaries which delimit "fields of interests"—are broken down, or simply not observed. Everything is referred immediately to the central touchstone of his own experience. Thus, when he speaks of "anomie" and cites the sociologies, we still hear the voice of a disappointed lover, just as we hear the voice of a poet when he marshalls the insights of linguistic analysis.

This act of synthesizing is certainly one source of the remarkable incisiveness of these short paragraphs. It is a source, too, of their centrality of argument, since no man suffers uniquely. Only direct quotation can do justice to this aspect of *Five Years,* though even a dozen quotes would give a poor idea of the book's variety. Here, in any event, are some excerpts. They may indicate roughly a quality that can best be described as *resonance*, for though the book is not long, it is endlessly relevant and fertile, centered squarely in the experiences which have proven to be crucial for our time. One need not name the crises here but say only that the *shaping of the life* has fallen so heavily to the individual that the greater part of our analytical literature does little but describe our various failures. This is reflected in the fact that the *act of witnessing* has assumed such prominence among the aims of art that the entire period has been characterized by the monumentalization of the lyric form.

> So-called complex words, poems and orations, that develop into feeling and action—akin to the songful polysyllabic concretions of primitive speech, as Jespersen reconstructs it—are the premises in ethics. The positivists are in error; ethics does not consist of prescriptive commands and the sentences deduced from them; rather, it states the relations in the soul between how I am in the world and what I command myself to do. Poems and rhetoric give us these premises in a synthetic form; the implications must be drawn out by criticism. This justifies the vague and seemingly pompous carryings-on in the literary reviews. As Arnold said, Literature is the criticism of life, but it is not easy to know what it is saying. Similarly, belief is expressed in puzzling scriptures that require rabbinical exegesis. But there is no help for it. Simplicity or precision is not to be hoped for. If it is achieved, something is wrong, since ethics and faith are in present motion.
>
> Except on some such view as this, it is impossible to understand how ethical propositions can be motivating. Why would I obey the command unless it engaged me as I am? Conversely, it is not the "proposition" that God created War-Horse and Leviathan that is convincing to Job—at best this could lead him to servile identification with his powerful conqueror. Rather, the ethical proposition is the moving poetry, which engages us, and so we move of our own initiative. The speech of Adam in the garden is Jesperson's non-analytic syntax and song; it is neither abstract or value-neutral, nor does it state "values."

> To the end of the old pier reaching into the river, where you have to pick your way in order not to fall between the broken planks, come (1) adventurous boys, (2) queers following the boys, (3) hung-over winos to sleep it off undisturbed, (4) persons in distress or elation, often weeping women, seeking calm from the sight of the water or meditating jumping in, (5) old men to sun-bathe, (6) philosophic gentlemen puffing on pipes, (7) fishers of the deep. Such is the State of Nature.

> Christian theologians have been

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drawing ammunition for the reality of their faith from Auerbach's style-study showing that the Greeks could not represent reality. (Homer and Sophocles vs. Genesis and the Gospel.) But I think that Auerbach unwittingly proves the very contrary of what the theologians want to prove. He fails to ask, "In what conditions does a man *write* a book?" Had he asked it, he would have seen that the Greeks would never have thought of *representing* "reality," which is something that must be lived; as Kafka said, "Man kann nicht Erloesung schreiben, nur leben." For the Greeks, poetry had quite other aims, of dream, recreation, or community worship; and the totality of *that* function was the reality. In this respect, Homer reads just like a Border Ballad. The foreground he presents is sharp and clear because the background is quiet, without neurosis or problem of community function. One must rather ask: what is imperfect about Christians' faith (and what is the neurosis) that they must *represent* reality in a book and spread a Gospel as a story?

Nineteenth-century rationalism in France was an ideology of the establishment, peculiarly without revolutionary threat. The schoolteacher and the priest were rival figures of comedy. This co-opting and alliance was nauseating, so that French existentialism has been driven to the most Wild West extreme-situations in order to escape Reason and God. What elsewhere would be a bold practical use of the intellect, in France seems to be an extreme situation, simply because it makes sense, as if to say, "This could make a difference, therefore it must be an extreme situation." The French Revolution fell apart into two fragments, its rationality that "succeeded" and was taken over by the new establishment, and its fraternity that failed, and now the world is inanimate. No life left but in a "subjective moment."

Small-Town Italians: The Left and the Right

THE SEARCHERS: CONFLICT AND COMMUNISM IN AN ITALIAN TOWN, by Belden Paulson (with Athos Ricci). Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 347 pp. $6.95.

To novelists, social scientists seem a subversive class. It is not merely that the latter have increasingly invaded the hitherto settled territory of the novelist—the individual's complex ties with his society. Far worse. In recent years they have sought to pry further into the novelist's secrets and to escape with the precious jewels of his art: those peculiar aesthetic forms that transmute the invariable topicality of material into works of permanence. Among the arch-criminals is Oscar Lewis. Through skillful use of the first-person narrative forms, and patient revision of his material, Lewis has consistently brought to artistic life the enduring and painful lives of the poor, the marginal, the exiled.

Lewis and his methods are relevant to the book at hand, *The Searchers*, a study of the social and political structure of a small Italian town. For Belden Paulson, the American author,

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has chosen to shape his material by means of tape-recorded interviews with the inhabitants of Castelfuoco, so that they can narrate their own stories. Paulson is more impure than Lewis, and sees fit to interlace these personal accounts with commentary of his own. Embarrassing in their self-deception, they are frequently as helpful as television commercials (pushing American "ideals," no less). Thus the upshot is really two books uneasily joined; one, a dull affair, the pieties of the American missionary, and the second more lively and valuable, the accounts by the Italians themselves.

The interest in Castelfuoco, a town of 5000 lying 30 miles outside of Rome, issues from the fact that since the 1948 elections it has regularly led the rest of Italy in voting the Communist ticket. *The Searchers* tries to assimilate information that will explain this decisive dominance of the Left. The attempt to put together a "human document of happenings . . . over the past fifty years" is indeed admirable. Naive and self-defeating, however, is the attempt to do this by interviewing, in the space of three months (in 1961), no less than "old aristocrats, fascists, communist idealists, communist practitioners of power, Churchmen, Christian Democrats, bourgeoisie, youth," and, for good measure, "representatives of the old civilization."

Anyway, apart from the textbook observations on the passing of the old ways, and the customary nuggets about alienation among youth, two interesting facts emerge. Surprisingly, neither arises from the Communist experience. The first concerns the inadequacy of the Christian Democratic party, both as a political-moral rallying point and an administrative arm. Even those who most want to believe in the Christian Democratic party and have the most to offer it—the young professional class—are repelled by its corruption. The result is a disaffected and pitiable group, turned off from both Church and politics, only too conscious of the self-debasing consequences of their position. ("We lose no sleep over Italy or the town which we love, Castelfuoco," writes the young lawyer, Piero Riservetti, trapped by the "loneliness, disgust and meaninglessness of our social system.")

The second interesting note concerns the continuing hold and fascination of Fascist ideology. Espoused openly and candidly by Fascists of varying classes and mentalities, it finds its most respected speaker in the aristocratic Patriottini, a former Fascist general, consul, and friend of Mussolini, who is now the town's leading dignitary. Sounding as if he hailed from Arizona, not Castelfuoco, Patriottini sermonizes on the moral decay rampant in Italy, recalling the days when Fascism was a symbol of order, discipline, and high moral standards ("the morality of the regime was such that if a pocketbook were lying on the ground, you could almost be certain it would remain there untouched . . ."). He concludes by prophesying that "it is just a question of a few years until Fascism comes back." The easy candor of Patriottini, the venerable position he holds in the town, the small band of followers that surround him (including some semi-

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skilled workers), all suggest a flame that was never quite extinguished (and perhaps never will be).

The most successful portions of *The Searchers* occur when the actors are given time on the stage. The most vivid account is by Spartaco Lotta, a bricklayer's son, formerly a Resistance fighter and now a top Communist. Lotta is an impressive example of intellectual and worker, Party man and Party critic, idealist believer and realist sceptic. Although his story about the rise and fall of the God of Communism has been narrated before (and most eloquently by a fellow countryman, Ignazio Silone), it nevertheless compels our interest:

> Who knows how many times I have thought about the contradictions of our movement and wanted to send everything and everybody to the devil! But I have always stayed "orthodox." How could I forget the horrors of fascism and the Nazis, my father's protest against injustice, my *compagni* with whom I fought in the Resistance, some of whom are no longer here, a lifetime of insults against fighters who seek a better life? For thousands of people like myself these are the things that are important. True, you can say that communism has reduced the dignity of some people, with its pettiness and the hundreds of objections to its details. These have dirtied its mission. But when you have become "married" you overlook some of the truth, you are a bit like a child.

More powerful yet is the merciless knowledge of the alternatives that confront him:

> So if I leave the party, where do I go? I enter the "solitude." Compared to the emptiness outside the party, the evils within are small. The comrades who have withdrawn become lonely individuals blown by the wind, divorced from their friends with whom they fought great battles in war and peace, cut off from a great ideal, cold-shouldered by the party itself, where they spent the best years of their lives.

What is implied here about Castelfuoco is amply demonstrated in the surrounding text, namely, the moral and political vacuum that engulfs the city. The decline of Communist fervor, after the failure of the Church, Fascism, and history, is notable mainly for its swiftness. The difference between a vote for Communism in Castelfuoco just after the war, and one now, lies in the degree of conviction it symbolizes. From all classes in the town we witness evidence of emptiness and fatigue, people parading about aimlessly in Antonioni streets. The sense of futility is evoked most emphatically by the Mayor, who was himself a staunch Fascist during the war and now calls himself a Communist.

Obviously, it would be imprudent to use Castelfuoco as a model upon which to construct large and definitive generalizations. But the knowledge of a center fallen apart, of a purpose gone astray, that pervades every honest confession (Communist and non-Communist) in the town, is a theme familiar enough to all of us. Writing in his *Notebooks* some 20 years ago, Camus said, "There is a whole civilization to be remade." Enlightened Castelfuocans, of every political stripe, still feel this need acutely. Their painful groping for a "new humanism" echoes Camus' words, and it is not very different from most of the groping in the West.

If this book tells us anything, it

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reminds us of the dangers and consequences of losing faith in politics at times of setbacks and crises. In this sense it is especially useful for us here in America, who, at this moment, are more aware than ever of the debasement of our government and its institutions. For it is not through despair and cynicism that the situation will be improved. On the contrary, it is through people coming together once again, through the pain of *political* reconstruction, that despair can be diminished. It is the task of the democratic Left to reaffirm our belief in politics. *The Searchers* is another of those books that, by charting the course of past failure, can help us to define the road ahead more carefully.

ALAN LELCHUK

Charted Journey through Theories of Deterrence

DEADLY LOGIC: THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, by Philip Green. Ohio State University Press; a publication of the Social Science Program in National Security, Mershon Center. 361 pp. $6.00.

This is a work of humane scholarship, in a field of overwhelming importance, which it would be hard to overpraise. Professor Green has obviously read virtually the whole literature of this field, at least in English, and his bibliography alone is worth the price of admission. His study is documented with almost 50 pages of notes, and it represents a quality of scholarship which in these days is rare. Nevertheless, the text is readable, it is as objective as the nature of the subject allows, and it will unquestionably become a standard work of reference for any future author in the field.

It would be too optimistic to say that Professor Green has written the last word on the great debate on nuclear policy which has been going for the last 20 years in an atmosphere of such intense intellectual radiation that the main product has been nausea. He has, however, summarized and clarified the issues in a way that should make every future student of this subject grateful. He minces no words, translates the technical gobbledygook into English and at the end of the book this reviewer, at any rate, felt that a great intellectual swamp had been drained.

The structure of the book is straightforward; after an introduction on the idea of nuclear deterrence, there is a chapter which is essentially an analysis of the work of Herman Kahn, disposing once and for all of the pseudo-scientific rhetoric of the high priest of the Air Force, yet also recognizing the very great service Mr. Kahn has done for us, and the frequently profound insights which lie behind the

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rhetoric of the propaganda. The next chapter, which is on game theory and national policy, deals with the uses of game theory as rhetoric rather than a science and exposes many of the underlying moral assumptions behind it. In the following chapter, this theme is expanded to take care of Thomas Schelling, who is taken apart with kid gloves but admirable finesse. The next two chapters deal with deterrence rationality, one with decision-making, and the other with ethical choice. The idea that there can be scientific decision-making in the absence of both political and ethical choice is attacked mercilessly, while due acknowledgement is given to the value of operations research and like rituals at lower levels. A concluding chapter makes an eloquent plea for what might be called a total political and ethical approach to these problems, in which agendas can be widened to include human decency and survival.

A good deal of the argument of this book is also contained in Anatol Rapoport's *Strategy and Conscience*, and perhaps Green's greatest contribution is the exhaustive literary scholarship with which he documents his argument. I must confess that I emerged from this work with greatly increased respect for the value of what is often regarded as "old-fashioned" scholarship. There is an impressive quality about exhaustive documentation which no amount of undocumented brilliance can match.

Within the limits of his method, Philip Green has done a job which could hardly be bettered. This is not to say, however, that there is nothing else to be done. Green has put his finger unerringly on the fatal weakness of strategic thinking, which is that it operates in only a subset of the total social system and operates, furthermore, with an extremely narrow moral agenda. The task of expanding the analysis to include the total social system is yet to come, and one should certainly not blame Green for not performing it. He does not, however, develop a really adequate theory of the role of the threat system in the total dynamic of society, and as a result he does not have an adequate theory even of the concept of deterrence as a general phenomenon in society. However, as none of the deterrence theorists have an adequate theory either, Green is hardly to be blamed for this, and his critical acumen and insight is certainly adequate for the demolition job which he set himself to do.

The fundamental fallacy of deterrence can be stated almost in a sentence. While it may be stable in the short run it cannot possibly be stable in the long run, simply because there must be a positive probability of its failing or it would fail to deter. We can see this very clearly if we ask ourselves what would happen if the probability of a nuclear weapon going off were zero. In that case, nuclear weapons would clearly fail to deter anybody from anything and they might as well be dismantled. If, however, there is a positive probability of nuclear weapons going off, if we wait long enough, they will go off. If the probability of nuclear war were only 1 per cent per annum, which seems about the right order of magnitude, if we accumulate this for 100 years,

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the probability becomes frighteningly large. Consequently, one thing we can say for certain about a system of deterrence is that it cannot survive, for after it has broken down, it is never set up in the form in which it existed before. Certainly, after a nuclear war, if anybody survives at all, we are not likely to set up the system that produced it.

The real question is, therefore, how do we use the short-run stability which a system of deterrence provides to change the system sufficiently so that deterrence will not be necessary. In order to know how to do this, we must know a great deal more about what I have elsewhere called the "integrative system" which deals with such matters as the dynamics of the rise of community. For the only real answer to deterrence is community, yet on the whole we tend to take community for granted rather than as a problem to be solved.

All this, however, is a task for the future. In the meantime, Philip Green is to be much congratulated, and one should extend these congratulations also to the Mershon Center, for which, I am sure, the publication of this book required a certain act of courage. The untimely death of Edgar S. Furniss, who directed the Mershon Social Science Program in National Security, is a grievous loss, and this book in a way is his finest memorial.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

THE YOUNG PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST LEAGUE

YPSL is the organization of American youth and students who are committed to the ideals of democratic socialism. Current programs include:

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- mobilizing young people behind the Freedom Budget
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LETTERS

The Oswald Case

EDITORS:

In his article "Let's Talk Sense About Oswald," in the March–April 1967 issue, Henri Rabasseire suggests that much credit must be given to the Warren Report because the case for Oswald has been built on material contained in the Report —presumably, in the 26 volumes of Hearings and Exhibits. Mr. Rabasseire seems to assume that the Warren Commission, in a spirit of fairness, purposefully published evidence inimical to its own assertions and conclusions. That is not so. My personal conversations with Commission lawyers or expert witnesses, as well as comments by such spokesmen to my colleagues among the critics, indicate that the Commission and its legal staff are surprisingly unfamiliar with the contents of the 26 volumes and certainly with the last five volumes of exhibits not read into the record during testimony by witnesses.

The published record indicates that the Commission's investigation was so hurried and careless that on one occasion a lawyer asked a witness, "Was there an E. V. Brown?" and the witness had to reply, "That's me." (VI, p. 232.)

It seems abundantly clear to me, as it must be to any close student of the record, that documents containing information embarrassing or contradictory to the Warren Report were published in the Hearings and Exhibits without awareness of their compromising character, not in spite of it.

Mr. Rabasseire further suggests that it is unfair and erroneous to quarrel with the Commission's method, arguing that the Commission acted properly in refusing to grant Mark Lane the right of cross-examination. I must reject the argument that it was proper to exclude the adversary procedure in any genuine search for the truth. The Commission itself capitulated, belatedly, to that imperative when it appointed the President of the American Bar Association to assume some vague responsibility with respect to the fairness due the accused assassin. This compromise was worse than useless—the gentleman in question (and his "representatives") in no way fulfilled the role of defense counsel. Moreover, it introduces a principle that is wholly unacceptable, indeed, unthinkable—that counsel for the defense may be selected by the prosecution, judge, or jury, or any combination of parties other than the accused or those who argue his innocence.

But over and above these considerations, the real point is that the Commission refused *its own lawyers* the right to cross-examine particular witnesses whom the lawyers considered to have engaged in perjury or other untruthfulness. Not only was permission to cross-examine requested by them and denied by the Commission but the witnesses in question were cited in the Warren Report as credible witnesses, and their testimony was given great weight in the presentation of evidence against Oswald. An account of this denial of the right of cross-examination, not to Mark Lane but to the Commission's own legal counsel, is found in *Inquest*, by Edward Jay Epstein, Viking Press, New York, 1966, pp. 96–97 and 135–136. Time does not permit me to comment on other parts of Mr. Rabasseire's article, which are also vulnerable in fact or in logic.

SYLVIA MEAGHER

Social Work

EDITORS:

Having belatedly read the piece by Bensman and Rosenberg, "Administrative Liberalism and the War on Poverty" (Nov.–Dec., 1966), I object to the wild attack on the social work profession.

It is not true, as implied, that social workers played any decisive role in the drawing up of the basic current welfare programs—either the Social Security Act of 1935 or the Economic Opportunity Act. The "administrative liberal" responsible was not "basically a social worker." If our two critics had taken the trouble to familiarize themselves with current social work literature on poverty they would uncover these themes among others:

Poverty is primarily a societal problem,

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not one caused by personal insufficiencies;
The means test in public assistance is degrading and should be abolished;
Poverty should be abolished by one or more of the following—guaranteed employment, negative income tax, demogrants, new social insurance programs for such hazards as loss of paternal support.

We are even blamed for Moynihan, not a social worker at all. The only article in *Social Work*, the professional journal, about his approach was highly critical. ("Is there a 'Breakdown' of the Negro Family?" by Elizabeth Herzog, *Social Work*, January, 1966.)

The authors argue that the poor tend to be alienated and apathetic but they object to "outsiders" who attempt to help them organize. What the hell do they want? Shall we leave the poor alone so that certain ivory-tower types can write learned dissertations on these quaint people in their pristine state?

The social work profession, more than any other profession, has been concerned with the problems of low-income people—even before poverty became "in."

REUEL S. AMDUR

Russia, Another View

EDITORS:

The rather depressing report on the U.S.S.R. which Stanley Plastrik presented in the January–February 1967 issue of DISSENT invites a somewhat different view by another traveler to the "land without Soviets" in the summer of 1966. As historians (and colleagues at the same institution) I think we both recognize the perils of subjectivity and bias as indigenous to our craft—indeed to any discussion of human beings as social animals. That my version of a similar set of "facts" is at variance with his should occasion no surprise. His remarks were candid, thoughtful, and well stated, and my own are intended more as an alternative interpretation than a reply.

My impressions were obtained on a twenty-four day tour of the Soviet Union, chiefly of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Volgograd, Rostov, Sochi, and Tbilisi. The trip was oriented toward sight-seeing and took place under the paternalistic auspices of Intourist and their English-speaking guides. Hotel accommodations were comfortable or better, and unlike Dr. Plastrik I had no difficulty turning off the radio. Nor did the Russians who visited my hotel room bother to turn up the volume to circumvent possible "bugging." Having been led to expect a mediocre and monotonous diet, I was pleasantly surprised by its variety and quality. Of course, the average Russian would find the food—generally eaten at major hotels—prohibitively expensive for everyday fare. Tours were provided in each city, but I made a point of extensive explorations on my own. I detected no sinister characters lurking on my trail—though conceivably they were more skilled than the operatives who haunted Dr. Plastrik. In Leningrad (still the most sophisticated of Russian cities) I was waylaid several times by Russians who spoke a bit of English and apparently recognized me as a foreigner because of my alien-looking apparel. Dollars rather than clothing were the items in demand, but the rate of exchange was not particularly tempting and suggests that the black market may have lost some of its old-time vigor. Teenagers offering cheap souvenir pins for chewing gum or ball-point pens were much more pervasive at tourist sites than black marketeers.

The housing shortage, an acute problem since World War II, has been considerably relieved by prefabricated apartment units (usually five to eight stories high) that stretch for miles on the outskirts of the major cities. Many of these dwellings are drab and the quality of construction, especially in buildings dating from the Stalin era, leaves much to be desired. But at the present time, quantity—a small apartment for every family—is the main goal. Few wooden structures remain in Moscow and Leningrad, and the newer public buildings are far more attractive than the ornately pretentious "Stalin baroque" that prevailed for some years after the dictator's death. Substandard housing is still abundant, however, and I noticed housewives in parts of Rostov obtaining water from community pumps. Nevertheless, slums and the attendant "culture of

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poverty" that seem endemic to the American metropolis were notably absent.

If "public squalor and private affluence" is a stereotype applicable to the U.S., the reverse could be said to prevail in Russia. Clean streets, broad boulevards, flowered esplanades, spacious parks, and elaborate buildings for educational and recreational purposes are typical of Soviet cities. Free medical care and free education (often with stipends) through the postgraduate level are other services that must be considered in comparing Soviet living standards with those of the West. The Kremlin leaders still view public investment rather than private consumption as the most important sector of the economy. The military establishment and space technology take a disproportionate share of resources that might otherwise provide cheaper automobiles and well tailored suits, but the government has had the wisdom or good luck to avoid the kind of foreign policy fiasco represented by Vietnam.

Despite substantial progress in the area of civil liberties in the past decade, Russia is ruled by a party oligarchy fearful of breaking away from the Stalinist legacy of intellectual obscurantism. Perhaps they recall only too vividly the Pandora's box that Khrushchev opened with his famous anti-Stalin speech of 1956. Western newspapers and journals, except those of Communist orientation, are not on public sale, and even the libraries eschew ideologically tainted publications. Large collections, such as the Lenin State Library in Moscow, include Western books and other banned materials inaccessible to the general public. I was given an impressive-looking library card after some delicate negotiations. The card catalog of Western authors listed my 1954 monograph involving Russian diplomacy in 1917–18 but not my 1963 history of Soviet foreign relations or any other work on the Soviet regime, even the most sympathetic. But I understand that a special catalog of proscribed books is available for those with proper credentials.

A "cultural underground" certainly exists, but I think Dr. Plastrik overemphasizes its significance. We appear to agree that it does not constitute a political opposition, although in an amorphous way it forms a small portion of the technological and bureaucratic elite that the Party leaders must satisfy in the long run. The overwhelming majority of Russians—as of citizens elsewhere—are politically passive. Of the increasing number who have had some college-level education, virtually all, I should judge, accept the fundamentals of the Soviet system.

But within this group there is a strata of intellectual "idealists" (or malcontents, depending on one's point of view) who are openly critical of many aspects of their society and are roughly comparable to the civil rights advocates in the United States, especially before the "black power" movement, or to the militants opposed to the war in Vietnam. Obviously, in contrast to their American counterparts, they have few opportunities for open dissent.

The recent abstract art show in Moscow was presumably sponsored by the artistic intelligentsia that emerged briefly from a semi-underground existence. We may anticipate further "surfacing" in the future. I found the Hermitage collection of French impressionists and postimpressionists well attended, nor did it strike me that these galleries were located in a "remote part of the building." Important is that the authorities have removed most of the "poster art" mandated by Stalin (and all of his portraits and busts) and have permitted other than "academic" paintings in the major art museums.

In sum, my conclusions are less gloomy than those of Dr. Plastrik. Far from dull, the Soviet Union was a diverse and even fascinating country. The economic level of the average citizen has been steadily improving, and the nagging problem of low agricultural productivity seems to have been solved with the bumper harvest of 1966. The development of a Western-style democracy is highly unlikely, but further political and cultural liberalization is almost inevitable, assuming peaceful relations with the United States and China.

ROBERT D. WARTH

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Jerry DeMuth

GE: PROFILE OF A CORPORATION

Early in 1960, when the big price-fixing indictments against General Electric were made, Ralph J. Cordiner, GE board chairman, called the resulting publicity a "blow upon the company's good name. But this situation will pass," he added, "as have other unfortunate situations."

There have been many other such "unfortunate situations." GE's record includes, besides price-fixing and other antitrust activities, anti-union efforts and ties with the right wing.

GE was a defendant in an antitrust case as far back as 1911, when the company was only 19 years old. Since that time it has been a defendant in 64 additional government antitrust cases, 49 of them in the last 10 years. The Justice Department referred to "GE's proclivity for persistent and frequent involvement in antitrust violations" in early January 1962, when it unsuccessfully asked for a court order to forbid GE's fixing of prices.

Price-Fixers Since 1911

Back in 1911 a federal court held that GE had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by fixing prices and eliminating competition with respect to light bulbs by concealing its stock ownership of ostensibly independent companies and using tie-in contracts and other agreements. GE then gained control of a patent from two Viennese scientists and fixed prices and divided markets under cross-licensing agreements. But this still wasn't good enough for the company.

In 1932 a GE engineer's report told how GE had reduced the life of its flashlight bulbs by one third, so that they would last as long as two instead of three batteries. Then he added, "We have been continuing our studies and efforts to bring about the use of one battery life lamps. . . . If this were done, we estimate that it would result in increasing our flashlight business approximately 60 per cent."

A former GE vice-president, T. K. Quinn, admitted that "from the beginning of the electric lamp industry, freedom of enterprise in manufacture and sale has been restricted by GE. The effect has been to keep prices and profits up and investment down."

No wonder, then, that light-bulb profits carried the whole company during the Depression, even enabling GE to pay dividends, although the volume of bulb sales was only about 10 per cent of the GE total sales volume.

In 1959 TVA authorities protested GE's high prices on turbines and

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showed that, even excluding labor costs, prices were higher than the competing British product. GE lowered its turbine prices but immediately raised the prices of its light bulbs.

GE was convicted of monopolizing electric bulbs in 1949. Suits against the company, totaling $104 million, were eventually settled for $1.395 million.

On April 4, 1937, GE, Allis-Chalmers, Westinghouse, and two other firms were ordered by the Federal Trade Commission to "cease and desist" from acting to maintain uniform turbine generator prices. As the convictions of the same companies less than seven years ago for similar charges showed, GE did not "cease and desist."

GE resumed price-fixing on what has perhaps been its most ambitious scale around 1954. In 1953 GE boycotted price-fixing, which had begun when OPA was discontinued after World War II, because some companies were undercutting others. GE resumed its rigging in 1954, a year in which sales had slumped. In 1955, although GE's sales continued to drop, the company earned a profit of $212,613 million.

Price-fixing was GE's private face. In an article in the July 1954 issue of *American Magazine,* Philip D. Reed, chairman of the board, revealed GE's public face. Writing of a talk with a cab driver, Reed said, "I told him that in any modern business you must move forward, take risks, and yes, stick out your neck if you want to lead rather than follow in your field. At my company," he emphasized, "we see 10 golden years ahead."

Those golden years were cut short in 1960, when GE was named as defendant in 37 antitrust suits. The government charged that GE and other companies worked out common prices, split up markets, and set up systems for rigging bids under which the companies involved took turns at making the low bid.

George E. Burens testified at Senate Trust and Antimonopoly Subcommittee hearings that in 1954 GE president Robert Paxton had suggested he meet with officials from Cutler-Hammer of Milwaukee to discuss prices. Paxton, who had referred to price-fixing as "optimum prices," resigned from the company in February 1961 because of "ill-health." Burens also said that Henry Van Erben, executive vice-president, told him the "only way to operate the apparatus business was to meet with competitors and set prices."

In August 1956 GE executives, including company vice-president W. F. Oswalt and executives from other electric manufacturing companies, moved into separate cabins at Camp Keystone, North Bay, Ontario. A messenger carried communications between them and when all was over, prices on heavy electrical control equipment increased by 10 per cent.

In 1958 there were eight meetings between executives and in 1959, 35 meetings. They used code names, assumed names, pay telephones, plain envelopes, and never contacted each other at company headquarters.

From 1951 to 1959 prices on generators, for example, rose 50 per cent. The Senate Small Business Committee announced that on one contract in 1959 GE had charged the Navy $82 per unit of carbon packing while a small company in Hackensack, New Jersey, had charged $15, representing an overcharge of 446 per cent.

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In the summer of 1959 a grand jury in Philadelphia began investigating price-fixing. The following February indictments against GE began. In 1962 the company's sales totaled close to $5 billion, and GE, which had already been fined $437,500, agreed to pay the government $7.470 million in damages. From 1962 to 1964 GE paid out over $150 million in damage suits filed by electric utility companies as a result of the 1960 indictments.

Earlier, Ralph Cordiner, who once served as head of the Commerce Department's Business Advisory Council, had said, "We don't think anybody's been damaged." And in the 1960 GE Annual Report, dated February 17, 1961, Cordiner wrote in his "Report on the Antitrust Cases": "Your management believes that purchasers of electrical apparatus have received fair value by any reasonable standards." Several weeks earlier, Cordiner had been named the National Association of Manufacturers' Man of the Year.

GE demoted, shifted, or cut the pay of 48 employees involved in antitrust violations, including 16 who were indicted and fined a total of $53,500. However, GE did not discipline its $125,000-a-year vice-president William S. Ginn who was one of three GE officials to spend 30 days in jail. Ginn, who was director of a boys' club in Schenectady and chairman of a campaign to build a new Jesuit seminary in Lenox, Mass., left GE of his own accord to become president of Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. at approximately $70,000 a year. A second indicted GE official became president of ITT Europe, Inc., and European general manager of ITT; a third became president of an earth-moving equipment company; a fourth became vice-president of a car-leasing company, and a fifth official a division manager of the Philco Corporation.

Identical bids continued. On December 14, 1960, less than a week after GE, Westinghouse, and others had pleaded guilty (with no contest) to price-fixing charges in federal court, TVA opened identical bids of $1,680.12 for lightning arresters from GE and Westinghouse. On January 5, 1961, TVA opened another set of identical bids for lightning arresters from GE and Westinghouse as well as identical bids of $2,208 for instrument transformers from the two firms. On January 12, both GE and Westinghouse bid $604.80 on current transformers, and on January 20 both bid $1,276 on overcurrent ground relays. On January 30, GE and *five* other firms all bid $4,274.50 on bus-type insulators, and in April GE and four other firms submitted identical bids on 11 different types of watt-hour meters to the city of Cleveland. Not only were bids continuing to be identical, but some prices were also rising identically.

"Sure, collusion was illegal, but it wasn't unethical," an "old GE hand" was quoted saying in the April 1961 issue of *Fortune*.

Industries Sue GE

Not only the Justice Department has initiated suits against GE. A suit filed in May 1933 by Tectron Radio Corp. charged that GE, RCA, and Westinghouse had restricted Tectron's use of its own radio tubes, and through conspiracy to monopolize trade the three firms had acquired control of over 4,000 patents. (During that year the Justice Department ordered GE

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to divest itself of its controlling stock in RCA and ordered GE company director Owen Young to resign as director of RCA.)

The Save Electric Company of Toledo, Ohio, also brought suit against GE and in February 1934 a federal judge ruled for Save Electric Co., declaring that GE's light-bulb patents were invalid. In March 1954 Save Electric Company brought another suit against GE, charging that $7 million had been lost in profits due to conspiracy and monopoly in light-bulb manufacturing.

In 1934 the Electric Machinery Manufacturing Company brought suit against GE for violating 15 of its patents covering operation and control of synchronous motors for a period of more than 10 years. In February 1936 a federal judge found GE guilty and ordered the company to pay court costs plus part of its profits. The amount GE eventually paid has not been disclosed, but it ran into the millions.

In November 1940 the United Lens Corporation of Detroit filed a suit against GE in Philadelphia for infringements of its patents on two filament headlight bulbs. In August 1944 Duro-Test Corporation and its subsidiary Tungsten Products Corporation instituted a trade monopoly suit against GE. The suit charged GE with controlling 90 per cent of electric lamps manufactured in the United States and asked that GE be rejoined and restore former prices. The suit was settled out of court by a compromise, according to Duro-Test attorneys.

In the same year that GE's profits were falling and the company resumed price fixing, the career of Ronald Reagan was also failing.

A New Career for Ronald Reagan

At one point Ronald Reagan was $18,000 in debt and had resorted to emceeing a Las Vegas night-club act in a desperate attempt to make money. Revue, an MCA subsidiary, suggested a weekly dramatic program to GE which was then looking for a new television show. Reagan would emcee the program, star in six of the plays each year, and spend a few weeks each year making personal appearance tours for GE.

GE Theater ran from 1954 to 1962, and Reagan visited all 135 GE plants during that time and spoke before innumerable civic groups. After the first year, Reagan was accompanied by George Dalen, an ex-FBI agent, who was put in charge of the tours and promotion for GE Theater. Reagan's tours changed. His Hollywood gossip shifted to dire talk of the "attempted take-over of the industry by the Communists." He spoke of the GE union that "suffers from Communist infiltration amounting to outright domination" and warned his audiences of "the swiftly rising tide of collectivism that threatens to inundate what remains of our free economy."

Now Reagan no longer spoke only before GE employees. Soon his tours were scheduled for three years in advance, with speaking engagements at Chamber of Commerce banquets, national conventions, high-school assemblies, executive clubs, and so on. Reagan recruited members for Young Americans for Freedom, helped plan Los Angeles Project Alert, appeared with Fred Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, made an anti-Medicare recording for the AMA, and was campaign chairman for John

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Birch Society supporter Lloyd Wright in the 1962 California GOP primary. He also was a featured speaker with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus and Dr. George Benson of Harding College at a joint meeting of the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce and the Associated Industries of Arkansas.

He kept attacking Social Security, federal aid to education, public housing, foreign aid, federal farm programs, and public power; and he called for the repeal of the income tax which he claimed was "spawned by Karl Marx." Reagan was always a representative of GE. They never indicated, he said, "I was singing the wrong song and should switch tunes."

The right-wing politics of Reagan and GE even carried over to GE Theater. In March 1962, for example, Reagan starred in a two-part program on Marion Miller, an FBI agent on whose testimony before HUAC right-wingers have capitalized (including her charges that the American Friends Service Committee was a belt line of the Communist conspiracy).

But the meeting at which Reagan shared the speakers' platform with George Benson was not the company's only contact with Harding College.

GE's Ties with Harding College

Harding College operates the National Education Program, with Benson as president and the same board of trustees as that of the college. NEP is mostly known for its film "Communism on the Map," produced by Bircher Glenn A. Green and widely used by the Birch Society, which contends that the only remaining non-Communist countries in the world are West Germany, Formosa, Switzerland, and the United States. NEP is under the supervision of Howard Bennett, a retired GE executive. While with GE, Bennett originated a plan to teach the "fundamental facts" about America's private enterprise system to GE's 280,000 employees and traveled from plant to plant setting up educational programs.

In a letter written March 25, 1961, in response to an inquiry to NEP, Bennett replied: "The General Electric Company uses the NEP films extensively in their many plants." He then gave a list of industrialists who recommend NEP, which included Ralph Cordiner and five other GE officials.

"It is a pleasure to endorse, without reservation, the National Education Program," G. Roy Fugal, GE's manager of employment practices, wrote that same year on GE stationary.

GE has also given money to Howard Kershner's Christian Freedom Foundation and to the Southern States' Industrial Council, a group that has fought organized labor, protects Southern wage differentials, and opposes anything federally supported. Lemuel Boulware, who developed GE's labor policies, is a leading contributor to Americans for Constitutional Action and the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists. GE official Russel E. White is a member of the senior advisory board of the American Security Council which was organized in 1955 to provide information on "Communist and other statist activities" and keeps a file on tens of thousands of Americans for industries to use.

In 1964 GE built a special communications network system for the two private planes of Barry Goldwater and

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William Miller so they could be in fast contact with their Washington headquarters, and Ralph Cordiner headed a committee to raise funds for Goldwater's campaign. More recently, John T. McCarty of GE has been active in the New York Conservative party.

Cooperating with Nazi Rearmament

GE's cooperation with the Far Right extended to Germany where the company worked closely with the firm of Nazi war criminal Alfred Krupp who was to serve six years of a 12-year sentence for using concentration-camp slave labor in his factories. In August 1940, while Nazi planes were bombing London and British planes were bombing Germany in retaliation, including the Krupp armament plants in Essen, GE was indicted by the federal government for conspiring with the Krupp corporation. GE was charged with and in October 1948 found guilty of conspiring with Krupp from 1928 to 1940 to achieve and maintain control of trade and commerce, to fix prices, eliminate competition, pool patents to restrict production, maintain a monopoly, and to impose restraints, limitations, and restrictions upon trade and commerce in hard metals. Although the Justice Department had asked for jail terms, arguing that fines were considered a license fee to be charged off as the cost of illegal business acts, GE, its two subsidiaries, and the three company officers involved were only fined a total of $36,000.

John Henry Lewin, Assistant to the Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, charged that GE's agreement with Krupp was "directly responsible for the disadvantage at which this country finds itself in comparison with its enemies" in the use and production of hard metals, mainly tungsten carbide.

The price of one hard-metal compound, according to the government, was $48 a pound. After Krupp and GE agreed that GE would set the price in the U.S., the cost sky-rocketed to $453 a pound, and at the time of the suit the price was still around $205 a pound. Two months after the government indictment, the price dropped to about $40 a pound.

Jay Jeffries, a GE vice-president and chairman of the board of the Carboloy Co., a GE subsidiary which manufactured the hard metals, stated that the $453-a-pound price tag wasn't excessive. But a letter by a GE engineer in GE's files said that the metal cost $8 a pound to produce. He suggested setting the price at $50 a pound for a "satisfactory profit."

Under terms of the agreement, GE would not compete with Krupp while Krupp controlled GE's licensing of additional manufacturers of the hard-metal compounds in the U.S. and collected royalties from GE. Krupp shipped the compounds to the U.S. until 1936, selling at the high prices set by GE, but the rest of the arrangement wasn't broken off until GE sent a cable to its international representative in Berlin on December 16, 1940.

Correspondence shows how GE referred business to Krupp. On August 8, 1939, GE advised a firm that "we are not in a position to make offers on Carboloy to the Russians." On April 18, 1940, a GE official wrote that the firm couldn't sell the hard metals to China. "You'll have to take your business to Germany," he advised.

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Agreements Extend to Five Continents

On January 18, 1945, while the Krupp indictments had been postponed until after the war, the Justice Department filed suit against GE and International GE, charging them with having made agreements, since 1919, with six companies in England, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Japan to divide the world into marketing areas, eliminate competition, and exchange patents and trade processes on an exclusive basis. Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, said that some agreements were still in effect during the war and that "without them the capacity to produce electrical equipment here would have been greater when the present war started." A vice-president of IGE explained that GE feared "a general lowering of prices of these products in this country" if there were competition.

Nine months later the government filed another antitrust suit against GE and Westinghouse and two of their subsidiaries, aiming, in Berge's words, at "extensive cartel activities" in Asia, Africa, South America, and Australia which had begun in 1931. GE, Berge explained, with Westinghouse and leading German, British, and Swiss manufacturers, conspired to form a cartel organization which acted as "a bid depository." The secretary of the cartel would decide to whom business was to be allocated. Prices were fixed, Berge said, and the company which was permitted to win the bid paid "compensation" that was divided among the members who did not receive the contract.

Although GE had illegal agreements with companies in countries the U.S. and its allies were fighting, two of GE's leading officials, C. E. Wilson and Ralph Cordiner, served as vice-chairmen of the War Production Board from 1942 to 1944. And while GE had seen nothing wrong with its cooperation with Krupp, even when the United States was at war with Nazi Germany, the company suddenly became very patriotic when Sen. Joseph McCarthy ran his investigations of alleged Communists.

Cooperation With McCarthy

When McCarthy shifted his investigation to industry, he began with GE, explaining on November 13, 1953, "Frankly, I hope that General Electric decides to can any employee who pleads the Fifth Amendment before this committee." After five days of hearings the company announced, on December 9, that it would "discharge from its employ all admitted Communists, spies, and saboteurs and will suspend employees who refuse to testify under oath on such matters when queried in public hearings conducted by government authority." With this policy, GE became the first non-governmental or non-institutional employer to have a "loyalty" program. McCarthy called GE's policy "fine" and said that the company "certainly should be commended" for it.

By March 1954 GE vice-president Lemuel Boulware was able to boast before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that the company had suspended 17 employees who had taken the Fifth Amendment. Back in the mid-1940s, while under government indictment for the Krupp conspiracy, Jay Jeffries, GE and Carboloy official, defining what he considered

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un-American, said that labor leaders had "un-American objectives." This was the beginning of GE's present labor policies which were developed by Lemuel Boulware and have become known as "Boulwarism." Boulware considered both major GE unions, the IUE and UE, "collectivist-minded." GE wanted, president Robert Paxton explained in February 1959, "responsible union leaders who will not only avoid unwarranted strikes and slowdowns, but will also be constructive in their economic and political teachings."

The Birth of Boulwarism

Boulware's policy was established in 1947, following a strike in which GE had attempted to hold firm with a 10¢-an-hour pay raise to UE members. GM and Westinghouse both had agreed to 18½¢, and finally GE was forced to fall into line. GE, which had abolished a pension plan in 1935 when the Social Security Act was adopted, was also forced to reestablish a pension plan for workers. GE, however, reduces its pension payments when Social Security payments begin or increase and has steadily reduced its own payments to the pension fund.

Workers' support of the 1946 strike and of the union caught GE by surprise. GE was also taken aback and frightened by the criticism it received during the strike from mayors, merchants, and editors, and by the clergymen who even had walked the workers' picket lines.

Boulwarism was developed so that GE would not have to give in to union demands again. In 1947 GE also abolished its bonus plan for employees, which had been established in the 1930's in an attempt to stem the tide of unionism. However, GE continued its bonus plan for executives. Under this plan company president C. E. Wilson, for example, in 1946 received a bonus of $90,000 above his base salary of $108,000.

"We decide what is fair," Boulware himself explained of his policy, "and stick to it. We don't go in for haggling." An NLRB trial examiner reported:

> It [GE] disparagingly refers to the "ask-and-bid" or "auction" form of bargaining as a "flea-bitten eastern type of cunning and dishonest but pointless haggling." Such bargaining . . . only serves, it says, to mislead employees into believing that union officials are useful in ways they are not, thus falsely enhancing the union's prestige while diminishing that of the employer and encouraging employee support of union shows of strength.

"General Electric seeks nothing less than to maintain total management control over the bargaining process," wrote Prof. Salvatore J. Bella of the University of Notre Dame in an unpublished study, "Boulwarism and Collective Bargaining at General Electric." Under Boulwarism, Bella pointed out, the power of unions decreased while the number of unionized workers increased and unions had to retreat on their demands and sometimes capitulate totally to the firm.

Because of GE's decentralization and the fact that it manufactures such a wide variety of products, strikes have little power. Also, less than half of GE's 250,000 employees are unionized

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with 70,000 in IUE, 10,000 in UE, and the remainder in some 100 other bargaining units. GE has also been able to play competing unions, IUE and UE, against each other to its own benefit.

In 1957, before Boulware retired, GE brought in Jack S. Parker as Boulware's successor and retained Boulware as Parker's consultant to provide continuity in labor policy. During that year, IUE tried to reach an overall automation agreement with GE. In April, GE agreed to study the problem and then to discuss it with the union, but by July IUE still was waiting. IUE wrote to the company, and GE replied by saying there wasn't anything to talk about. In August, GE finally agreed to hold a meeting on automation, but that meeting was never held.

GE Refuses to Change Policies

In April 1963 an NLRB trial examiner upheld IUE's unfair labor charge that Boulwarism was a "take it or leave it policy" and in December 1964 the NLRB itself upheld the trial examiner's report and found GE guilty of unfair labor practices. After the NLRB trial examiner issued his ruling, GE vice-president Virgil Day declared that GE "will approach and conduct this year's negotiations with over 100 unions in the same spirit and with the same approach as in the past years' negotiations."

The IUE, UAW, and Steelworkers filed charges of bad-faith bargaining in 1963 against GE. These charges were still pending before the NLRB as of February 1967.

NLRB trial examiner Arthur Leff found that even before negotiations began GE was discrediting union leaders and presenting its case directly to its employees. After negotiations began, GE put into effect for non-union workers the wages and benefits contained in its offer to IUE, although in the past GE had never given non-union workers benefits offered to union members until after a new union contract had been signed. But in 1960, before negotiations had begun, the company had told plant managers: "Show how employees not represented by unions get their wages and benefit improvements without possible delay of waiting for union acceptance."

GE also, in Leff's words, "rejected, ignored, or brushed aside" requests for cost or other information relating to holiday and vacation proposals, income extension aid, supplementary unemployment benefits, pensions, and insurance. Under the National Labor Relations Act companies are obligated to make pension and insurance costs available to the union but, out of six requests, GE only fulfilled two, and those only after the strike had ended.

At a meeting on September 27, 1960, GE's Union relations manager, Moore, told the IUE president "You'll get the information when we get it, or if we feel we should get it for you." When the union asked Moore how many workers would benefit from income extension aid, Moore gave his reply: "Somewhere between zero and 100 per cent." Leff stated that although GE was not talkative with union leaders, it was talkative with its employees. GE, he found, "advanced arguments not only more full but different from those presented to the union negotiators at the bargain-

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ing table" and "criticized to employees the Union's demands before first discussing them with the Union."

GE communicated with workers at plant meetings, through supervisors, and by means of plant newspapers, reports, bulletins, leaflets, letters, press releases—and newspaper, radio, and television advertisements. (GE conveniently owns radio and television stations in Schenectady.) In Waterford, letters were even sent to the homes of neighbors of GE employees. The communications, Leff found, reached "flood proportions."

GE Threatens Workers

At the Augusta, Ga., plant, GE refused to reinstate 20 striking employees and hired replacements for them. At the Waterford plant, employees were told by letter that "a strike would wipe out indefinitely all of the 75 new jobs created . . . since . . . 1958. It would also bring about a direct reversal of promotions, and result in a great many downgradings in reassignment."

At Lynn, GE's largest and oldest plant, foremen warned workers that the plant might be closed down if there was a strike. The company explained to supervisors that "the Company has more and more in recent years looked to the South and the West for its growth and expansion."

GE also bargained directly with employees and union locals and in some cases offered terms and conditions different than those offered in national negotiations. Leff concluded:

> There can be little doubt from the totality of its conduct that the Respondent [GE] was determined . . . merely to go through the motions of bargaining in the conference room and to rely entirely on the effectiveness of its direct "sales" approach to employees to resolve the bargaining issues in its favor. . . . Respondent virtually stated as much. . . .

On December 16, 1964, the NLRB found GE guilty of unfair labor practices and issued 11 orders to the company, including to rehire the Augusta workers, supply the union with the information it had requested, and to refrain from bargaining with locals or offering locals separate terms.

In May 1965 when workers at the Wayneboro, Virginia, GE plant voted to join UE, GE challenged the vote in an attempt to prevent the NLRB from certifying UE as the collective bargaining agent. The NLRB dismissed GE's objections in September and certified UE, but GE still told the union in a letter that "it cannot recognize or bargain with UE." Late in 1966 the NLRB ruled in favor of UE for the third time, this time ordering GE to bargain with UE. GE then appealed the ruling to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

In early 1964 GE even threatened to shut down its Schenectady plant unless the union agreed to shift 3,000 employees from piece rates to day rates. The resulting pay cut would have averaged $60 a week per worker. The plant employed 5,000, and 3,700 additional workers in Schenectady depended upon those 5,000 jobs.

The union did not agree, and GE began cutting pay on its own on July 13. In October GE and the union, UE, finally reached an agreement whereby workers would be given "transition" pay for four years so they could adjust

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and the company would begin a new incentive plan under which 250 workers would return to piece work in the next five years.

To make sure that employees at the Schenectady plant worked just as hard for less pay, GE installed what it termed "a modern industrial tool, closed circuit television." A television monitor was placed in the office of the general foreman who kept in touch with foremen by a direct telephone hook-up.

GE's eflorts in Schenectady, company vice-president Donald E. Craig explained, was an attempt to prove "we could be able to do everything in Schenectady we could do in the South."

The South has been an especially attractive spot for GE since the mid-1950's; the company, of course, has long been attracted to such low-wage areas. At the end of World War II, for example, GE abandoned a number of war plants and spent over $91 million building seven new plants in small-town low-wage areas.

In June 1953 Ralph Cordiner announced that the South would soon become a major center of GE's operations. Two years later, when GE opened its twelfth Southern plant, Raymond W. Smith, GE general manager, said, "It is in this area that great future growth is forecast."

In 1958 Cordiner and 18 other GE directors toured the South. Speaking in Atlanta, Cordiner explained why the South was becoming a major area for GE. "Right-to-work legislation very definitely is a factor," he said, "in deciding where General Electric plants are built. General Electric has a very firm stand in favor of right-to-work laws because we are interested in the rights of individuals."

The individuals whose rights General Electric is interested in are its own officials and major stock-holders, not the American worker or the American consumer. Profiteering is still the most important GE product.

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